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 Historically, Spain has been a country of emigration, not immigration.  Up until 
the early seventies Spaniards themselves were those that emigrated to other parts of the 
world, mainly to the Americas and other European destinations.  Spanish Emigration 
declined from the early 70s almost directly in conjunction with 1973 oil crisis.  In the 
early nineties, emigration from Spain became an almost non-existent practice through to 
the present time although there has been a slight but steady increase of about 200,000 
Spanish emigrants since 2002 to 2008.  Even so, the increase of immigration in Spain 
has been exponential since the year 2000. 
Coinciding with EU entry in 1986, immigration in Spain steadily increased, 
fueled by extreme economic growth and job creation in the 1990s and into the new 
millennium, right up until the recent world economic crisis.  The greatest increase was 
noted between 2000 and 2007 where the increase in immigrants both legal and illegal 
reached approximately 10.4% of the total population while in 2000 it was only 2.3% of 
the total population.  As a result of the turn from an emigration country to an 
immigration country in the recent decade or two, Spain has found itself in a position 
where its adjustment to such demographic change has become more than necessary, but 
indeed critical.  Up until the mid nineties when government bodies were first formed to 
address the phenomenon, policy towards immigration in real or skeletal form was non-
existent as there was truly no need for it.  As time went by, the sheer numbers of 
immigrants entering the country through documented or undocumented channels forced 
the Spanish government to act in several ways: amnesty being one of them, as well as 
barriers to further immigration that was not based upon economic need, and a continued 
focus upon the idea of integrating those that have become perceived permanent 
members of the Spanish society as a whole.  Integration being the popular and unclearly 
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defined term of the day, before setting out its intents and limits, several other terms 
should be brought forth first. 
First of all, the term immigrant should be defined as anyone who is residing 
outside his/her original national borders.  Within such a wide category there other sub-
categories: temporary residents (working or on extended holidays or retirement) with a 
finite idea as to the length of stay; residents that initially may think themselves to be 
temporary residents and then become permanent; and permanent residents that see 
themselves as settling in for the long-term.  Unfortunately, the same type of residency 
card, or certificate in the case of EU members, is given out to all except in the case of 
immigrants involved in temporary work programs who may not have access to a normal 
residency card on a permanent basis because of the irregular stay involved in their work 
timetable.  Generally though, those that are targeted for further integration into any 
society are those that wish to stay, without taking into account those from EU countries 
since they are allowed as EU residents to enter and leave as they please, with the 
exception the overlap of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens that have been stripped of the 
label of third-country residents (immigrant residents from countries outside the EU) to 
EU residents in 2007.  Their entry into the EU may be recent, but their involvement in 
associations that have been actively part of the development of integration policy with 
the Spanish government in the last few years still makes them part of the immigrant 
population targeted by integration policies.  So, with the exception of Romanians and 
Bulgarians, integration policy will be seen as directed to certain immigrants.  
Specifically, this is only part of the total immigrant population in the form of 30.5% 
from Latin America, 21% from Africa, (16% of that from Morocco), 6% from Asia, 
2.9% from the rest of Europe, and also including the 15% from Romania and 3% from 
Bulgaria as of 2007.  The other 21.6% of immigrants are either from the continent of 
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Australia labeled as Oceania, North America (not including Mexico), and along with the 
EU countries, are not the targets of integration policies for a number of possible 
reasons.  This could be for several reasons: either because their numbers are 
insignificant; they are considered to be already part of the European family; have access 
to their own resources that allow themselves to reside in Spain; or they are just 
temporarily visiting or working inside Spanish borders with no need or want to truly 
integrate themselves on a long-term basis. 
Secondly, the term integration itself will be defined as the following, 
disregarding individual country approaches to the contrary.  Essentially, it is comprised 
of the following points: one being the access to social benefits in the form of social 
security, medicine, unemployment, pension and education in the same venue and degree 
of any citizen; two being that the individual adapts to not just receiving benefits but to 
the responsibilities that come along with them such as paying one’s taxes; point three is 
access to extra aid and support in the form of allowing the individual to improve 
language skills, help if needed in employment insertion and open access to, and aid in,  
legal procedures etc.; fourth, an ability to move within the social web in an relatively 
equal manner constructed by free right to association and speech; leading us towards the 
fifth point of integration which is that of some sort of political involvement whether it 
be in the consultative sense or in the form of  direct suffrage.  Finally, all immigrants 
should have the possibility of applying for full membership in the form of naturalization 
procedures, if they choose to, once permanent residency has been established, while not 
being forced to completely assimilate if they do feel the need to.  In tune with a 
multicultural standpoint, there is no reason why they may not continue cultural practices 
within their home life and even celebrate publicly as long as they do not go against any 
basic laws of the host society.  Society must adapt along with the immigrant through 
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linguistic education and the upholding of all other laws that protect the rights and 
equality of its citizens.  In other words, an approach towards a sense of equal treatment, 
along with extra help in gaining such treatment in the form of legal, education and 
employment services temporarily needed in order to breech the gap between an 
informed citizen and an immigrant not completely adjusted to his/her surroundings.   
In order to further set out the context and towards answering the question as to 
whether Spain really has a clear and efficient integration policy for targeted immigrants 
as a whole, Part One of this study will deal with political science theories directed 
towards the evaluation of the concepts of membership, rights, citizenship, residency, 
civil society, and naturalization since such concepts cannot be ignored when faced with 
the their implications towards immigrant integration.  After such theoretical designs 
have been explored, especially that of the modern role of citizenship, examples of 
models of immigrant incorporation in European nations shall be briefly discussed, 
suggesting how such models could be applied to the integration policy in Spain in the 
present and near future.  Part Two is a historical treatment of Germany’s much longer 
experience as an immigration country, treatment of citizenship, naturalization policy, 
judiciary and political party standpoint as well as welfare and Immigrant Association 
experiences in a hope to add a wider European historical context of Spain’s very recent 
experience in regards to immigration.  Both countries have quite different outlooks on 
to how immigrant integration should be approached and in regards to evolutionary 
themes such as citizenship and integration policy, Germany has dealt with both 
simultaneously, making it a prime example of the treatment of both theoretical concepts 
within a European context.  Part Three returns to the Spanish model by going into the 
depths of its recent and present judiciary history as well as the functions and 
involvement of its Autonomous regions, including the analysis of the actual policy and 
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the involvement of various Immigrant Associations in the consultative representation of 
government bodies and institutions that have played a part in the production of said 
integration policy up until now. 
Most importantly is the efficiency and reach of such declared integration policy 
that is the focus of the study.  In other words, whether it currently measures up to what 
may be required in order to include and incorporate targeted immigrants into Spanish 
society and whether its promise has a future within a Spanish and European context.  
Broadly approached, associational involvement in institutions that allow limited access 
to the political process is only one aspect towards labeling Spain as a country with an 
outright and clear integration policy, while it should not be ignored as a window 
towards which one may view its efficacy in dealing with the very barriers that do not 
allow for immigrants to fully integrate themselves into their host society: lack of legal 
expertise, cultural misunderstandings, lack of language skills, or lack of proper access to 
social welfare either because it is denied or simply bogged down by a slow bureaucratic 
process.  Throughout the study, a normative political theory evaluation, supported by 
empirical data and statistics along the way, will be used to gain a sense of the theoretical 
approach Spain has defined, or on the contrary not defined clearly enough, in order to 
explain its plan to integrate its immigrant population—those they feel that are in need of 
such integration for the most part—as well as its form of implementation.  A political 
theoretical standpoint of integration policy as well as the concept of citizenship as 
membership will be explored, supported by a qualitative interviewing process in dealing 
with the Spanish approach towards integration in particular.    
Along the way one will begin to see, that while those involved may have it 
considerably clear as to what the Spanish government’s focus should be, and while the 
formal policy may truly allude to such a focus, its inconsistency in directly 
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implementing it and its lack of effectiveness in its coordination is more so reactionary 
than active.  Given, the demographic change has been extraordinary and the government 
has not had much time to react, but at the same time it has also been constantly in the 
midst of an economic growth that has up until now been a rather steady platform to 
stand upon, which could have enabled it to form a more active role. 
Still, the integration policy on behalf of the Spanish government is not all that 
lacking on paper.  In fact, all points towards the definition of integration are met to 
different degrees.  Still, the question as to whether such policy is effective in its 
implementation is a completely different matter, directly related to its liberal, bottom-up 
and therefore reactionary process of dealing with issues as they occur, as opposed to 
foreseeing actual difficulties.  Nonetheless, such disorganization does not mean that 
those implementing the Spanish plan for integration on a day-to-day basis do not share 
the same ideals objectives and endeavors.  Quite the contrary as the reactionary sense of 
implementation has allowed for focus upon the basic needs of the targeted immigrant 
population, mainly judicial, social welfare-orientated, and educational as each need has 
arisen and become a compound problem.  In fact, the extensive need has turned most 
organizations and associations into entities that branch out to aid any immigrant group 
or individual, regardless as to their nationality, when before they were much narrower in 
their objectives and audience. 
In answer to the proposed question of whether or not Spain has an immigrant 
integration policy— yes and no.  Yes, what it does have is a great necessity for it, and 
the very policy a direct result of such necessity forced on paper in a well-rounded plan, 
although unclear in its ultimate goal of complete inclusion of the immigrant population 
as full members in society as naturalized citizens.  No, in that its implementation does 
not reach its targeted population because of its lack of initiative and reliance upon 
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private entities that do not have the proper scope or organizational skills among them to 
address the integration process as a whole.  One cannot exactly fault them in the 
slightest since there really is not an active direction on the part of the government and 
they cannot possibly be expected to somehow come together in agreement when in 
reality the very government pits them against one another in competition for funds.  In 
other words, a policy does exist.  Nevertheless, it is simply a policy, not an effectively 
applied policy, since its implementation only reaches a small percentage of its targeted 
population. 
  
10 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Part One: A Political Theory Basis for 
the Citizen, Society and Immigrant 
Incorporation Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Citizenship and Immigrant Integration 
 
“Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community.  All 
who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the 
status is endowed.” 
—T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, p 18. 
 
 In order to actually address even the concept, let alone the policy and its 
implementation, of immigrant integration, membership into society must first be 
thoroughly explored and put into some sort of historical context.  One must be aware 
that citizenship in and of itself is the current title given to those that are seen as truly 
part of the workings of a society in regards to responsibilities and rights.  In modern 
times, liberal democratic nation-states may have opened the circle up wider to include 
women and minorities so as they might have full rights as citizens, not just in order to 
assume responsibility, but as full participants through suffrage; and the concept that 
basic rights should be allowed to people, in the form of human rights, not just as 
citizens, has come to be.  Even so, in practice, the permeating concept that full members 
are citizens has maintained itself even as populations fluctuate, moving and merging, 
sometimes fleeing, sometimes closing ranks as part of a migration process that 
supersedes borders as well as identity.  At the same time, the very first-world liberal 
democratic societies that are generally on the receiving end of migration, those with 
borders that seem to be all too permeable in most cases, are the very societies that have 
in the past come to pride themselves in their maintenance of certain theoretical 
standards.  Internally, the existence of present definitions of the rights and 
responsibilities allowed to full members of their communities has come about as the 
result of a process of circumstance, tied a to sequence of upheavals and gradual changes 
within the modern world, and leading up to the definition of equality and justice now 
held as evident in the same liberal democratic societies.  Eventually, it has been the 
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citizen that is truly guaranteed such rights and responsibilities, up until the 20th century 
when the concept of human rights first appeared for refugees and then immigrants, 
sometimes linked to naturalization, and sometimes not, swerving one way or the other.  
Basically, it seems that our definition of citizenship, our will to hang onto its meaning 
and its consequence, does not allow for exception to the rule.  Inclusion is inclusion and 
those outside its periphery either do not wish to enter the circle or are not even invited 
in until their very numbers demand such attention. 
 Eventually, this attention comes about in the form of a direct and straightforward 
immigration integration policy, a contradictory concept really, as it assumes that policy 
can be bring about integration in the first place just as a result of its very existence as 
such—most cases should more than likely be referred to as an immigration integration 
statement, not policy as policy implies effective implementation, considering that the 
definition of policy, political or otherwise, is a plan of action in the first place.   As 
such, any plan of action should be in concordance with basic concepts and definitions, 
such as the very idea of full membership: first, who is a citizen, who is not; second, 
those that are citizens are credited with certain guarantees and those who are not are not.  
Blurring the two, whether through intention or not does not seem to improve clarity; but 
instead create the sensation that differences are simply ignored, to be dealt with later 
only in the case that some conflict allows for their reactionary attention.  In the case of 
Spanish immigrant integration policy, such dismissal is clearly taking place, the 
assumption that differences can be blurred, not accurately accepted and as a result 
effectively addressed. 
 By insisting on the allowance of rights and responsibilities to all, while at the 
same time allocating full membership within the first two years of residence only to 
those considered to have cultural and historical ties, sends a message that some will 
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initially assimilate and that others may need ten years in order to do so.  Ironically, it 
may be those forced to wait their ten years to vote that, being aware of their obvious 
differences, are more willing to adjust to their surroundings, when those that expect to 
be welcomed with open arms as they return to the “mother country” are thrown into the 
same category, similar, but at the same time very, very different from the autochthonous 
population.  Therefore, while Spain outwardly seems to uphold the belief on paper that 
all those within its society are to be included, they obviously are not to the same degree 
regardless of their willingness to be so, transforming their integration policy into a 
reflection of pertinence, targeted towards those thought to become a permanent member 
but not in concordance with the reality of actual practice.  In other words, access for 
everybody to everything, but full membership only to some when in its very essence, it 
proclaims full membership as its aim.   
 And so, in order to tie integration policy into the concept of citizenship, 
maintaining that one cannot be discussed without the other either as contrast to 
integration in some cases or its aim in others, lets return   to focus upon the sequence of 
events that has allowed western societies to define who is a member and who is not in 
an effort to explore the origins behind present day inclusion and exclusion into liberal 
democratic societies.  Surprisingly it seems, historically the very reason behind the 
creation of citizenship itself has been the same reason behind immigration—paid labor. 
Beginning with the idea that man is no longer tied to the land and lord within an 
agrarian society, but instead an individual entity, paid for his labor instead of taken care 
of in exchange for his servitude, allowed for mobility not just as one exiled or expelled 
from one’s community, but as an individual setting out in search of work, pay and 
hopefully a better tomorrow.  As a result, choice of work begins the sequence of events, 
followed by increased civil freedoms, as well as political and then social. 
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Throughout the past two centuries, the existence of modern day citizenship has 
been the result of a process with the following developments being: civil freedoms of 
person, speech, thought, religion, choice of work and justice; political rights such as the 
right to participate in the exercise of political power either as a member or a voter in 
parliaments or councils; and social rights such as access to the social welfare state.  
According to Marshall, these three aspects of citizenship came about successively in 
that order beginning with civil rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the 
nineteenth and social rights on the twentieth century.  In regards to this thesis, when 
dealing with the rather large amount of third-country nationals present in Spain as well 
as other European countries, it is the third, social aspect of citizenship that seems most 
relative.  By and large, immigrant integration represents access to the social rights and 
responsibilities that have already been established as a result of political and civil 
upheavals in the past. 
 Even as the definition of citizenship, and the access to such citizenship changes 
as the result of demographic changes in each country, one must wonder as to its 
relationship with the idea of immigrant integration in the first place.  In other words, is 
it necessary?  If it is the a finite goal set forth as to measure one’s integration or full 
membership into society as its definition stands, then reality may not hold itself up to its 
policy.  In other words, is full integration into society considered to be full membership 
as a citizen or have we produced a second option, that of a limited version in the case of 
a permanent resident?  Within the European Union, it is encouraged to travel, live, work 
and play within borders that may not be one’s own nationality as a member of the 
European Union.  Next, enters the third-country national, the true transient, the 
economic immigrant looking for a better life for him/herself and family.  Are they 
expected to become full members as citizens?  It obviously makes their lives 
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bureaucratically easier in every sense of the word, but must citizenship and integration 
go hand and hand, even as access to such citizenship is still biased depending upon 
historical relationships between countries in the form of specific bilateral agreements in 
the example of Spanish naturalization processes?  Entire frameworks for their 
integration into society as permanent members have been set to paper, while European 
members are considered to already be integrated.  Overnight, Romanians and 
Bulgarians are no longer third-country nationals in need of integration policy on the 
same scale as before as their residency card is replaced with a residency certificate, soon 
to be equals to the English, French and German immigrant population in 2009—on 
paper.  But has their status really changed day-to-day?  Are they still economic 
immigrants or just simply accepted members of the European Union?  Is the pursuit of 
citizenship necessary for them now as a measurement towards their successful 
integration, or has their status has been upgraded and their bureaucratic worries 
lessened, has citizenship lost its luster for them?  Obviously, Spanish integration policy 
is still directed towards this population, particularly since they have taken part in its 
formation since the mid-nineties, but where does full membership come into the picture, 
as a full citizen, EU citizen, or simply as a permanent resident? 
Curiously, the term citizen is misused within Spain’s national Integration Policy, 
as its targeted population is referred to as immigrant citizens.  Not only does such 
terming of their role in society allow for increased inclusion, but it also allows a great 
deal of confusion, such blurring of supposedly clear definitions implies full membership 
while at the same time allowing such membership at different intervals for those of 
different backgrounds—discriminatory in its declaration of anti-discriminatory 
practices.  This confusion may be fueled by the government’s wish to allow for 
municipal electoral participation for permanent residents.  In fact, within the 
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constitution, the reciprocal exchange of the municipal vote between EU members could 
be extended to other nations in the near future, so as to include its immigrant citizens 
even further into their local settings.  While such reciprocal exchange may be difficult 
for nations to agree upon, especially with those nations that do not allow their own 
citizens the right to vote within their own borders, the blur between citizenship and 
integrated immigrant becomes even more evident—one cannot be spoken of without 
reference to the other.  In fact it seems that reference to immigrants as citizens, even 
though they are not, and supposed allowance of electoral participation is almost 
insulting in its superficial impossibility, allowing for the appearance of inclusion while 
in reality, only those that are generally included within such an experiment already have 
access to full membership anyway—those that could reciprocally vote are those that 
come from Latin American countries and have access not only to citizenship after two 
years of permanent residency but also dual citizenship—so why would they need yet 
another path towards further inclusion anyway?  Also, more and more, it seems that 
assigning rights and responsibilities to sections of the population is somewhat confusing 
without really assigning them the formal title of citizen as well. 
Ultimately, one must look back to the formation of citizenship, the process 
leading up to the rights that full membership allows in order to understand that it is the 
very end result of citizenship, and access to social rights, that recently has made the 
term citizenship an obscure title.  No longer is it all encompassing.  Now, whether or 
not such blind faith in that access to said social rights is forever guaranteed to them is a 
wise assumption or not, is a completely separate matter.  Allowing such a large part of 
society not to take part in the democratic process that its population puts such pride in, 
considering themselves to be shining examples of democratic equality throughout the 
world, well yes, that could contrast in an incongruent manner to the very principles that 
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such a society upholds, or claims to uphold.  Therefore, one must delve even further 
into the notion of citizenship, and more importantly, its evolution, in order to properly 
ascertain as to whether immigrant integration policy is directed to the formation of its 
targeted population—the third-country national as an economic, but permanent 
immigrant—into full participants and members of society.  Only then can the question 
be answered as to the existence and effectiveness of Spanish Immigrant Integration 
policy by addressing what it hopes to achieve and to whom. 
Already mentioned are the three aspects of citizenship that T.H. Marshall 
explained in his work, Citizenship and Social Class.  In regards to civil rights, legal 
residents in most countries do enjoy the majority of them: liberty of person, freedom of 
speech, thought and faith, right to own property, contracts and right to justice.  Still, not 
all of them necessarily enjoy the economic right to work, following the occupation of 
their choice, since some residence permits are restricted to certain professions in an 
effort to protect local employment in other sectors.  Political rights to participate in the 
exercise of political power, whether as a candidate or a voter, are simply not allowed.  
While some third-country nationals have the right to be heard in local councils and even 
federal institutions, individually or represented as a group, they still have no direct vote 
in the collective action in the parliamentary, democratic system.  Instead, they must rely 
upon third parties that are full members as citizens to represent their interests. 
 Simply, the only aspect of citizenship that third-country nationals have complete 
access to is the social rights that Marshall defined as economic welfare in the form of 
the educational system and social services.1  Curiously, it is this very characteristic of 
modern day citizenship that has developed just recently in the twentieth century.  Most 
importantly, one must not forget that Marshall’s analysis was an internal one.  In all 
                                                 
1 Marshall, T.H. Citizenship and Social Class, pg. 8. 
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actuality, it was designated for those that already were guaranteed membership within a 
nation-state.  In other words, Marshall could not have possibly considered the effect of 
modern mass migrations or such cultural diversity as a result.2  
In regards to political rights, it was in the nineteenth century they had very little 
or no part in citizenship rights.  This took place in the next century where political rights 
were independently attached to citizenship.  Still in the nineteenth century, political 
rights, while attached to economic achievement, did exist and were offered to all those 
who were able to “earn, to save, to buy property or to rent a house, and to enjoy 
whatever political rights were attached to these economic achievements.”3  Thus, once 
again we are brought back to the point of social rights which were originally guaranteed 
by membership of local communities and functional associations.  How then, did social 
rights begin to coincide with the rights of not just those in need, but the everyday 
citizen?  Marshall contends that such a change came about by the introduction of public 
education defined as “not the right of the child to go to school, but the right of the adult 
citizen to be educated.”4  Still, while this may have started to take place in the 
nineteenth century, it was not until the twentieth that social rights in general fused 
themselves into a true definition of citizenship. 
 Marshall then makes it clear that one cannot ignore the relationship and 
development of citizenship along with that of capitalism that in the latter 17th and 18th 
centuries coincided. While in fact citizenship and capitalism, initially complimented 
each other, they have recently been at war in the twentieth century.  Basically, without 
men as free actors and free labor, a system that citizenship not only allowed but also 
embodied itself in, capitalism could not come to be.  At the time that capitalism started 
                                                 
2 López Sala, Ana María.  Derechos de ciudadanía y estratificación cívica en sociedades de inmigración, 
pg. 5. 
3 Marshall, T.H. Citizenship and Social Class, pg. 13. 
4.----------------- Citizenship and Social Class, pg. 16. 
19 
to thrive, citizenship was embodied by civil rights, which was necessary to the survival 
of the capitalist system.  Since each man was able to act as an independent actor that 
had no need for social protection, he was basically able to take care of himself.  
Individualism was the ideal of the day and you did have a right to property, if you could 
get it, as well as a right to freedom of speech, if you were educated enough to get 
someone to listen to you.  Still, ironically, it is in the twentieth century, along with the 
instatement of social rights, that citizenship and capitalism have become enemies.5
 How did citizenship come from being a necessary partner in the development of 
capitalism to its archenemy in the twentieth century?  Simply, it was a result of 
improved political rights.  These political rights were a clear danger to the capitalist 
system although it could not possible perceive how great it was: “They could hardly be 
expected to foresee what vast changes could be brought about by the peaceful use of 
political power, without a violent and bloody revolution.”6  And so, basic equality was 
the goal of greater social rights even though its initial impetus was public education, 
which in of itself is the equal opportunity to be unequal through academic achievement 
of ‘the equal right to be recognised as unequal’.7  Marshall believed that as a society, 
one must simply be aware of the consequences that education exists as a social right that 
stratifies the population into unequal terms, but not necessarily ‘deplore’ it. 
 This then brings one to the discussion of the importance of equality in a liberal 
democratic society.  While its basis may have started in a system such as the public 
educational system that in turn stratifies our society into a sort of professional 
inequality, in Great Britain or any other democratic society, equality as a crucial 
principal in such a society cannot be denied.  Seemingly, as long as things are equal, we 
always are much more able to accept them, positively or negatively.  If in our 
                                                 
5 Marshall, T.H. Citizenship and Social Class, pg. 20. 
6 ------------------ Citizenship and Social Class, pg. 25. 
7--------------------Citizenship and Social Class, pg. 38. 
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workplaces conditions worsen, as long as it is equal, we are more likely to accept them, 
as well as if conditions improve, we would be definitely more likely to accept such 
improvement as long as it concerns everyone.  Likewise, in regards to social benefits, 
basic equality is the aim.  We accept longer waits to see a medical specialist or a longer 
line just to see our general practitioner as long as the wait is the same for everybody and 
the reason for such delay is the allowance of medical treatment for everyone in the 
population.  Equality, for good or bad, is ingrained not only in our system of citizenship 
but in our daily lives as members of society—acceptance of our lot in life is ever so 
much easier as long as we are all treated as equals, even though our constant aim in life 
may be to be unequal professionally, in regards to job status, and personally in regards 
to the acquirement of possessions, the status that having a more expensive car and a 
bigger house with everything in it entails.  Citizenship and capitalism are at war, not just 
within society but also within our own subconscious. 
 So, that brings one to the question of whether or not social rights, limited civil 
rights, and practically no political rights are enough in order to be equal—such equality 
allowing one to pursue inequality in every sense of the word to his or her heart’s 
content.  Again, third-country nationals have access to most civil rights, except for job 
access, to all social rights in the form of access to the welfare state and equal education.  
The conundrum is then if such access to equality truly makes them equal or whether or 
not this is simply a generic equality, like that given to children who are unable to 
represent themselves in a democratic society until the age of eighteen who are not 
considered to be fully developed enough in order to really have a valid opinion about 
the society they live in.   
Another question is, as the quantity of third-country nationals without 
citizenship increases in Spain in particular, how does this quantity of the population 
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existing as it does go against basic principles that have founded equality in a process 
that has stretched over centuries?  And finally, what if the process is not over, then are 
those that have no representation to be left out of the system some time in the future, 
their rights reduced socially even?  Simply because they are pretty much treated as 
equals up until now does not mean that they pretty much will be treated so in the future, 
particularly if economic woes decrease employment so that conflict arises in the form of 
those that “belong” and those that do not “belong”.  There is no reason that permanent 
residents filling an employment void in the beginning will not be considered equals 
when they occupy economic and social space in an economic reality in which 
overcrowding is a concern, instead of a welcoming of physical laborers. 
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Equality and Justice 
When one thinks of present day global immigration many topics may come 
automatically to mind—economics, cultural enrichment or threat, poverty, employment 
or unemployment, citizenship, integration, expulsion and justice.  Entire populations are 
simultaneously categorized yet again into ‘Us’ or ‘Them,’ without specifying exactly 
where such categories gain their justifications and knowing that any justification would 
ultimately be futile anyway.  While insisting on the merits of equality, nationally and 
internationally, fear that the level of equality that we enjoy may decrease, forces ‘Us’ to 
rely upon an exclusionary concept of that equality.  Common sense tells us that its 
preservation has priority, so that self-preservation and equality become one common, 
yet conflicting, all encompassing goal.   
Rousseau insisted on two principles that are prior to reason: self-preservation 
and a natural repugnance towards the suffering of fellow man.8  Rousseau also defines 
two types of inequality, one natural and the other political or moral based upon society’s 
consent.9  When contemplating the requisites of inequality, Rousseau was focusing on 
civil society within a common State, not the flow of persons over a society’s frontiers.  
Still, his brand of inequality is more than applicable to the present state of affairs 
regarding international immigration, especially once residents have established 
themselves within a nation-state.  It is the nation-state that sets the limits as mediator 
within its own civil society between its citizens, and now its residents, in an intent to 
equalize the status of all its occupants, citizen or not.  Citizenship may no longer be the 
ultimate source of rights and privileges, but instead a simple optional path towards 
                                                 
8 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse in the Origin of Inequality “…the first and most simple operations of 
the human soul, I believe I perceive in it two principles that are prior to reason, of which one makes us 
ardently interested on our well-being and our self-preservation, and the other inspires in us a natural 
repugnance to seeing any sentient being, especially our fellow man, perish or suffer.”(p 14) 
9 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse in the Origin of Inequality “This latter type of inequality consists in 
the different privileges enjoyed by some at the expense of others, such as being richer, more honored, 
more powerful than they, or even causing themselves to be obeyed by them.” (p 16) 
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equality.  In some cases, attainment of citizenship may offer a less bothersome existence 
bureaucratically while for others it may mean the difference between work and 
unemployment and access to social welfare or not when processing lines for plain 
residents congest for renewals or residency cards limit work access geographically etc. 
Returning to theoretical premises, in order to explain the concept of equality and 
put it into practice, justice and welfare are two concepts that must be explored in both 
their general and specific senses.  In order to define welfare, justice must first be 
defined and related to it.10  Joseph H. Carens explains that society’s response to 
immigration is framed within liberal democratic principles of justice that may not solve 
all questions, but “rather establish constraints that mark out the range of morally 
acceptable policies.”11 (Carens 10)  Again, it is the preservation of equality, here based 
on a minimum level of welfare, which represents just one facet of the justice that is 
referred to in civil society.  Once more, it seems that the justice we speak of is the same 
that is guaranteed to children, a part of the population that is dependent upon others to 
look after their rights.  The difference with children as opposed to legal residents is that 
children eventually do become full members of the society when he/she reaches legal 
age.  In some cases, immigrant residents can spend a lifetime living in their host country 
without being allowed access to full membership. 
Returning to the topic of social rights, welfare can take the form of what is 
constantly referred to in today’s liberal democratic societies, as basic rights allowed to 
members within the nation-state.  What one might refer to as membership rights or 
                                                 
10 “The language of justice is the language of ultimate moral judgement, of right and wrong.  Justice 
establishes the morally legitimate parameters of public policy in three ways.  It requires some actions, it 
prohibits others, and it establishes the moral permissibility of actions that are neither required nor 
prohibited…justice requires the maximization of welfare (overall or on average), or the maximization of 
the welfare of the least well off, or even the provision of some minimum level of welfare to all…the right 
(justice) establishes the framework within which we may consider competing conceptions of the good (of 
which welfare is one dimension).” (Carens, Joseph H. pg. 10) “Immigration, Welfare and Justice”; Justice 
in Immigration. 
11 Carens, Joseph H. “Immigration, Welfare and Justice”; Justice in Immigration, pg. 10. 
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goods are the following: employment, emergency services and socioeconomic resources 
(emergency medical care, education, housing, child allowances, social welfare, 
healthcare, unemployment insurance), political participation, right to movement and 
permanent access, immunity from expulsion, and access to full citizenship.  Before such 
consideration, immigrants have various forms of gaining access to a nation-state as a 
resident: through agreements between countries based on colonization histories, 
geographical closeness, ethnic, cultural or religious ties, family reunion, asylum or 
through the necessity of temporary work programs, and professional workers or 
students.12  Depending upon how each nation-state sees itself and defines its members 
generally effects how a nation-state will define its access to membership.  If a society 
sees itself as an ethnic entity, membership is generally based upon ethnic composition 
and birth as opposed to a society that sees itself as a group of individuals that belong to 
a voluntary club, thus making membership easier to attain.  Among liberal democratic 
countries, refugees claiming asylum has been a universally accepted concept since the 
Geneva Convention of 1951.  For example, it is estimated that 30 percent of asylum 
seekers are granted it in Europe and of those rejected, 75 to 85 percent stay in the 
country where they have solicited and been denied asylum.13  In regards to access 
within the other categories, countries vary greatly in their approach and necessities.  
Once an immigrant is admitted as a resident,  his/her incorporation into society also 
varies, thus further discussion of the terms of rights and membership is more than 
necessary. 
                                                 
12 Coleman & Harding. “Citizenship, the demands of justice, and the moral relevance of political 
borders,” Justice in Immigration, (p 20-35) 
13 Nuhoğlu Soysal, Yasemin. Limits of Citizenship, (p 24) 
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Membership and Rights 
 
Understanding how membership in a polity or a society is defined, and what 
rights and obligations come along with it, is crucial to understanding what a society 
expects of its current and future members.  Each individual nation-state varies in its 
qualifications but there are general trends that have developed in liberal democratic 
states that may even at times contradict themselves.  Such contradiction could be 
viewed as an impediment towards congruence or a balance.  First of all, the idea that the 
world could exist as a global political unit leans towards impossibility as a result of the 
very structure of the nation-states that it is made up of.  Territories validate nation-states 
and nation-states in turn validate the necessity for territories, making it impossible for 
coordination and incorporation of states into a global polity.  As the world becomes 
more global, it also is persistently segmented.   
Rainer Bauböck, defines citizenship as “a kind of membership as well as a 
bundle of rights.”14  As a result, the author defines citizenship by categorizing it into 
two aspects that he refers to as nominal citizenship and substantial citizenship.  In the 
first, nominal citizenship simply classifies members into certain groups, giving them a 
legal status and a name, i.e. German, French, and Italian.  From the author’s point of 
view this label unfortunately overlaps with cultural affiliations or identities instead of a 
strict legal status and reminds the reader that such status does not mean that they are 
necessarily equal either.  On the other hand, substantial citizenship is what involves the 
transaction of rights and obligations and stresses that such rights are recognized in a 
political community.  By separating the society from the polity, the author ideally links 
the rights and obligations directly to the citizenship, beyond legal and formal terms so 
that they may be taken seriously.  Again, limiting citizenship to its interaction within the 
                                                 
14 Bauböck, Rainer. Transnational Citizenshpi; pg. 28. 
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polity, the author offers yet another definition of citizenship: “Citizenship is therefore a 
substantial form of equality in the public-political sphere which results from blocked 
translation of social inequalities into political ones.”15At first sight, this definition 
disregards society as a direct influence on how citizenship is defined, but as one 
continues to follow the author’s line of thinking throughout the book, he does admit 
later on the increased role of society in translating its expression into law.  In other 
words, what the author here defines is not necessarily disregarding society and solely 
focusing on the polity, but instead simply concentrating on the end result of society’s 
inclusiveness which then leads to the interaction between the public-political sphere and 
the citizen, insisting throughout on the political nature of rights, citizen or human.  In 
fact, without citizenship rights, human rights would not exist as there is no all-
encompassing global agency that has the power to protect them; thus if citizens are 
denied their state membership, then there can be no guarantee for their human rights.  In 
regards to immigrant rights, again it is the process that has brought about the social 
rights.  It is the evolution of a society’s political rights into social rights that has allowed 
its transference to the permanent resident, even though such a resident does not have 
full membership as a citizen.  Again, if the immigrant is not a full part of the structure, 
how can such rights be guaranteed in the future?  Leaving such guarantees out of the 
equation, the more pertinent question is are these immigrants truly integrated into 
societal structure in the first place, rights or no rights, citizenship or no citizenship?  16
                                                 
15 Bauböck, Rainer. Transnational Citizenship; pg. 26. 
16 José Martinez de Pisón explains the relationship between the citizen and non-citizen with the state:  
“...la teoría política y el Derecho han definido la ciudadanía como el estatuto legal de las derechos y 
deberes atribuido por el Estado-nación al ciudadano.  La ciudadanía, por lo tanto, consiste en ese estatuto 
jurídicamente reconocido de derechos y deberes que posee el nacional.  Ciudadanía y nacionalidad se 
identifican, en oposición de la extranjería, al extranjero que es el no nacido o quien no ha adquirido la 
nacionalidad y que, por tanto, queda al margen de dicho estatuto de derechos y deberes.” (Martínez de 
Pisón 11)Martínez de Pisón continues by noting that “frente a la condición plena de ciudadanía, la del 
extranjero es parcial” (Martínez de Pisón 11)  In other words, a resident that has not been naturalized is 
only a partial member, not to mention that an illegal immigrant who, while some of his/her rights may be 
respected, is not a member at all.   
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Returning to Bauböck, he suggests that permanent residents should be offered 
membership in a polity, strictly termed as citizenship or not.  In his opinion, immigrants 
live an alternate reality than that of native-born citizens as well as naturalized citizens 
and such a reality should be respected as such.  Resident foreigners should be 
considered to be members of the polity in order to reduce inequalities, and automatic 
inclusion, or naturalization, could be oppressive especially if these residents have turned 
down the option to be naturalized—not consenting which is a crucial point to 
membership in the polity.17  As membership and rights come along together, both 
existing at the same time dependently, status in a community as an equal depends upon 
having full membership in that community.  As such, the author does not wish to make 
a list of rights, but instead explain how such rights contribute to equality within the 
polity.  Overall, Bauböck is concerned with how rights relate to full membership in a 
democratic polity. 
 In order to explain how rights bring about equality within membership, rights 
themselves must be clearly defined.  A right is categorized as “a resource provided by 
social institutions which protect and legitimate the existence, the needs or interests, or 
the action of the bearer of the right.”18  Furthermore, they need to be recognized by 
other human beings and institutionalized or they are non-existent.  Citizenship justifies 
itself within its basic norm of equality and always aims at such institutionalization. 
 Regarding immigrants, collective rights are quite relevant since immigrants are 
generally seen as either independent individuals or groups of nationalities, depending 
upon a country’s approach to their situation as will be discussed later on in this paper.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
17 “The point is that these inequalities of membership have to be accepted in a liberal conception which 
acknowledges that native citizens, emigrants and immigrants face different options of membership, and 
respects their individual choices…Inclusion is therefore achieved by equalizing the substantial rights of 
citizenship and extending them to the resident population as a whole independently of nominal 
membership.” (Bauböck  207) 
 
18 Bauböck, Rainer. Transnational Citizenship; pg. 209. 
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Bauböck differentiates types of rights by categorizing them as either individual, group-
specific, collective or corporate.  If rights are individual, group members are not 
beneficiaries, a group is not a collective actor and a group does not exercise collectively 
the right.  Group-specific rights maintain group members as beneficiaries but the group 
is not a collective actor and they do not exercise their rights collectively.  Collective 
rights do have group members as beneficiaries, the group is a collective actor but the 
group does not exercise their right collectively.  Corporate rights are group-based on all 
three counts where the group members are the beneficiaries, the group is a collective 
actor and they exercise their rights collectively.19  Republican and libertarian traditions 
generally do not except collective rights as a rule because it goes against their strict idea 
of equal rights and citizenship, but the author defends such initial inequality as long as it 
is temporary and it is used to eventually increase levels of equality.  In other words, 
“group-specific and situational rights can be easily justified if it is the state which 
defines the groups and the situations that must be taken into account in order to equalize 
substantial membership in the polity.”20Still, if it is the group that claims the rights from 
the state and exercises them collectively, the author sees them as a threat for three 
reasons.  First, public reasoning about justice, not by bargaining or negotiation, should 
determine citizenship rights.  Second, this bargaining could mirror inequalities between 
groups particularly when some groups are more organized or have access to better 
resources.  Finally, the structure of rights could be different between groups and would 
really just tie an individual to a group, not to citizenship in itself, leaning more towards 
feudal estate practices instead of democratic practices.  Even so, in the author’s opinion, 
collective rights should not be forgotten since a static and overlay state-centric view of 
democratic structures is not positive in its extreme and collective and corporate rights 
                                                 
19 Bauböck, Rainer. Transnational Citizenship, p 266. 
20 Bauböck, Rainer. Transnational Citizenship; pg. 267. 
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are a norm in present-day contemporary democracies.21  This category of rights may 
lead to eventual advancement of equality among individuals within the democratic 
polity “as long as they build upon a common structure of individual liberties and rights 
and improve the position of specifically disadvantaged groups.”22  For example, the 
trade unions could be a transitional form in which equal rights have been formally 
institutionalized by law.  Collective bargaining originally won group rights that had to 
be transformed into proper social entitlements of citizenship.  Essentially, as long as the 
collective bargaining does not go to far or last too long, and it is the state that allows for 
the structure of institutional rights, collective rights may equalize individual rights that 
are non-existent for some groups.  In effect, it is the institutional legalization and 
equalization of individual rights that the author aims toward, not the temporary 
empowerment of discriminated groups.   
Therefore, the focus is upon the individual gaining of rights as the ultimate goal, 
represented solely up until now in the form of citizenship, but recently expanded 
towards legal residents in the form of “immigration integration policy”.  Rights reserved 
for citizens only are now considered to be human or personal rights of all those present 
within the society.  Still, the question remains, can such rights be true forms of 
integration in a society if the individuals themselves do not take part in the very 
structure and future evolution of said society?  Is a simple minimum welfare for all the 
sole basis of justice and equality and thus the ultimate aim of inclusion of an outsider 
into the fold?  Again, it comes down to the ability of immigrant integration and 
citizenship as copartners either hand in hand or walking side by side—one cannot be 
addressed without discussion of the other, because up until quite recently one only did 
                                                 
21 Bauböck, Rainer. Transnational Citizenship, p 268 
22 Bauböck, Rainer. Transnational Citizenship; pg. 268. 
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exist on its own as citizenship was the only true option in integrating oneself, at least 
superficially, into a society. 
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Citizenship vs. Residency 
 
“To an increasing extent, rights and privileges once reserved for citizens of a nation are codified 
and expanded as personal rights, undermining the national order of citizenship.” 
—Carens, Limits of Citizenship, p 1. 
 
 Until relatively recent times, rights and privileges granted by the nation-
state were considered to be limited to the citizen of a polity, exclusively and with an 
accepted justification.23  In order to gain such equality, historically a foreign resident 
would have to denounce prior citizenship and claim loyalty towards his/her new nation-
state.  In fact, it was considered crucial for an individual to pledge their loyalty to only 
one nation-state.  The League of Nations in 1930 stated that “it is in the interest of the 
international community to secure that all members should recognize that every person 
hold a nationality and should have only one nationality.”24  Even in 1963, the Council 
of Europe signed the “Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality”, 
in an effort to reduce the amount of individuals with more than one nationality and 
ensure their military obligation.  Twelve countries signed and ratified it including 
Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden while Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, only were in agreement with the 
“Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality.”  Spouses of dual nationality 
were encouraged to pick one nationality or the other so as to simplify allegiance, taxes 
and military obligations.25  In 1997, the European Council allowed for each European 
nation-state to decide whether to allow for dual citizenship.  Austria, and Denmark still 
do not allow it and their allotted time of permanent residency required before becoming 
                                                 
23 “The process of achieving personhood frequently requires acts of allegiance to the nation-state, which 
entails the rejection or down-playing of past cultural or national memberships…Citizenship is passive and 
active membership of individuals in a nation-state with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a 
specified level of equality.” (Janoski, Thomas. Citizenship and Civil Society; pgs. 8-9) 
24 Morjé Howard, Marc. Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies, International Immigration Review,  p 
700. 
25 Morjé Howard, Marc. Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies, International Immigration Review,  p 
702. 
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a citizen is over 5 years, including, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal.  
Spain also has a time period of ten years of legal residency as a prerequisite in order to 
apply for citizenship (disregarding marriage, birth in the territory, former colonies etc. 
which will be further explained later in this paper) but does allow dual citizenship to 
immigrants coming from Latin American countries, Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial 
Guinea and Portugal.26 Even so, Spain, along with Denmark and Austria can be 
considered to be the most restrictive countries in regards to citizenship policy in the EU.  
In the postwar period in Europe, many European countries allowed temporary 
workers to enter their nation-states with the idea that when unemployment grew and 
their need for outside workers diminished, they would simply send them home.  Instead, 
these countries found it difficult to just send them home, especially when their length of 
stay became greater, even stretching over generations.  Simply put, “A la vista de los 
lazos que establecieron con los lugares a los que se habían trasladado, los términos 
originales del acuerdo se volvieron irrelevantes.”27 Still, while residents are generally 
allowed permanent residency after between two to ten years, usually falling around five 
years before two,28 citizenship may be even impossible to attain based on what each 
individual country sees as its requirements for membership. 
 For example, German membership as a citizen has historically been based on 
what one would consider an ethnic identity.  Instead of one being a voluntary member 
of a club, as is the case of the US and Canada, which could be considered as countries 
of immigration,29 Germany has always based its membership by ethnic terms.  In fact, 
their post-WWII citizenship laws were based on a 1913 German law that defined the 
German nation not as a political entity, but an ethnic entity belonging to the “German 
                                                 
26 Ley 36/2002, de 8 de octubre, de modificación del Código civil en materia de nacionalidad. 
27 Carens, Joseph.  Inmigración y Justicia 13.  
28 Rubio-Marín, Ruth, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge, (p 25 footnote) 
29 Coleman & Harding. “Citizenship, the demands of justice, and the moral relevance of political 
borders,” Justice in Immigration, (p 19) 
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People.”30  Until recently, generations of immigrants in Germany could live as residents 
for long periods of time without the possibility of naturalization.  Still, in agreement 
with the 1990 Foreigners Law and a 1993 decree, naturalization of immigrant children 
between 16 and 23 years of age, born or living in Germany for more than eight years 
became practically automatic.31  In 2000, immigrant children born in Germany were 
declared German citizens.32  Even so, while naturalization laws may be changing, 
making it easier to become a “full” member of a society and nation-state, it can be 
argued that citizenship is not the only way to maintain basic rights in a polity, especially 
when most immigrants would rather not denounce their original citizenship in favor of 
becoming a citizen in the nation-state that they reside in.  A 1990 figure showed that the 
average length of residency for migrant workers in Europe was more than 15 years and 
naturalization only 1.9 percent on average and decreasing.   
Even now, as naturalization becomes easier to attain as permanent residents, is it 
completely necessary to possess it—at least in the immediate future?  As human rights 
become more common and universal in describing what a person deserves, not 
necessarily a citizen, incorporation into a society may be attainable through simple 
permanent residency instead of through naturalization. Citizenship may even be in need 
of redefining in its content and importance.  In any case, “Qué sentido tiene seguir 
abundando en las profundidades orgánicas de una noción de ciudadanía que no es 
realista, que no asume los cambios y que ha perdido el contacto con un mundo que es 
ahora radicalmente distinto.”33 Disregarding everyday discrimination and actual 
acceptance of cultural discrepancies, a third-country national really may have no good 
reason to denounce citizenship of their country of origin in order to have the same rights 
                                                 
30 Hampton, Jean, “Immigration, Identity and Justice,” Justice in Immigration, (p 74) 
31 Rubio-Marín, Ruth. Immigration as a Democratic Challenge, (p 26) 
32 Howards, Marc Morjé. Variation in Dual Citizenship, International Immigration Review, (p 709) 
33 Seco, J. & Rodríguez, R. p 17. 
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and privileges in their country of residence.  Even if such denouncement occurs, native 
citizenship is either returned or not lost from the point of view of the country of origin.  
Also, if the gaining of citizenship did not entail bureaucratic advantages, but instead 
simply allowed the immigrant o take part in the electoral process, would the said 
immigrant even bother to denounce anything or even accept dual nationality?   Within 
the EU, such an existence is even encouraged.  While double nationality is the 
preference in a nation-state that is not one’s ‘own,’ it is very commonly not an option 
for most foreign residents.  Instead, it is an individual’s treatment as a person that is the 
concern as being a member of a society and polity.34   
Here, citizenship as the only means to full incorporation is a priority, since immigrants 
are maintained in a category apart, with human rights, but not the same rights as those 
considered full members.  Even so, incorporation of millions of persons into the society 
in which they choose as their home may also be seen as a priority from the points of 
view of both the foreign residents and the nation-state.  Curiously, incorporation into a 
society is a relatively new and completely ill-defined term.  In order to gain some sort of 
proximity to its true definition in the present sense, the most logical means is to observe 
the nation-state’s intent in regards to the term incorporation.  In other words, how they 
define it, to what extent do they wish to attain it, and what steps are being taken in order 
to achieve it, if any?  
  
                                                 
34 In regards to the treatment of immigrants, Javier de Lucas somewhat ironically explains how 
citizenship can be preserved as a distinctive bundle rights, as a population still maintains its necessity for 
the immigrant worker as a priority also. 
“Ahora se trata de ‘tratarlos bien,’de respetar los derechos que tienen como  
seres humanos (un enorme gesto de progresía este de tomar en serio lo que venimos proclamando como 
obvio), incluso de reconocerles algunos derechos en los mismos términos de los ciudadanos, pero, por 
supuesto, dentro de un orden: porque si reconocemos que pueden tener los mismos derechos que los 
ciudadanos plenos, ¿cómo vamos a mantener la distinción?” (De Lucas  81) 
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 Civil Society and Citizenship 
 
Before analyzing different forms of incorporation by civil society, I would like 
to define what civil society is so as to keep clear the actors in which incorporation may 
take place.  Thomas Janoski, in his work, Citizenship and Civil Society, offers a clear 
definition of civil society and its relationship with the state.  “Civil Society represents a 
sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse between the state, the public sphere 
consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market-sphere concerning private firms 
and unions.”  Janoski then proceeds in presenting his readers with a conceptual diagram 
of the public and private spheres and how they overlap.  The first is the state sphere, 
which consists of the legislative (law-making) branch, the executive (law-
implementing) branch and judicial (law and constitution-evaluating) branch.  Next, the 
private sphere consists of family life, networks of friends and acquaintances and 
personal property.  Third, there is the market sphere, which mixes both state and private 
and public spheres through private and public organizations that create income and 
wealth through the production of goods and services.  Finally, there is the public sphere, 
and like the market sphere, it overlaps with all other spheres through five types of 
voluntary organizations: political parties, interest groups, welfare associations 
(‘communities’ such as the Red Cross or United Way), social movements, religious 
bodies and of course the Media.35
 Most importantly is the author’s definition of the relationship between 
citizenship and civil society.  All actors within civil society have an effect on what state 
legislation comes to be.  In fact, state legislation originates in this complex and 
                                                 
35 Janoski, Thomas. Citizenship and Civil Society, pgs. 12-17. 
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conceptual diagram of civil society.36  So, it is civil society that provides the impetus 
for citizenship, molds it and then turns it over to be defined through state legislation.  
Over the years, citizenship has clearly over gone quite a change for various reasons.  
The author provides four approaches to its development. 
 The first approach is termed as the ‘power resources theory’ and consists of 
internal non-citizens that prepare the way for new citizenship rights by eliminating 
property as a requisite, as well as gender, ethnicity, race, disability and sexual 
preference.  Each group demands different solutions to their varying problems.  The 
second approach involves the state structure, which “focuses on constraints and 
opportunities afforded by state structures.”  This ‘state-centric theory’ “allows 
differential modes of state mobilization for leaders’ and bureaucrats’ interests with the 
effects of political institutions on their identities, goals and power.” (Janoski 143)  In 
effect, the state institutions are used as a tool to either constrain or offer opportunities 
regarding citizenship rights.  The third approach deals with ideologies and political 
parties connected with interest groups and how such ideologies ‘mesh’ in governments 
as the result of compromise.  Different solutions are found based on different social 
problems seen in the interest of the public.  Finally, the last approach comes about 
through war, colonization and migration to colonizing and settler countries where 
diverse cultures and nations come together, allowing for further naturalization of 
natives.  Therefore, there are four means of the extension of Citizenship according to the 
author.  In regards to the first approach, non-citizens, in this case foreign residents, 
                                                 
36 “While citizenship and civil society are quite different—the former refers to state-enforced rights and 
obligations, and the latter focuses on groups in concert or opposition—they are empirically contingent.  
Civil society creates the groups and pressures for political choice and state legislation, and many ideas of 
citizenship originate in civil society rather than in the state…It[Civil Society] is not the state sphere and 
cannot be the home of citizenship rights…most claims for and defenses of citizenship are made in civil 
society through the motivating interests of class- and status-based groups.  As such, civil society provides 
many of the independent variables that explain citizenship.  However, the actual citizenship rights 
themselves reside in the state sphere with bureaucratic and political implementation  through official 
protections using legal sanctions.” (Janoski 17) 
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could serve the purpose of not only preparing the way for new citizenship rights, but by 
preparing the path for an alternative way to gain rights without citizenship.  First, state 
institutions could serve as an extension of personal rights, not just citizenship.  Second, 
ideologies and political parties could have a direct effect in forming policy in regards to 
residents.  Third, veterans, voluntary military members and survivors and their family 
members of terrorist attacks can be offered residency or citizenship. The fourth effect 
has already allowed preferential treatment to foreigners if they are from a former colony 
by most post-colonizing states.  So, there may be a fifth means of “extension” of 
citizenship: third-country nationals and residents with a separate but practically equal 
set of rights as an alternative to actual citizenship.  Still, as they are not allowed direct 
political participation, they must depend upon the will of full members, or citizens, to 
fight the represent them.  Will such full members show themselves to be sufficiently 
altruistic and selfless in their representation?  Could such representation belittle the 
democratic system by converting it into a negotiating and bargaining system between 
interested, organized groups only, while the others are lost along the way, instead of a 
system of representation where very vote is worth as much as every individual.  Or, is 
even this theoretical observation of the current contract in between citizen and state 
overly ideal, untrue and outdated.  Is not the system more akin to a negotiating and 
bargaining of organized groups anyway?  Even so, the difference is that access to the 
floor is still open to any individual, regardless of affiliation to any organization although 
there is always strength in numbers—mobilized numbers that is. This question, 
individual versus group or corporate incorporation into the political sphere, will be 
further explored when the associative movement in Spain is taken into consideration 
later on in the third part of this paper. 
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Models of Incorporation and Different European Approaches 
 
 According to Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal in her book, Limits of Citizenship, 
citizenship is not necessary in order to incorporate oneself into membership in a polity.  
Instead, “entitlements are legitimized on the basis of personhood.”  Now that migrants 
are not expected to be molded into national citizens, “The recent guestworker 
experience reflects a time when national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal 
model of membership, anchored in deterritorialized notions of people’s rights.”37  In 
other words, it is no longer citizenship with what one is concerned, but the personal 
rights of the resident existing within a polity that takes center stage.  Since people are no 
longer bound by frontiers as their defining identification with the nation, it is their rights 
as humans, not citizens that are the concern.  Ironically, along with the identification 
with the nation-state as the legitimate political entity after the final breaking up of the 
empires in the early 20th century, at the same time migrants have been enabled to 
identify with one’s original nationality while living in a different nation-state altogether.  
The building of the nation-state has logically coincided with the immigrant’s increased 
rights as non-citizens.  After the French Revolution, the nation-state was established as 
the political organization and nationality as a condition of its membership38  Lately, 
while citizenship has been increasingly defined, foreign residents have attained more 
and more equal rights in tune with each nation-state’s citizenry.  Again, full 
membership in regards to participation and representation on equal terms is not present. 
 Nuhoğlu Soysal outlines four models of incorporation and bases them upon five 
separate but correlated variables of how a nation-state may approach this incorporation, 
the five variables being: stated policy goals and language; specific policy instruments 
and budgets; administrative and organizational structures for the formulation and 
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implementation of policy; legal framework defining the status and the social, economic, 
political and cultural rights of migrants; and migrants’ associational and participatory 
schemes.  The author then defines and elaborates on four membership models: the 
corporatist model (Sweden and the Netherlands), the liberal model (Switzerland and 
Britain), the statist model (France) and fragmental model (Gulf oil countries). 
In the Corporatist Model, membership is organized around corporate groups and 
their functions.  Occupational, ethnic, religious or gender identities are the source of 
action and authority that assume “natural” right vis-à-vis the state, the definition of 
action and authority being the following: “The legitimized locus of action and authority 
in a polity specifies to whom the action is oriented and from whom the action is 
expected in a given social situation.”39  In this model it is public interest and the welfare 
of social groups that act upon their needs and collaborate and even elaborate state 
structures or state-sponsored structures in order to provide public social services.   
In Sweden and the Netherlands, migrants are seen as corporate groups and are 
defined by their collective identities as such.  In turn, the states generate elaborate, 
highly organized policy in regards to the incorporation of these groups.  For example, 
Sweden adopted an immigration policy in 1975 with three objectives: equality between 
immigrants and Swedes; freedom of cultural choice for immigrants (mother-tongue 
education, ethnic radio and TV broadcasting, literature in migrant languages that receive 
state subsidies); and cooperation and solidarity between the native Swedish majority 
and various ethnic minorities.  Migrant organizations are expected to act as channels 
between migrants and Swedish institutions as a collective ethnic minority.  An ethnic 
group can be considered to be such a collective with at least 1,000 members or more.40
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The Dutch are a bit different in their ordering of migrant groups but they do have 
collective categories nonetheless.  While it is not based on ethnic characteristics, they 
have the following groups: Moluccans, residents of Surinamese and Antillean origin, 
migrant workers and family members, gypsies, and refugees.  In contrast, the Chinese or 
Pakistani are not a migrant group because their incorporation is considered to have 
already taken place and “they are assumed to have no problems with their participation 
in Dutch Society  The term used until the late eighties was “emancipation” within their 
own communities, rooted in the religious emancipation that the Dutch experienced in 
the early twentieth century.  “Emancipation has meant the organization of social, 
cultural, and political function along denominational “pillars”—Catholic, Protestant and 
Secular—each with a separate system of schools, welfare and health organizations, and 
unions.” In the late eighties, policy shifted from the term “emancipation” and turned 
toward the phrase “reduction of disadvantage and discrimination.”41  
Regardless of the terms or phrases used, what defines the Corporatist model in 
Sweden and the Netherlands is its organizational means of grouping migrants into 
collective entities that are then expected to mobilize and act in their own interests.  
Minority budgets are granted in both countries in various categories.  In Sweden, state 
spending is dedicated to Swedish language instruction, study allowances to students 
participating in such instruction, language support in schools for children of immigrant 
or linguistic minorities and grants to national immigrant organizations including 
religious groups (1987/88).  In the Netherlands the 1988 minorities budget was split into 
the following categories: general policy instruments, employment, education, housing, 
social welfare, health and culture.  The importance of such specific budgeting is quite 
clear, proving that “migrants constitute separate, formalized categories in central state 
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programs, and that they are incorporated into legal and formal organizational structures 
as collectivities42  In the end, the state is responsible for the public good and creates 
top-down policy for the incorporation of migrant groups even as they are themselves 
expected to mobilize as collective groups and participate in their own interest. 
The second method of incorporation is the liberal model in which the individual 
is legitimized and seen as the source of action and authority.  In these countries, most 
political action is effected by individuals and private organizations where individuals 
and their interests “supersede institutions in society.”  There is a weak central authority 
and loosely organized state apparatus where local authorities play a larger role in 
regards to policy and implementation.  Basically, it is the labor market that is 
considered to be the main instrument of incorporation.  Overall, migrants are seen in 
these polities as individuals, not collective groups. 
 For example, Swiss policy is guided by three principles: 
stabilization/equilibrium [numerical regulation] of the foreign population, improvement 
of the labor market structure, and integration.  Their main concern is to control the size 
of the foreign population in regards to labor market demands.  In essence, all 
individuals are meant to co-exist and there is not much involvement besides regulation 
of migrant flows.  The Swiss society is separated and organized at a canton or commune 
level, which are highly autonomous and separate linguistically, but not defined along 
ethnic lines so that individual identity is defined regionally, not ethnically.  On the other 
hand, British policy is based upon “racial equality” where integration is aimed at 
through the enhancement of “equality of opportunity” and the promotion of “good race 
relations.”  The 1976 Race Relations Act prohibits discrimination in education, housing, 
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and employment.  While there is a budget allowed to support anti-discrimination, 
migrants are treated as individuals, not collective groups.43  
 The third approach is the statist model, best represented by the example of 
France.  In this model, the complete opposite of the liberal model, the central state is the 
‘locus of sovereignty’ and organizes the polity as the main provider and initiator of 
most public services, intervening actively in societal functions with a centralized 
political process and decision-making apparatus.  Still, it has in common one aspect 
with the liberal model in that, “Statist polities are like liberal ones in terms of 
interacting with the citizens as individuals, but their mode of operation is top-down.” 
(Nuhoğlu Soysal 39)  The central state in this case is more responsible for the migrants, 
not because they are migrants, but because most social functions are already centralized 
and organized by the state in regards to all individuals.  Most importantly, equality is 
valued as a concept in regards to all individuals, immigrant or not.  “Moreover, within 
this framework, the concept of incorporation acquires a very state-centric meaning; it 
assumes uniformly equal individuals vis-à-vis the state.  This assumption disallows 
specialized action or intermediary structures on behalf of migrant groups…special 
treatment or institutions for migrants would be considered a breach of the relationship 
between the state and the citizen.”  French integration is therefore in favor of integration 
through equal access to services and institutions that are already centralized in the state 
in order to create equality, not through collective groups.  Indeed, when interviewed 
about immigrant policy, a FAS (Social Action Fund) director stated, “In fact, the 
concept of community has no relevance in the French system.”44   
 The final model, fragmental, is explained only briefly as the partial incorporation 
of immigrants when families, clans and churches dominate social and public life in 
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countries such as those in the oil-exporting Gulf.  While the author considers the study 
of these countries to have the utmost importance in comparing immigration policies, her 
focus is on European countries.  That being so, she also goes on to explain an example 
of the combination of two models, corporatist and statist, in the German case.  In 
Germany, immigrants are not referred to as “ethnic minorities” but still, a centralized 
and corporate incorporation pattern has developed.  The welfare of foreigners is the 
responsibility of trade unions and major social service organizations, along with a 
highly central state.  Migrants are assigned to agencies according to religious and 
national orientations while migrant policy and implementation differs among local 
states due to federal political and administrative structure.  While collective groups are 
not targeted in that they are expected to organize themselves, they are formally put into 
groups by the centralized state whether or not policy varies or is implemented in 
different channels in different localities.45   
Unfortunately or not, in many respects a non-national is opened up to the alien 
environment whether he/she wants to be or not.  Maybe it is not so much that the 
immigrant is open to its environment, but whether or not he/she is capable or even 
allowed to be open to the possibility of incorporating that environment into his/her 
everyday life in a positive manner, at the same time being allowed to choose what 
he/she sees as the most beneficial aspects to include into what he/she sees as functional.  
If a foreigner is to incorporate, he/she has to be allowed the possibility of incorporating 
and rejecting certain aspects of the nation-state in which he/she lives.  It is up to the 
incorporation model of each country to clearly outline what is considered to be required 
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as incorporable and what each immigrant may consider as ‘rejectable’ also.  Cultural 
identity has to be challenged to a certain degree and if it is professed not to be, 
immigrant individuals or communities may be rudely awakened as well as host 
countries.  To deny that an immigrant does not live in a state of conflicting identities is 
to deny the relative importance of his/her very culture and ultimately falsify his/her 
everyday reality.  Quite clearly put by Juan Carlos Velasco, “…el individuo a menudo 
salta entre los diferentes códigos culturales que se le ofrece, sin permanecer anclado a 
ninguno en exclusiva…”  A possible solution to the jump from one identity to another 
would be that of an Republican Model of Political Community as opposed to the Liberal 
or Communitarian Models, the first being focused upon the individual and multicultural 
and the latter on the communal ethno-cultural or nationalist.   In such a Republican  
model, so that the jump from one collective identity to another could be facilitated, such 
identities are made even more abstract as civic identity and compromise.46  Back to the 
Spanish case of Immigration Integration Policy, there is a definite lack of conciliation in 
regards to the reality of an immigrant’s situation in that the idea of molding both 
immigrant and society into altruistic cultural exchange where nobody gets hurt may not 
be quite as easy as simply becoming a citizen—at least for those that are even directly 
allowed early access to such citizenship in the first place, let alone those who are not.   
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 Combination of Civil Society Interaction and Models of 
Incorporation 
 
 
Throughout the paper I have been referring mainly to legal residents as third-
country nationals, not to illegal residents without documentation.  Within this category 
there exists two realities for legal residency: permanent and temporary.  Permanent 
residency in Spain is defined as the following.  “Se halla en situación de residencia 
permanente el extranjero que haya sido autorizado a residir en España indefinidamente 
y a trabajar en igualdad de condiciones que los españoles.”  In order to gain permanent 
residency, a foreigner must reside continually and formally in Spanish territory for five 
years, absences allowed as long as such absences do not make a total of one year of the 
five years of residency. 47   There are some clear exceptions to the rule48 and practically 
all of them involve some form of legal, formal residency.  Temporary residency is based 
upon a “contigente” or economic pool, which is analyzed each trimester by the 
Comisión Laboral Tripartita de Inmigración by province, including Ceuta and Melilla, 
and are given out as an initial authorization for a period of one year, limited to an 
economic sector and geographical area.  Such temporary permits are based upon labor 
needs in each area and businesses must present solicitation of the authorization for 
residency and work to the corresponding province along with the work contract. 
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48 •Residentes que sean beneficiarios de una pensión de jubilación, incapacidad permanente absoluta, o de 
gran invalidez, en su modalidad contributiva, incluida dentro de la acción protectora del sistema español 
de la Seguridad Social, o de prestaciones análogas a las anteriores obtenidas en España y consistentes en 
una renta vitalicia, no capitalizable, suficiente para su sostenimiento.  •Que hayan nacido en España y al 
llegar a la mayoría de edad acrediten haber residido en España de forma legal y continuada durante, al 
menos, los tres años consecutivos inmediatamente anteriores a la solicitud.  •Que hayan sido españoles de 
origen y hayan perdido la nacionalidad española.  •Que al llegar a la mayoría de edad hayan estado bajo la 
tutela de una entidad pública española durante los cinco años inmediatamente anteriores de forma 
consecutiva.  •Apátridas o refugiados que se encuentren en territorio español y a quienes se les haya 
reconocido el respectivo estatuto en España.  •Extranjeros que hayan contribuido de forma notoria al 
progreso económico, científico o cultural en España, a a loa proyección de España en el exterior. 
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In order to classify Spain as a liberal state in regards to immigration with 
definite corporate tendencies, one may imagine a combination of the two theories, that 
of Janoski in regards to the state, public, market and private spheres49 and that of  
Nuhoğlu Soysal’s Corporatist, Liberal, Statist and Fragmental models.50  The state 
sphere overlaps with the public sphere through political parties and public welfare, state, 
media, and education.  Both public and market spheres come together through union 
federations, employer associations and consumer associations.  Finally, the private 
sphere overlaps the public sphere through people’s private lives disclosed in the media 
and the courts and with the market sphere through family firms and elite club networks.  
The Statist Model of course coincides within the state sphere while the Liberal Model 
exists within both the market sphere and the state sphere.  On the other hand, the 
Corporate Model operates between both the state and public spheres.  Finally, the 
Fragmental Model primarily acts within the private sphere, leaning towards the public 
sphere.  Regarding Spain, I would like to focus primarily on the following aspects: 
judiciary, political parties, public welfare, education, and voluntary associations.  So as 
to classify Spain as Statist, Liberal or Corporate, focus will be upon the following 
factors demonstrated in Table 1.7. 
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Table 1.7 - Classifying Factors of Incorporation Models 
 
 
Relationship between 
state and individual? Statist Corporate Liberal 
Type of right assigned 
as? Individual Group Individual 
Who organizes the 
relationship? State through the state 
Private group through 
the state 
Private group/individual 
through private 
group/individual 
How is the right 
exercised? Individually 
Individually and 
collectively Individually 
 
 
 
From a bird’s eye view it seems that the Spanish system may be a combination 
of mainly liberal and a bit of statist when dealing with immigration as a whole.  Again, 
its Foro para la integración social de los inmigrantes as well as its Plan Ciudadanía e 
integración 2007-2010 is not only encouraging collective ethnic groupings, but using 
them as representatives through associations that have a formal political influence, 
while they as of yet have no vote, in the evolution of immigrant integration policy. 
Generally, the Spanish approach leans quite a bit towards the liberal standpoint as 
immigration is based upon market necessities.  “Lamentablemente, en España y todavía 
en la UE (aunque hay atisbos de cambio) el modelo de gestión de la inmigración 
consiste en eso, policía de tráfico y adecuación de contingentes.” 51 Each year, the 
government releases information on how many immigrants are needed and in what 
areas.52  Restriction of entry is consistently more and more restrictive, despite the two 
Regularization Processes in 2002 and 2005   Brought about in restrictive necessity of 
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the illegal immigration reality, the first one was under the conservative regime, and the 
second even more restrictively under the social regime.  By legalizing already existent 
immigrants and at the same time restricting further legal entry and access to new 
residents, Spain has contributed greatly to the building of the walls of what has long 
been known as the European Fortress.  As already noted, even its naturalization laws are 
considered to be the most restrictive in Europe along with Austria and Denmark.53   
First of all, I would like to outline the manners in which the Spanish government 
has addressed the incorporation of its immigrants through its judiciary, public welfare 
and educational approach in the state sphere.  As the state sphere tends to blur with the 
public in regards to voluntary associations with NGOs, that would be the second sphere 
to be looked into—the public consisting of NGOs and political parties.  While this 
outright handing over to the private sector of the incorporation of immigrants is 
subsidized, its organization seems to be taken over by voluntary organizations for the 
most part, classifying the Spanish approach as liberal in the sense that its laws address 
the individual immigrant with basically the same rights as the individual Spanish 
citizen.  Even so, Spain has continually shown itself to be somewhat corporate in its 
treatment of its immigrants, but such corporate leaning only takes place superficially in 
regards to the formation and organization of its Foro par la integración social de los 
inmigrantes; and the handing out of subsidies to immigrant associations, that while they 
have always been based upon specified immigrant origin groups, have in the last years 
branched out in order to help other immigrant group from other countries of origin as a 
result of expanded need. 
What do not make this approach in regards to immigrants solely liberal are its 
top-down characteristics that are typically statist, but only in the form of said subsidies 
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as its organization is really bottom-up.  Still, like a Liberal Model of Incorporation, the 
Spanish government seems to work on a local basis of subsidization in regards to 
programs of immigrants, allowing for organizations in autonomous regions to 
incorporate their own immigrants based on these same regions.  Strictly speaking then, 
the Spain should be recognized as a liberal state in regards to its incorporation, while 
keeping in mind its bureaucratic history of incorporation of ethnic groups and regions, 
i.e. Catalan, Basque, Galician and its continued leaning towards an initial corporate 
approach in dealing with its development of its formal integration plan for 2007-2010, 
which we will take a closer look at later on.  Before moving on to the Spanish case, as a 
point of comparison, there is the German case, one in which its development has had a 
longer trajectory, at least in regards to its immigration experience. 
 Recently, the treatment of immigrant populations within the borders of a nation-
state has been measured by its very difference in treatment towards its own citizenry.  
Regardless of whether or not an immigrant has access to citizenship, or even intends to 
take advantage of such availability or not, without citizenship as a direct comparison, 
along with its rights and responsibilities that come along with it, there cannot exist any 
true discussion or debate as to the integration of any foreign national, not just politically 
but also socially.  Basic social rights within the welfare state, as well as political 
participation in a polity are rights that are generally attributed fully to citizens of a 
nation-state, but not necessarily guaranteed to third-country nationals.  Education, 
healthcare, pensions and worker’s compensation are generally allowed to all while free 
association, freedom of movement and the right to choose ones profession may not be, 
which directly affects one’s social integration and daily activities.  One exception could 
be direct political participation, suffrage or holding public office, not having so much of 
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an effect in the daily integration of the average social life of an immigrant.  Still, it does 
directly exclude him/her from the polity in which he/she resides. 
 So how is it that one may be partially or entirely integrated into a social welfare 
state, into a community, a nation and excluded from that same polity?  Individually, 
such an instance may not bear too much significance until the number of such a 
population reaches a certain percentage that causes this same immigrant population to 
have a great deal of say through the very representation that they are currently denied.  
Political parties generally recognize the potential of such a population, even court their 
favor in hopes of including them into the polity—that is of course if their numbers may 
take a seat on their side of the political spectrum, not the opposing side.  Thus, political 
integration may come to be, or be denied, not because it upholds the moral norms of a 
liberal democratic society, but because of a party in government that finds it in its best 
interest to include those that will vote for them in the future.  In a sense, it is liberal 
democratic principles that do bring this about, while maybe not the exact principles that 
one clings to with such high aspirations such as equality and justice; but instead, simply 
the systematic structure of the electoral system. 
 This being said, one would suppose that the inclusion, or exclusion, of 
immigrants into a society would merely be based upon the number of the immigration 
population and the opportunistic nature of a nation-state’s political parties.  While this 
cannot be completely negated, it is rather obvious that this is simply not the case.  
Nation-states on a whole do differentiate between a citizen and a permanent resident, in 
some cases only allowing citizenship to be attained if any other citizenship has been 
denounced.  In Spain, those allowed dual citizenship are citizens of former colonies, 
those geographically near, or that share a clear history with Spain.  Is it because there 
exists some cultural tie between them or because this population exists within Spanish 
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borders in great numbers?  In regards to its Latin American population both hold true 
seeing that they are great in numbers (30.5% of total documented immigrant population 
2007)54 and they have cultural ties; but Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and 
Portugal may simply be based on historical and cultural ties as they are also allowed 
dual citizenship55 and quicker access to naturalization (two years instead of 10 
including Sephardim Jews expelled in 1492).56   
As a result, the conclusion must be drawn in that the historical or cultural ties are 
a deciding feature in what Spain may consider to be an allowance for a third-country 
national to hold dual citizenship as well as earlier access to naturalization.  Just like the 
Republic of Germany’s famous focus on “Germaness,” there exists a prerequisite of 
“Spanishness,” or at least a Latino affiliation so as to make the process towards 
naturalization easier.  Not only easier, but also accessible if one is not willing to 
renounce previous citizenship, generally that being the case.   
In spite of reasons behind obvious preferences towards some immigrants and 
others in regards to access to citizenship, the truth of the matter is that some have a 
wider access and others do not.  In hope of not straying too far in applying a theoretical 
platform towards the understanding of immigrant integration policy in Spain, the focus 
should be upon the Spanish government’s will to integrate its immigrant population, its 
definition of such integration and the effectiveness of its application of said policy, not 
necessarily the effectiveness of an individual’s eventual internal integration; but 
instead of each individual’s equal access to said integration policy.    The specifics 
of said plan shall be delved into in the third part of this study, on paper, and 
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qualitatively in regards to interviews conducted with those that have taken part in its 
formation and its congruence or lack thereof with political theory structures will also be 
discussed and applied.   
Before doing so, the example of Germany’s immigration experience is 
presented, paired with its internal historical treatment of citizenry that has forever 
coincided within what is now considered to be the German nation-state, beginning with 
relations between regions, Länder, as early as the 19th century.  Historically, Germany’s 
treatment of immigration, represented consecutively by its allowance or negation of 
access to full citizenship, and sometimes its outright removal of said citizenship from 
ethnically different immigrants as well as its own ethnic emigrants over the years, has 
lead to a distinct definition of what is German and who may be considered to be full 
members of German society.  Ironically a country with a much longer history of 
immigration and a drawn out definition of who is a member, who is not, and who may 
be a candidate for membership, Germany offers a detailed example of the evolution of 
integration that has never once been separated from the issue of citizenry, even now.  
Curiously, instead of citizenship being at the forefront of immigration integration as in 
the case of Spanish policy as a way of including those that the Spanish government sees 
fit to receive full membership, it has been used as a tool of exclusion in Germany.  Until 
recently, the German citizen was only considered to be a full member and access to 
citizenship was solely based upon ethnic lines.  Even third-generation “temporary 
workers” were not considered as candidates for any type of integration as Germany 
proclaimed itself to not be a country of immigration; regardless how many immigrants 
lived within its borders.   Access to naturalization processes was not even an option, yet 
alone integration policy of any kind.  Since the turn of the millennium, Germany’s focus 
has been somewhat changed and an effort towards integration has been made, statist in 
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nature while carried out by regional government (Länder); and its historic evolution, 
ever so tied into the concept of citizenship, establishes a European experience and 
brings Spain’s much more recent experience into context. 
54 
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“For many years, the statement “Germany is not a country of immigration” summed up 
our country’s basic policy towards foreigners.  The fact that many people come to 
Germany for a wide variety if reasons and often stay for long periods, even 
permanently, was largely ignored.  Many people closed their eyes to the reality that 
Germany has long been a country of immigration.  The opportunities brought by 
immigration were squandered, while obvious problems were suppressed rather than 
dealt with.” 
                 —Otto Schily, German Federal Minister of the Interior, Foreword to     
                   Immigration Law and Policy 2005; Federal Ministry of the Interior 
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Germany’s Historical Treatment of Citizenship 
 
 “In Germany, the language of politics uses a terminology separating citizenship 
from nationality and identity.  Although both citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft) 
and nationality (Staatsangehörigbeit) are defined with reference to the state, the 
first is defined as an instrument, the second as a belonging.” 
                                           ————Rira Kastoryano, Sociological and Political Aspects of   
                                                         Dual Nationality in Germany, pg 170     
                                          
Keeping in touch with the two main focuses of this thesis, integration policy and  
the applicable treatment of citizenship as two concepts that can be compared and related 
to, but not severed one from the other, Germany’s approach towards both concepts may 
not allow for outright comparison.  Instead, simultaneous reference to both immigration 
experiences may allow for a clear alternate route towards an understanding of the 
relationship between citizenry and immigrant integration policy as a whole.  Again, in 
regards to the Spanish government, citizenship has been a limited access point used as 
an assumed “intercultural exchange” process of partially adjusting to the autochthonous 
society, along with expedited access for those foreign populations with some sort of 
historical likeness such as Latin Americans.  When it comes to the German government, 
up until quite recently, those that were not ethnically considered to be German, could 
not have any access towards naturalization processes, regardless of historical ties or 
length of stay.  Therefore, there is a clear difference as to the approach towards 
integration policy in both countries—up to a point though as both governments lean 
towards naturalization as the ultimate level of integration.  Access to such a degree of 
integration is quite another matter.  Since Germany has allowed for naturalization of its 
immigrant population at the turn of the millennium, its focus has ultimately been on 
naturalization, as total rights are only guaranteed to Germans within its very 
constitution.  While the definition of Germaness has been broader in order to include 
non-ethnic Germans, the ultimate goal of integration policy, if one were to measure its 
efficacy when total equality is achieved at least on paper, would be outright immigrant 
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naturalization.  All in all, naturalization in Germany is rather difficult and involved for 
practically all those concerned as its requisites are not limited solely to length of stay 
and thus bureaucratic process. 
From the German standpoint, its historical treatment of immigrants has come 
about in different ways and in different historical times.  The recent influx of Turkish 
immigrants is what currently makes the German immigration experience most renown, 
while most of its policies came about in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
Historically, citizenship became a necessary tool in assigning territorial boundaries to a 
moving population, that no longer was restricted by the Agrarian system in the early 
19th century as the liberation of peasants and the breakup of the Ständish social order 
took place.  Before that, in 1794, the legal code Allgemeines Landrecht (ALR) under 
Fredrick the Great had freed the peasants as ‘free citizens of the state’ while still making 
them subjects to their rural lords.  The Stände were corporations and guilds that were 
autonomous in the middle ages but state-regulated under the ALR so as not to pose a 
threat to monarchical rule.  Just as modern immigration is a process encouraged by 
economic need, so was early immigration within pre-German Confederation times.   
Poverty persisted, either as a result of industrialization or simply the same poor that had 
previously had been under the protection or responsibility of regional lords, and the 
impoverished began to move, making municipalities unwilling to be responsible for 
foreign poor, even as the ALR guaranteed every “Bürger” the right to state support.  
Basically, state-membership came about as a reaction to the expulsion of the unwanted 
poor and while families, guilds, corporations, rural lords and municipalities were held 
responsible for their poor, the state was responsible for organizing the system.  After the 
establishment of the German Confederation in 1815, freedom of movement was 
encouraged, especially in an age of mercantilism, but expulsions of the poor and 
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criminals became commonplace.  Treaties were signed in order to regulate expulsion of 
unwanted foreign poor or criminals which affirmed that a state could expel into a 
second state only members of that second state and that any state was bound to accept 
any of its members.  Citizenship was originally a simple means of excluding those 
unwanted.57 It was these relations between different states that led to the very definition 
of citizenship in its day, further clarifying the idea that the two, immigration and 
citizenship even in modern day times cannot be separated; but instead they are linked, 
embodied in the very approach that each nation-state adopts in dealing with the two 
concepts simultaneously.58  As a result, membership in a state, or citizenship came to be 
associated with a territory based on who could expel who and where: inclusion and 
exclusion were the same two main aspects of concern the same as they are today. 
 In his book, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany, Eli Nathans systematically 
plows through the history of citizenship in Germany, starting in the mid 19th century 
until today.  Up until the 1990’s it seemed that Germany’s immigration law had been 
built upon a Prussian law in 1842, the Untertanengesetz, that “… made descent from a 
Prussian father the principal basis for the transmission of status as a Prussian, and also 
implied that henceforth allegiance to Prussia was to be exclusive.  Prussian subjects 
were to be the subjects of no other state.”59  Prussia had always been much more liberal 
than other states and accepted immigrants, thinking them to be good for their economy 
as a source for labor.  Locally, outsiders were not widely accepted, while the state 
encouraged population growth.  While Prussia accepted a great deal of immigrants, its 
own poor were not allowed to settle and so they began to sign treaties with other states 
                                                 
57Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany pgs. 57-59, 68-69  
58“Thus citizenship, as a formally defined, externally bounded membership status,  
      was not the product of the internal development of the modern state.  Rather, it emerged from the     
      dynamics of interstate relations within a geographically compact, culturally consolidated,    
      economically unified, and politically (loosely) integrated state system.” Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship  
     and Nationhood in France and Germany pg. 70 
59Nathans, Eli, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany, pg 55. 
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in order to regulate as mentioned before, another practice that still exists in the transfer 
of temporary workers through bilateral agreements between nation-states.  For example, 
a treaty was signed with Bavaria, in 1818, in which only those with a connection to a 
state could be expelled to it.  The definition of such a connection is the curious aspect of 
the deal between the two states so early in the century:  
“1. birth to parents who were state members  
  2. birth to homeless parents within state borders  
  3. marriage and independent economic activity  
  4. ten years of tolerated residence (except for servants, students, journeymen    
      and the like)”60
 
Membership to a German state in this era holds almost the exact same qualifications as 
today, if you add the 1842 Prussian law which allows membership to only one state, 
having only recently changed, unclearly changed as it may be, in the Republic of 
Germany today. 
 After the revolutions of 1848 and 1849, the reaction of the state towards the very 
sort of liberal ideas that had guided its immigration policy up until then, also had the 
state and administration in fear of losing its own footing in power.  Economic growth 
and social aid were replaced with the strengthening of the existence of the state and 
foreigners were held in fear of bringing with them revolutionary ideas.61
 In 1885, Bismarck ordered the expulsion of foreign Jews and Poles in the eastern 
provinces of Prussia, ending their immigration and from 1885-1888, 20,000 foreign 
Poles and 10,000 foreign Jews were pushed out. The Poles had not allowed themselves 
to be “Germanized” and the Jews were just as blamed for trying too hard to fit in while 
the jealousy towards their economic and social success brewed.  Clearly put by the 
author, “Unlike most Poles, German Jews avidly sought cultural integration into 
German life.  But the high level of Jewish integration prompted more hostility than the 
                                                 
60 Nathans, Eli, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany, pg 22. 
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Polish efforts to remain separate.”62  Politically, the Poles were feared because Prussia 
did not want them to gain the same autonomy that they enjoyed in Austria-Hungary, the 
French could have possibly used them in an anti-German coalition with Polish 
nationalism as a base, and there was a hope that such anti-Polish policies would create 
some sort of bond with Russia. 63
 One also may keep in mind that in 1871, one fourth of ethnic Germans lived 
outside the state: 9 million in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 1.5 million in Russia and 2 
million overseas mainly in the U.S. with another 3 million to follow by the end of the 
century, making Germany a strong emigration nation-state then to later primarily 
become a nation-state of immigration.  70% of 2.7 million Swiss spoke German and 
within German borders there were quite a bit of non-ethnic Germans: 2.5 ethnic Poles; 
300,000 Masurians (Polish speaking Lutherans), 1.5 inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine that 
mostly identified themselves with the French nation, not German; 512,000 Jews; 
200,000 Danes, 160,000 Sorbs; 120,000 Lithuanians; and 75,000 Czechs.  Practically all 
were German citizens and the idea was to homogenize them all; but either their rejection 
in some cases, or fear of overly integrating them to the extreme of infiltration, in the 
case of the Jews, did not lead to a successfully homogenized German state.64
 After Bismarck was no longer in power, agricultural workers were needed and 
Prussia again allowed Russian Poles in as workers, but only on a seasonal basis, and 
naturalization, or lack of access to it, became the primary weapon against permanent 
immigration, as early as the turn of the century, a practice that was to continue through 
until the turn of the millennium.  A 1904 treatise singled out Jews, Poles, Czechs and 
Danes, making it much harder for them to be naturalized.  Various factors applied to 
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such exclusion, such as the Jews tendency to vote for the Progressive Party (in 
opposition in the 1890’s) and surprisingly part of the coalition when the treatise came 
about.  Fear of Jewish success even disregarded their political support of the 
government at the time, and while Poles were discriminated less so in regards to the 
availability of naturalization, more Jews were naturalized between 1905 to 1907 simply 
because their work was done more openly to the public eye than Poles, therefore 
making naturalization necessary.  In regards to the Danes, it was harder to exclude them 
since a treaty that ended the war with Denmark in 1864 had agreed to allow them to 
reside in Schleswig.  The Czechs were treated like poles in areas where they could have 
an influence on the elections, in Silesia for example.65
 Still, it is the 1913 Wilhelmine citizenship law that is most known as the law that 
has shaped Germany’s outlook towards citizenry, being part of the Kaiser’s Weltpolitik 
plan to spread Germany’s trade and power throughout the globe.  Above all, 
Wilhelmine wished to bind Germans abroad to the homeland, increasing Germany’s 
influence through them and so he abolished the 1870 law that said they were to lose 
their citizenship if they left German borders in ten years time without having come 
back, and immediately if they left without formal permission.  Thus the jus soli 
approach to Germans outside their territorial boundaries that ironically rejected them, 
became jus sanguinis for all—inside and outside German territory.  At all times, any 
citizenship was dependent upon military service and with the outbreak of WWI, 
naturalization was offered more freely to minorities and German men as well were 
called home to return to the Fatherland several times during the war.66
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 Even so, after the loss of WWI, those Germans outside Germany saw the loss of 
their citizenship positively.67  Therefore, as Germans themselves outside the Kaiser’s 
reach did not wish to continue in the possession of their ethnic citizenship, 
Wilhelmine’s Weltpolitik was over, as Germans citizens abroad could not or would not 
hold the influence intended and Germany stood without even a conscript army. 
 Also after the war, citizenship was granted almost automatically to those 
Germans who were on territories taken by the Treaty of Versailles as well as to ethnic 
Germans “…(deutschstämmige Ausländer) who have never been citizens, as long as 
they preserved the German outlook (deutsche Gesinnung) and German special nature 
(Eigennart) while abroad.”  Questions asked by officials in order to gain citizenship 
included language instruction, whether or not children had been raised with a German 
education only, whether siblings lived abroad, whether individuals maintained any type 
of relation with nationals if a foreign country, whether the individual spoke fluent 
German or with a strong foreign accent, and again whether the applicant really had a 
German nature and ethnicity. 68  As a result, even though obvious ethnic aspects formed 
part of the requisites for German citizenship beforehand—this is why the 1913 law is so 
mentioned in regards to laws that have only been changed just recently—Wilhelmine’s 
call to the ethnic Germans to return during the war only exacerbated the tendency, along 
with the fact that after the war, Germans outside the territory were not that interested in 
being Germans anymore.  “Germaness” inside and outside the territory thus became 
genuinely jus sanguinis in every way leading right up to the entry of the Nazi regime, 
                                                 
67“Soon after the end of the war it became apparent that many Germans viewed the loss of German 
citizenship not as a punishment but as a favor.  In England the private property of German nationals had 
been confiscated during the war, and at the war’s end many such individuals sought to regain their 
possessions by demonstrating that they had in fact lost German citizenship through the passage of ten 
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while from 1924-27 neither Nazis nor Communists were allowed entry visas.  In fact, 
Hitler himself only became German one month before his presidential election in 1932. 
 Little by little, Germany’s openness to immigration weakened, partially because 
of the great Depression, and in part because as Germany’s presence in lost territories 
weakened, so did their claim to those same lost territories.  In 1929, a three-year 
residency requirement was insisted upon for all ethnic Germans to have access to 
naturalization.69  During all this time, while treatment towards Jews was lightened in 
hopes of a positive reaction internationally in regards to negotiations of lost territories 
and fear of German treatment of minorities might effect the treatment of their own 
minorities outside its territories, deportation and internment camp placement of 
unemployed Jews did start in 1920.  At all times, it was the concern over immigrants 
truly being German that lead to the criticism of minorities and Jews in particular.70  
Bavaria even proposed a twenty-year residence requirement for Jews and all other East 
Europeans and even succeeded in amending the 1913 law insisting that naturalization 
lists must be presented to all the Länder so that they had the right to object, and in the 
case of such an objection, the Bundsrat would have to resolve the conflict.  Bavaria 
consistently used this power to object to all of the Jews that Prussia put on its own list, 
Prussia still being the most liberal in its immigration policies like always.  Prussia 
continually objected and was able to keep Bavaria from influencing its liberal approach 
until 1931 when the Reichsrat, controlled by right-wing government, made the twenty-
year requirement mandatory for all the states, including Prussia.71
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 In 1920, the Nazi’s program in regards to immigration had insisted that all 
immigration of non-Germans should be prevented and that all non-Germans that had 
immigrated into German since the 2nd of August 1914 should be forced out of Germany 
One of the first actions of the Nazi government was to ban the naturalization of Eastern 
European Jews in August of 1933, and the government stopped all naturalization of 
‘non-Aryans,’ since in March of that same year the government had seized control of all 
Land governments—the autonomy to follow one’s own immigration policy was ended 
in the Länder.  On the 14th of July 1933 the Reich was allowed to take away citizenship 
to all those who had been naturalized between the 9th of November 1918 to the 30th of 
January 1933.  As a result, 6,943 Jews lost citizenship as well as 3,544 non-Jews not 
including family members.  On the 14th of July, 1933, a denaturalization process started 
for those whose “´conduct…violates the duty of the loyalty of the Reich and the 
[German] Volk and damages German interests.’”  Before 1937, 291 emigrants lost their 
citizenship this way, 566 in 1937, 1,300 in1939 and 1,268 in 1940 primarily so that the 
government could confiscate Jewish property.  In October of 1941 Jews had begun to be 
sent to the Ghettos and death camps and in November of that same year, if a Jew left 
Germany, their property was confiscated. 
 One of the most interesting aspects of Nazi rule was their approach towards the 
redefinition of citizenship within German borders.  Germans were divided into first and 
second-class citizens.  Under the Nuremberg Citizenship Law of September 1935, 
Ethnic Germans (Reichsbürger) were considered be first class citizens, allowed to vote 
and hold public office.  On the other hand, Jews and ‘racial’ Germans who were under 
political doubt were the second-class citizens (Staatsangehörige), not to mention those 
with one or two Jewish Grandparents (Mischlinge) whom were generally not sent to 
death camps or subject to the same fines, although marriage to an Aryan required prior 
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permission if one had two Jewish grandparents.  Also, as the war went on, military 
needs became greater and the definition of ‘German’ became wider.72  Overall, in 
regards to the extent of which Nazi policy carried on with the historical pretexts of 
Bismarck and other earlier regimes, Nathans insists that while Hitler demonstrated the 
same sort of “obsessive insecurity” he did not simply continue with Bismarck’s 
policies.73  Overall, the definition of citizenship was constantly redefined based upon 
the different needs and historical contexts of each government, but the transfer from a 
geographical definition towards an ethnic one, while erratic, was clear.  
  
It was the Federal Republic of Germany’s constitution of May 23, 1949 that 
sought to repair and separate itself from the Nazi regime.  German citizens who had lost 
their citizenship were given it back, as well as their children.  A law in 1955 gave 
citizenship to those that had been put on the expanded Volksliste categories of 
citizenship that had been given to those outside the 1937 borders by Nazi authorities, 
effectively allowing the right to refuge to over five million ethnic Germans from the 
Soviet bloc and the German Democratic Republic to West Germany from 1949 to 1990.  
While the building of the wall in 1961 slowed such migration, the fall of the Soviet 
Union sped it up again. 74
 This brings us to the more recent history of the millions of temporary workers 
employed in the 1960s.  In September of 1973, right before the temporary worker 
recruitment ended, there were 3,966,200 alien immigrants of whom 893,600 were 
Turkish, 673,300 were Yugoslav, and 622,000 were Italian.  Between 1980 and 2000, 
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2,663,058 requested asylum and while only ten percent had it granted, most stayed 
anyway.  More than anything, Germany is commonly known for its insistence on the 
‘temporary’ nature of its foreign workers that became anything but temporary.75  And 
so, the temporary nature of Turkish workers in Germany was limited by its membership 
to the EEC and later the EU.   
In 1973, the recession stopped the recruitment of more foreign workers and in 
1983, 80% of Germans wanted the supposed “guest workers” to leave as unemployment 
soared from 3.8% in 1980 to 9.1% in 1983.    The CDU-FDP coalition government even 
offered immigrants a lump sum offer to return to their original countries in order to 
compensate for pension and unemployment loss, special loans so as to build houses in 
their own countries and made it more difficult for families to reunite.  Such a practice is 
rather reminiscent of the Spanish government’s recent offers of the accumulation of 
their pension funds in order to return to their native countries as well as Spanish banks’ 
cooperation in offering loans for houses bought overseas, more specifically in Latin 
American destinations and in light of recent economic crisis.  In the end, since foreign 
immigrants were not successfully made to leave Germany, it was the naturalization laws 
that became the final official impediment for these populations to incorporate fully into 
society.  In regards to Spanish policy, it is the very populations that are encouraged to 
leave, negating the possibility of return, that also have quick access to naturalization 
processes. 
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67 
German Naturalization Policy 
 
 In 1977, the national guidelines for immigration simply stated, “‘the Federal 
Republic of Germany is not a land of immigration.  It does not desire to increase the 
number of citizens through naturalization.’” In order to become a citizen, one had to live 
as a legal resident in Germany for 10 years—except in the case of spouses of German 
citizens and if there existed a ‘clear public interest’; the individual had acquired a 
‘voluntary and lasting inclination [Hinwendung] to Germany’; democratic convictions; 
‘adaptation to German living conditions’; and no ‘misdevelopments of the personality’ 
which could include alcohol or drug abuse.  The price of naturalization could be up to 
5,000 marks although it was usually around 1,800, spouses paying half and refugees a 
quarter.  In order to maintain a historical perspective, it had improved since in Bavaria 
before 1970 the fees had reached a high if 12,000, a health certificate was no longer 
required, and one no longer had to belong to the “German cultural world.” 76
 It was in April of 1989 that the change of national Interior Minister went from 
conservative to moderate (Friedrich Zimmermann to Wolfgang Schäuble) and in Spring 
of 1990 the national guidelines were amended so that naturalization would be granted to 
those that had lived legally within the Federal republic for eight years, attended a 
German school for six, had given up prior citizenships and had not been convicted of a 
crime.  The charge was lowered to 100 marks, to be raised in 1993 to 500 marks.  You 
had to be between the ages of 16 and 24 in order for these rules to apply, and those who 
had legally resided in Germany for 15 years were generally granted citizenship if they 
were able to support their families and had committed no crime.  Astonishingly, a great 
deal of Länders actually allowed dual citizenship, 45% in 1993, lowering to 20% in 
later in the 1990s as Turkey made it even easier to regain citizen’s rights after formally 
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renouncing them in the acquisition of German citizenship.  As a result, Turkish 
naturalizations went from 1,713 in 1989 to 103,900 in 1999. 77  Finally, in 1999, the 
citizenship law changed giving citizenship to all those born in Germany with parents 
who had legally resided for eight years, having lived three years with the unlimited right 
to remain.  Otto Schilly, the SPD Interior Minister stated one of the reasons for the 
change in citizenship law quite well, emphasizing the allowance of the same right to 
foreigners that are given to Germans: 
“…the result will be the progressive alienation for the immigrants, the young 
people who grow up in immigrant families will turn their backs on the society, 
immigrants will live increasingly in ghettos, [Germans and foreigners will live] 
in parallel societies.”78
 
The new law came into effect in January of 2000 with the double jus soli principle of 
both eight years of simple residency (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) and three years of 
unlimited residency (Aufenthaltserlaunbnis).  Dual citizenship is of course a result of 
such a law, as most children do inherit citizenship through their parents and Germany 
does require that a naturalized German under this law declare their choice of citizenship 
at the age of eighteen—failure to do so results in the loss of their German citizenship.  If 
the eighteen-year-old chooses to renounce their other citizenship in order to retain 
German citizenship, their renunciation must be proved.  One may retain both 
citizenships if the renunciation of the other is impossible or unreasonable, or if 
multinationality is allowed under the Aliens Act provisions.79
 As of 2005, the Aliens Act, or Residence Act, was changed in several different 
ways.  First of all, the number of types of residence permits went from five to two in 
order to simplify the process.  First, there is the “temporary residence title” which is 
subject to a time limit depending upon the purpose of residence. (Residence Act, 
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Section 7)    Then, there is the “Settlement Permit”, a permanent residence title that 
entitles the holder to pursue any economic activity without geographic restrictions. 
(Residence Act, Section 8) 80  As one can observe, it is just a bit complicated as it 
should be noted that this version in 2007 is different from the 2005 version where it was 
more specific in point number four.  Instead of a general “breach of public safety” it 
stated that “he or she has not been sentenced to a term of youth custody or a prison term 
                                                 
80 In order to be granted a settlement permit, the foreigner must fulfill the following requisites:  
“1. he or she has held a residence permit for five years, 
2. his or her livelihood is secure, 
3. he or she has paid compulsory or voluntary contributions into the statutory pension scheme for at least 
60 months or furnishes evidence of an entitlement to comparable benefits from an insurance or pension 
scheme or from an insurance company; time off for the purposes of child care or nursing at home shall be 
duly taken into account, 
4. the granting of such a residence permit is not precluded by reasons of public safety or order, 
according due consideration to the severity or the nature of the breach of public safety or order or the 
danger emanating from the foreigner, with due regard to the duration of the foreigner’s stay to date 
and the existence of ties in the Federal territory, 
5. he or she is permitted to be in employment, insofar as he or she is in employment, 
6. he or she is in possession of the other permits which are required for the purpose of the permanent 
pursuit of his or her economic activity, 
7. he or she has an adequate knowledge of the German language, 
8. he or she possesses a basic knowledge of the legal and social system and the way of life in the Federal 
territory and 
9. he or she possesses sufficient living space for himself or herself and the members of his or her family 
forming part of his or her household. 
The requirements of sentence 1, nos. 7 and 8 shall be deemed to be fulfilled if an integration course has 
been successfully completed. These requirements shall be waived if the foreigner is unable to fulfill them 
on account of a physical, mental or psychological illness or handicap. The requirements of sentence 1, 
nos. 7 and 8 may also be waived in order to avoid hardship. The aforesaid requirements shall further be 
waived if the foreigner is able to communicate verbally in the German language at a basic level and has 
not been entitled to participate in an integration course pursuant to Section 44 (3), no. 2 or has not been 
obliged to participate in an integration course pursuant to Section 44a (2), no. 3. The requirements of 
sentence 1, nos. 2 and 3 shall also be waived if the foreigner is unable to fulfill them due to the grounds 
stated in sentence 3. (3) In the case of cohabiting spouses, it shall suffice if the requirements in 
accordance with subsection 2, sentence 1, nos. 3, 5 and 6 are fulfilled by one spouse. The requirement in 
accordance with sub-section 2, sentence 1, no. 3 shall be waived, if the foreigner is undergoing education 
or training which leads to a recognised academic or vocational qualification. Sentence 1 shall apply 
mutatis mutandis in the cases covered by Section 26 (4). (4) In the case of convicted foreigners, the 
period specified in sub-section 2, sentence 1, no. 4 shall begin on release from imprisonment. The 
following periods shall be taken into account with regard to the periods of possession of a residence 
permit which are necessary in order to qualify for issuance of a settlement permit: 
1. The duration of former possession of a residence permit or settlement permit, if the foreigner was in 
possession of a settlement permit at the time of leaving the Federal territory, minus the duration of 
intermediate stays outside of the Federal territory which led to expiry of the settlement permit; a 
maximum of four years shall be taken into account. 
2. A maximum of six months for each stay outside of the Federal territory which has not led to expiry of 
the residence permit. 
3. Half of the period of lawful stay for the purposes of study or vocational training in the Federal 
territory.”German Federal Ministry of the Interior. Residence Act of 30 July 2004 (Federal Law  
Gazette I, p. 1950), last amended by the Act on Implementation of Residence- and Asylum-Related 
Directives of the European Union of 19 August 2007, pgs. 8-9. 
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of at least six months or a fine of at least 180 daily rates due to an intentionally 
committed offence.”81  So, their ability to turn down the application for a permanent 
residency is even more obscure. 
 Another interesting topic is present in Section 47 titled: “Prohibition and 
restriction of political activities”82  Essentially, this is an extremely obscure, ambiguous 
means of restricted political activity.  Some of the statements such as that of (1)3 that 
states, “contravene the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany “ or (1)4 that mentions, 
“respects human dignity” could be that applied to all citizens in general.  Even those in 
(2) that speak of “codified standards of international law” of “inciting violence”, 
“advocated attacks or threatened attacks” since these again are standards that all citizens 
made be held to.  Even so, the phrase such as “impair or endanger the development of 
informed political opinion” or “may be counter to the interests of the Federal Republic 
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82 “(1) Foreigners may pursue political activities within the bounds of the  
prevailing general statutory provisions. A foreigner's political activities may be restricted or prohibited if 
they 
1. impair or endanger the development of informed political opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the peaceful co-existence of Germans and foreigners or of different groups of foreigners in the Federal 
territory, public safety and law and order or any other substantial interests of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 
2. may be counter to the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of foreign policy or to 
the obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany under international law, 
3. contravene the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, particularly in connection with the use of 
violence, 
4. are intended to promote parties, other organisations, establishments or activities outside of the Federal 
territory whose aims or means are incompatible with the fundamental values of a system of government 
which respects human dignity. 
 
(2) A foreigner's political activities shall be prohibited if they 
 
1. endanger the free and democratic constitutional system or the security of the Federal Republic of 
Germany or contravene the codified standards of international law, 
2. publicly support, advocate or incite to the use of violence as a means of enforcing political, religious or 
other interests or are capable of inciting such violence or 
3. support organisations, political movements or groups within or outside of the Federal territory which 
have initiated, advocated or threatened attacks on persons or objects in the Federal territory or attacks on 
Germans or German establishments outside of the Federal territory.”German Federal Ministry of the 
Interior. Residence Act of 30 July 2004 (Federal Law  
Gazette I, p. 1950), last amended by the Act on Implementation of Residence- and Asylum-Related 
Directives of the European Union of 19 August 2007, pg 35. 
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of Germany” again, seem to be rather ambiguous and not that enlightening in the sense 
that freedom of expression could be limited.  Then again, the whole process blatantly 
not democratic in that the interested parties, the third-country immigrants, do not take 
part in the electoral process.  One must also consider that the right to freedom of 
assembly and association is not guaranteed for immigrants in the German constitution, 
even though it is guaranteed thorough legislation in The Act on Assemblies and 
Processions that guarantees assembly and the Act Governing Private83 associations the 
right to associations—legislation that has not be incorporated in the constitution, 
German Basic Law. 
 Still, within in an official document from the German Ministry explaining 
Immigration Law and Policy, in regards to integration it is stated that,  
“Immigrants are required to learn German, through their own efforts and with 
state help, and to know and respect the basic values of our society.  And German 
society is called on to recognize and remove existing barriers in order to give 
immigrants equal treatment and equal access to all important areas of society, 
politics and the economy.”84
 
It is also stated that while third-country immigrants cannot vote in municipal elections 
as EU members, they can be naturalized now as complete citizens as the result of the 
new naturalization policies of 2000.  Thus, while the statement above is quite contrary 
to the reality of third-country immigrants to gaining “equal access to all important areas 
of society, politics and the economy” the idea is that through the naturalization process, 
full access in the form of full citizenship can be attained (with sufficient knowledge of 
German, having completed an integration course and after seven years as long as the 
applicant does not have any ‘record of anti-constitutional activities’ as of 200585)  
Ultimately, full integration is not that unlike the Spanish government’s approach; while 
                                                 
83 German Federal Ministry of the Interior. Immigration Law and Policy; www.bmi.bund.de; pg 48. 
 
84 German Federal Ministry of the Interior. Immigration Law and Policy; www.bmi.bund.de; pg 40. 
 
85 German Federal Ministry of the Interior. Immigration Law and Policy; www.bmi.bund.de; pg 88. 
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Spain may vaguely refer to them as citizens, at least Germany is quite clear in admitting 
that absolute integration is considered be achieved by becoming a full German citizen,   
Again, all is fine and well until the mention of ‘anti-constitutional activities’ which 
surely in some cases are more than justified, but what about the obscure cases when the 
declaration of any such activities could be used as an excuse to not allow naturalization? 
Now, residence permits are either unlimited in duration or limited and they are 
both based upon the purpose of entry (vocational training, gainful employment, family 
migration, humanitarian reasons, etc…).  Procedures have been further simplified into 
one process once the labor administration has consented to the work permit.  Entry is 
based upon the level of skill: highly skilled and qualified workers can begin to work 
upon arrival with an establishment permit and the unskilled are generally banned with 
some exceptions (not including those admitted under family reunification).   
In regards to certain qualified professions, the ten new EU countries are given 
priority over third countries, but they are still subject to a priority check to see if any 
German or EU national is available first.  Also, those family members joining a relative 
in Germany have the same labor market access as the relative, and there is no longer a 
one year waiting period before they may start working.  Finally, language instruction 
and orientation to German law, history and culture is available to new arrivals and a 
limited amount of prior resident immigrants.  “Integration Courses” are compulsory for 
immigrants lacking knowledge of the German language and a minimum level is 
required for permanent residency, as well as language requirements for family members 
of ethnic Germans.86
 Up until the 2000 change in the Nationality Law, it seemed that the right to 
citizenship was a serious impediment to full integration in German society of third-
                                                 
86 OECD International Migration Outlook Annual Report 2006 Edition 
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country nationals.  For some reason, it seems to internally hypocritically criticize liberal 
democratic tendencies to have such a population present without the right to full 
membership.  Curiously or not so, the percentage of those actually naturalizing has not 
changed much.  As you can see in the following table, there was a slight increase in 
naturalization of Turkish immigrants right up until the year 2000, right before those 
born foreign were no longer foreign and naturalization was not an issue.  The 
percentage of Turkish naturalization and even the whole immigrant population is very 
much the same in 2004 as it was in 1998 (Turks 0.8% 1998 and 0.7% 2004; Total 1.5% 
1998 and 1.9% 2004).  Regardless, the question is to whether or not naturalization has 
become the last barrier that has been knocked down in order to let way for further 
integration, or is it further assimilation really for those willing, since full integration is 
not offered for those that do not become citizens?   
Table 2.1 - Naturalization in Germany 1998-2005 
 
Country 
1998 
               % of total   
              immigrant   
             population 
1999 
             % of total  
            immigrant
           population
2000 
            % of total  
            immigrant
           population
2001 
% of total
immigrant
population
2002 
% of total
immigrant
population
2003 
% of total
immigrant
population
2004 
% of total
immigrant
population
2005 
% of total 
immigrant 
population 
Turkey 59,664 .8% 103,900* 1.4% 82,861 1.1% 76,573 1% 64,631 .9% 56,244 .8% 44,465 .7% 32,661 .7% 
Iran 1,171 <.1% 1,529 <.1% 14,410 .2% 12,020 .16% 13,026 .17% 9,440 .1% 6,362 <.1% 4,482 <.1% 
Afghanistan 1,200 <.1% 1,355 <.1% 4,773 <.1% 5,111 <.1% 4,750 <.1% 4,948 <.1% 4,077 <.1% 3,133 <.1% 
Morocco 4,981 <.1% 4,312 <.1% 5,008 <.1% 4,425 <.1% 3,800 <.1% 4,118 <.1% 3,820 <.1% 3,684 <.1% 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
2,404 <.1% 3,120 <.1% 9,776 .1% 12,000 .16% 8,375 .1% 5,504 <.1% 3,539 <.1% 8,824 <.1% 
Lebanon 1,782 <.1% 2,491 <.1% 5,673 <.1% 4,486 <.1% 3,300 <.1% 2,651 <.1% 2,265 <.1% 1,969 <.1% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3,469 <.1% 3,745 <.1% 4,002 <.1% 3,791 <.1% 2,357 <.1% 1,770 <.1% 2,103 <.1% 1,907 <.1% 
Croatia 2,198 <.1% 1,536 <.1% 3,316 <.1% 3,931 <.1% 2,974 <.1% 2,048 <.1% 1,689 <.1% 1,287 <.1% 
Vietnam 3,452 <.1% 2,270 <.1% 4,489 <.1% 3,014 <.1% 1,482 <.1% 1,423 <.1% 1,371 <.1% 1,278 <.1% 
Other 
Countries 26,469 .4% 18,412 .3% 52,380 .7% 52,747 .7% 49,852 .7% 52,585 .7% 57,462 .9% 57,462 .9% 
Total 106,790 1.5% 142,670 1.9% 186,688 2.6% 178,098 2.4% 154,547 2.1% 140,731 1.9% 127,153 1.9% 117,241 1.9% 
 
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook Annual Report 2006 
*Note the height of naturalization for the Turkish population was in 1999, the year before the 2000 law took effect and foreign births were no longer “foreign” 
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Still, second and third generations from now on will be German even though 
they will have to eventually decide upon one nationality or the other as adults (unless 
this stipulation is eventually withdrawn also).  Even so, it is curious that those that live 
within a country’s borders may not want to be full members of that nation-state.  One 
reason could be their inability to keep their own citizenship from their native land and 
that they intend to move back to the land they were born in.  Another explanation could 
also be that for emotional reasons they do not feel to be a citizen of the nation-state that 
they are currently living in and for that reason it does not simply feel right to naturalize.  
Still, more than likely the true reason could be that they simply do not find it at all 
necessary, so they do not even bother considering it since all of their pertinent social, 
civil and political rights necessary to their well-being are taken care of as a permanent 
resident.  When it comes down to it, while ideology and theoretical supposition may 
play its part, economic immigrants are above all a population of pragmatic entities in 
that the very reason for their existence is one of practicality—the need for work and 
economic security.  Thus, the gaining of citizenship, or the lack thereof may simply be 
tied to a bureaucratic need of said citizenship, simple geographical security if you will, 
not necessarily an emotional bond to their home country or host country as first 
generation immigrants.  Therefore, if bureaucratic needs are met, and their existence is 
secure, the jump towards citizenship may not be completely necessary—or the next 
wave may be to come once their seven years have been satisfied of permanent residency 
so that may be even considered for German citizenship in the first place. 
 
Table 2.2 - Foreign national residents in Germany 1998-2005 
 
 
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook Annual Report 2006 Edition/2007 Edition 
*Note change in 2004—relatively stable number of foreign residents up until that time: change due to AZR register cross check and decline in number of foreign births (result 
of 2000 law granting of nationality at birth for children with one parent resident of eight years and right to permanent residence) 
Country 1998 
% of total 
1999               
% of total 
2000 
% of total 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
% of total % of total % of total % of total % of total 
Turkey 2,110,200 28.8% 2,053,600 28%   1,998,500 27.4% 1,947,900 26.6% 1,912,200 26.1% 1,877,700 25.7% 1,764,300 26% 1,764,000 26% 
Italy 612,000 8.4% 615,900 8.4% 619,100 8.4% 616,300 8.4% 609,800 8.3% 601,300 8.2% 548,200 8.1% 540,800 8% 
Former  
Yugoslavia --------- ------- --------- ----- ---------- ------- ---------- ------- ---------- ------- ----------- -------- 381,600 5.6% 196,900 2.9% 
Greece 363,500 5% 364,400 5% 365,400 5% 362,700 5% 359,400 4.9% 354,600 4.8% 316,000 4.7% 309,000 4.6% 
Poland 283,600 3.9% 291,700 4% 301,400 4.1% 310,400 4% 317,600 4.3% 326,900 4.5% 292,100 4.3% 326,600 4.8% 
Croatia 208,900 2.9% 214,000 2.9% 216,800 3% 223,800 3% 231,000 3.1% 236,600 3.2 229,200 3.4% 228,900 3.4% 
Russian  
Federation 81,100 1.1% 98,400 1.3% 115,900 1.5% 136,100 1.9% 155,600 2.1% 173,500 2.4% 178,600 2.7% 185,900 2.8% 
Austria 185,200 2.5% 186,100 2.5% 187,700 2.5% 189,000 2.6% 189,300 2.6% 189,500 2.6% 174,000 2.6% 174,800 2.6% 
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina 190,100 2.6% 167,700 2.3% 156,300 2.1% 159,000 2% 163,800 2.2% 167,100 2.3% 156,000 2.3% 156,900 2.3% 
Ukraine 63,800 .9% 76,800 1% 89,300 1.2% 103,500 1.4% 116,000 1.6% 126,000 1.7% 128,100 1.9% 130,700 1.9% 
Serbia and  
Montenegro 719,500 9.8% 737,200 10% 662,500 9% 627,500 8.6% 591,500 8% 568,200 7.7% 125,800 1.9% 297,000 4.4% 
Portugal 132,600 1.8% 132,600 1.8% 133,700 2% 132,600 2% 131,400 2% 130,600 1.8% 116,700 1.7% 115,600 1.7% 
Netherlands 112,100 1.5% 110,500 1.5% 110,800 1.5% 112,400 1.5% 115,200 1.6% 118,700 1.6% 114,100 1.7% 118,600 1.8% 
Spain 131,100 1.8% 129,900 1.8% 129,400 1.8% 128,700 2% 127,500 1.7% 126,000 1.7% 108,300 1.6% 107,800 1.6% 
France 105,800 1.4% 107,200 1.5% 110,200 1.5% 111,300 1.5% 112,400 1.5% 113,000 1.5% 100,500 1.5% 102,200 1.5% 
Other  
Countries 2,020,100 27.6% 2,057,800 28% 2,099,800 28.8% 2,157,300 29.5% 2,203,000 30% 2,225,200 30.3% 2,005,300 30% 1,999,300 29.6% 
Total 7,319,600 7,343,600 7,296,800 7,318,600 7,335,600 7,334,800 6,738,700* 6,755,800 
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German Judiciary and Political Parties 
  
Germany’s judiciary is curious in that the German Basic Law (GBL), Germany’s 
constitution, originated in 1949 came before the immigrant, post-war experience.   Even as 
recent history may have provided cause for a more direct reference to its immigration 
situation, there still remains no direct mention of immigrants or foreigners in the German 
constitution.  Instead, it makes reference to the importance of “everyone’s rights,” with a 
focus on “human dignity” in direct reaction to the Nazi experience, and “German rights.”  
German rights include: freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of travel and 
movement, freedom to choose a profession, right not to be deprived of German citizenship, 
right not to be extradited, right to resist the overthrow of government, guarantee of equal 
access to public service, and equal status of rights in all the Länder.87  (The right to vote in 
regional, federal and local elections also is considered to be a German right only although it is 
referred to as a person’s right not as a direct right for the German people only, even though in 
practice it is, excluding members of the EU of course since they are allowed the right to vote 
in municipal elections.88) 
The German Foreigner Law of 1965(Ausländergesetz) explains three aspects: (1) 
possibility of entry into Germany (2) form and duration of residence (3) possibility and 
requirements of naturalization.  There are four explicit forms of residence.  The first is a 
temporary residence permit (Aufenthaltselaubris) in which after five years of residence one 
may have access to an unlimited residence permit if one is employed, has a basic competence 
in the German language and sufficient living space.  Second, there is the temporary right of 
residence (Aufenthaltsberectigung) which one must have had resident permit for eight years 
or an unlimited permit for three years and have contributed to German retirement insurance 
                                                 
87 Rubio-Marín, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and Inclusion in Germany and the United 
States pg 187. 
88 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgetz, GG)  
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for at least sixty months or the equivalent.  Third, there is the temporary residence approval 
(Aufenthaltsbewilligugn), which applies to those with a purpose such as students and contract 
workers and generally lasts two years although they can be extended.  Fourth, there is the 
temporary residence authorization which is for those ineligible for any other standard, i.e. de 
facto refugees, asylum-seekers with applications in process or disputed and these are granted 
for two years and can be extended.  After eight years, they can be extended indefinitely.  This 
Foreigner’s Law is derived from the “Police Ruling Concerning Foreigners of 1938/39” 
which was rather vague in allowing those to stay that are “worthy of hospitality.”  The law 
was amended in 1990 and performed three new functions: (1) the strengthening of residence 
rights for family members (2) extended protection against extradition for foreigners born in 
Germany (3) and eased naturalization requirements.89  The law’s last amendments, as 
mentioned before, are those concerning the naturalization process in 1999 and put into effect 
in 2000. 
It must also be dually noted that the biggest population of immigrants within German 
borders is that of the Turks, a country that has historically been trying to become part of the 
European Union for some time now and as a result, the relationship between the European 
Union as a whole and Turkey, cannot be ignored in the analysis of the German immigration 
situation even if the Third Pillar of the European Union allows immigration to be dealt with 
by each individual nation-state in regards to entry and expulsion “except in those areas where 
treaties or peremptory norms operate.”90  In the post-war period, Turkey had severe political 
and economic difficulties that impeded their entry into the EU, but on the 12th of September, 
1963, an Association with the Community was established with the Ankara Agreement, along 
                                                 
89 Senders, Stefan. “Laws of Belonging: Legal Dimensions of National Inclusion in Germany” New German 
Critique, pgs. 153-56. 
90 Cicekli, Bulent, “The Rights of Turkish Migrants on Europe under International Law and EU Law”, 
International Migration Review,  pg. 344. 
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with the envisagement of eventual EC membership.91  What membership would mean is free 
movement for Turks within the European Union, which has not come about even today, an 
influx of immigrants feared on the one hand, and a hope for better wages within Turkish 
borders on the other, resulting in the lack of need to leave their own borders if part of the 
European Union.  In 1970, the Additional Protocol established a timetable for the freedom of 
movement and dismantling of quantitative restrictions as well of the elimination of customs 
duties in 1973 (alignment to the Common Customs Tariff (CCT).  As a result, the Ankara 
Agreement was expected to be  implemented fully on the 1st of December, 1986.  At the same 
time, EC countries had stopped foreign recruitment of workers as a result of unemployment, 
expecting the energy crisis of the 1970s to worsen the situation.  On the 13th of December, 
1995, the European Parliament did enter into a Full Customs Union between Turkey and the 
EU.92  Since then, any further integration of Turkish immigrants has been proposed by the 
EU, while there has been no uniform practice overall.  This changed when Germany changed 
its Citizenship law in 2000, Turks were for the first time allowed to become full citizens of 
Germany as well as the European Union. 
 In regards to full entry into the European Union as a nation-state, the EU insists that 
Turkey; first, eliminate the death penalty and protect human rights, while Turkey is not 
willing to do so until terrorism is itself eliminated; and second, restructure its economy before 
negotiations even take place while Turkey insists that more investment would ease 
restructuring pains if and when the EU makes a formal commitment.  In November of 2000, 
the EU made public the APD (Accession Partnership Document) where it insisted that Turkey 
                                                 
91 “Article 28 of the Agreement states: 
“As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by 
Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall 
examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.”Cicekli, Bulent, “The Rights of Turkish 
Migrants on Europe under International Law and EU Law”, International Migration Review,  pg. 309 
92 “The Customs Union has basically removed all barriers to trade between the EU and Turkey, enhancing the 
free movement of goods, and obliges Turkey to adopt similar international trade policies as the EU.  But 
significantly, it does not include freedom of movement of persons. Cicekli, Bulent, “The Rights of Turkish 
Migrants on Europe under International Law and EU Law”, International Migration Review, pg.  311. 
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meet the following requirements: (1) guarantee minority rights (2) reduce torture and role of 
military in politics (3) and support efforts to find a solution to the division of Cyprus.  Turkey 
responded by created 89 new laws and amending 94 other in March of 2001 to “improve 
Turkey’s human rights record, combat the torture of prisoners, enhance women’s rights and 
bring the country’s inflation-prone economy up to European standards.”93  In regards to 
immigrants abroad, the Turkish government tends to shy away from religious organizations 
and organized in 1998 two commissions: the Supreme Committee for Nationals Living 
Abroad affiliated with Turks abroad in twelve countries and the Coordinating Committee for 
Nationals Living Abroad.  It has also made it easier for Turks to naturalize, for those under 
twenty years of age, making it unnecessary for them to fulfill their military obligations.  
Again, the main reason why Turkey is not admitted, along with its human rights violations, is 
the fear of an enormous influx of Turks throughout the European Union.  Already, as of the 
year 2000 according to the OECD, Turkish presence in the EU is great with 1,998,500 in 
Germany (27.4 % pop.), 208,000 in France (6.4% pop.), 134,500 in Austria (17.7% pop.), 
100,800 in the Netherlands (15.1% pop.), 58,000 in the UK(2.2% pop.), 56,200 in Belgium 
(6.5% pop.) and 35,200 in Denmark(13.6% pop.) not including those of Turkish origin with 
EU citizenship.94  A great deal of this presence has much to do with the temporary workers 
program, but currently, the walls of the European Fortress are up and vigilant, not especially 
concerned in acquiring any further residency from third- country nationals than necessary.  It 
is supposed that if Turkey were to join the EU in 2015, it would have a population itself of 
82.1 million, only slightly smaller than Germany at 82.4 million, supposedly surpassing 
Germany in the future.  If such a country were to cross borderless borders and set themselves 
up in EU countries other than their own because of possible wage increase, there would be a 
great employment impact on the receiving countries—and such is the argument against 
                                                 
93 Martín, Philip. “Migration and Development: Focus on Turkey”, International Migration Review,pg. 601. 
94 Hughes, Kirsty. “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?” A Friends of Europe Working 
Paper, pg 17. 
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Turkey’s entry in the EU with Turkey’s GDP per head only at 27% of the EU average. 95  
Even the SPD, generally more open and liberal to immigrant and asylum policy, states in its 
official statement of policies.96  At all times, the SPD is careful to note that entry into the EU 
is by no means a guarantee and history does not allow for any guarantees in relation to 
Turkey’s entry considering that the first agreement was signed almost forty years ago with 
Ankara Agreement. 
 The political fight over the immigrant situation in Germany has been waged on 
another front—not just in regards to the EU’s relationship with Turkey which cannot be 
divorced from Germany’s immigration discussion since Turks represent the biggest 
immigration population within German borders—but that of its asylum laws.  Since WWII, 
Germany has been most open in regards to its acceptance of  political refugees, resulting in 
the public’s complaint of asylum practices being taken advantage of and those offered asylum 
being exceedingly assisted by the German government, especially resentment of the 
burdening of the local social assistance programs.  Specifically, Article 16 of the Constitution 
attracted over half of all asylum seekers to EC countries starting in the late 1970s.  As a result, 
in June of 1980, the German government announced a visa requirement and employment ban 
to reduce entry rates of asylum seekers after a 1979-80 increase.  Then, after a major increase 
in immigration, in May of 1993, Germany passed an amendment to the Asylum Article 16a of 
the GBL that undercut access to a full-fledged judicial appeals process for most asylum 
seekers.   
                                                 
95 -----------------. “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?” A Friends of Europe Working 
Paper, pg i. 
96 “Germany has a particular interest in deepening mutual relations with Turkey and linking the country with the 
European Union.  The negotiations begun on 3 October 2005 that are aimed at effecting Turkey’s accession 
represent and open-ended process that does not automatically mean membership; the outcome cannot be 
guaranteed in advance.  This constitutes a special challenge in economic, demographic and cultural terms.  With 
this in mind, we welcome the efforts to bring about reform that have been initiated in Turkey.  We intend to 
promote the democratic, constitutional and economic development of Turkey, with which we are closely allied in 
NATO, to the best of out ability.” Social Democratic Party of Germany, Joint Paper as of Friday 28 October 
2005, www.spd.de
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This then brings us to a discussion of how the predominant parties in Germany feel in 
regards to the immigrant situation, which is faithfully represented in their views towards 
asylum reform.  The SPD eventually accepted the asylum amendment after the CDU/CSU 
openly pressured the socialist party locally.97  After far right parties (the Republikaner and 
German’s People’s Union) won 7-12 percent of the vote in three states by campaigning 
against asylum-seekers, as well as increased anti-foreigner violence in 1991 and 1992, SPD 
found it imperative to compromise with center-right parties.   
 Basically, what the 1993 amendment did in regards to asylum was reduce their 
constitutional rights and particularly if an asylum-seeker entered through a secure state, they 
were sent back just in case they had already applied for asylum there.  ‘Secure third states’ are 
considered to be: (1) EU members (2) those that guarantee application of Geneva Convention 
and the Human Rights Convention including: Finland, Norway, Austria, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the Czech Republic.  If asylum-seekers come from ‘safe states of origin’ they 
must substantiate their claims of political persecution or be returned, i.e. Bulgaria, Gambia, 
Ghana, Romania. Senegal, the Slovak Republic and Hungary. According to the Dublin 
conference, claims of asylum-seekers from safe states are assumed to be invalid. 
 In regards to the Green Party, their main concern is human rights and a “general right 
to stay” (allgemeines Bleiberecht) for all that happen to enter and stay for five years.  An 
official statement of the Green Party is the following: “The ‘multicultural society’ is not a 
theory, but a reality.  In the Federal Republic immigration has taken place, and immigration 
will continue to take place…Our idea of the ‘multicultural society’ is not based on (the) 
concept of the nation-state, but on the indivisibility of human rights.  Not citizenship should 
                                                 
97Karapin explains in detail: 
“Eventually many local SPD leaders including Georg Kronawitter, the mayor of  
Munich, became vocal advocates of consitutional reform.  Pressure from the lower-level representatives and 
members of the SPD was important in the SPD’s change of position through a series of decisions in various 
party organs during fall and winter 1992-1993.  Local politicians often came under pressure from citizens’ 
initiatives that opposed the housing of asylum seekers in Saarlouis and Hanover.” Karapin, Roger. “The Politics 
of Immigration in Britain and Germany: Subnational Politicians and Social Movements”, Comparative Politics, 
pg 436. 
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determine the rights of an individual, but where the individual lives (Lebensmittelpunkt).”98  
It seems that the Green Party’s open borders policy may openly contradict the reality of the 
system of nation-states today and may not be all that realistic in regards to present day 
situations, but the party is also open to the idea that citizenship is not the only venue open to 
residents in any given population to gain and maintain their human rights—an ideal that may 
not step out of the full circle of present day reality. 
  In 1999, 365 naturalized German citizens were interviewed as to their political 
preferences in a the Heidelberg case study and it was determined that those from Eastern 
European countries, ethnic Germans, were supportive of the CDU (88% Soviet Union and 
Successor states and 57% Romania) and Turks the SPD (77%).  The Green Party was barely 
even preferred at all by anybody at 2% for Romanians and 6% for the Turks.  Overall, Turks 
are more educated in parties and politician recognition, as 51% of them have received some 
kind of educational degree while only 11% of ex-S.U. and 8% of ex-Romanians have.99
 Such support from different ethnic groups has its roots in how each party has defined 
itself in regards to how they view the definition of German Kultur after Reunification.  All 
political parties sought the rights of potential voters, the CDU welcoming the return of ethnic 
Germans and the SPD or Greens arguing for the extension of voting rights to their supporters.  
The difference is in the clear distinction between the reasoning and basis for such rights 
grounded in the two definitions of Kultur: one based upon race, inherent and unchangeable 
and the other based upon “highbrow culture” with such things as literature, art, music, food 
and dance.100  Regardless, of each stance and whether it is inclusionist or exclusionist, each 
                                                 
98 Joppke, Christian. “Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Comparison of the Unites States, Germany and Great 
Britain”, Theory and Society, pg, 466-67. 
99 Wust, Andreas M. “New Citizens- New Voters? Political Preferences and Voting  
Intentions of Naturalized Germans: A Case Study in Progress, pp.565-566. 
100 “Conservatives use this definition of culture to argue against extension of  
citizenship to groups that are not ethnically German on the grounds that one should hold on to a definition of 
German culture as ethnically pure and protect it against becoming a hybrid…Liberals, however, generally 
subscribe to a narrow definition of Kultur as cultural production and entertain a universalist outlook regarding 
the political and social organization of life.  Such a stance risks producing a position just as intolerant toward 
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party clearly seeks out its own pool of potential voters, even before the new citizenship law 
that took effect in 2000.  As always, the center of attention is focused upon citizenship by 
practically all those involved, integration being intertwined with the concept of assimilation, 
as total equal rights are solely guaranteed through the acquisition of citizenship. 
                                                                                                                                                        
social forms that differ from German conventions as a conservative argument for assimilation based on a 
rejection of the multicultural idea altogether.”Berman, Nina. “Multiculturalism, Reintegration, and Beyond: The 
Afrikanisch- 
Asiatische Studentenförderung in Göttingen”, p. 37. 
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Welfare State and Immigrant Associations in Germany 
  
 Overall, Germany provides generous welfare benefits to its immigrant population, 
disregarding its limitations towards refugees and asylum seekers as minimum welfare benefits 
are allowed for refused applicants.101  Immigrants are offered training, short-time work, job-
creation schemes and apprenticeships, just like native-born citizens.  Both immigrants and 
native Germans benefit from such programs and as a whole there is a difference in success 
rates, second-generation immigrants are closing the gap, while they still do not reach the 
success of Germans.  45% of immigrants hold a position that meets the qualifications they 
have received in job-training or university while Germans are at 70%.   It can be supposed 
therefore that investment into the integration of the immigrant population allows for less 
welfare costs over time, especially in regards to education, as it has been proven that early 
preschool enrollment leads to higher education in immigrant children.102
 When it comes to associations, immigrant groups have the right to found them as long 
as rules are followed.  First of all, they do have the same rights as Germans in regards to 
unions and in workplace co-determination (Betriebsverfassungsgeetz) and in several cities 
they have foreign advisory boards, committees that have the right to a hearing by elected city 
government (Auslaederbeiraete) but  they are excluded for any other formal participation in 
the political process.103  When their needs are not met by a relationship with the majority 
population, they then found associations to meet their special needs, particularly when they 
settle in industrial cities, having coming from underdeveloped, traditional, agricultural 
societies.  Thus, according to Ulrike Schoenberg in his article, “Participation in Ethnic 
Associations: The Case of Immigrants in West Germany,” depending upon the focus of the 
                                                 
101 Rotte, Ralph. “Immigration Control in United Germany: Toward a Broader Scope of  
National Policies”, p. 366. 
102 Kurthen, Hermann. Immigration and the Welfare State in Comparison: Differences in  
the Incorporation of Immigrant Minorities in Germany and the United States”, pp. 725-727. 
103 Schoeneberg, Ulrike. “Participation in Ethnic Associations: The Case of Immigrants in West Germany”, p 
417. 
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association, segregation or integration could take place based upon the focus of each 
association.   
 The author focuses upon the Turks, the Greeks and the Italians in his study and defines 
social integration as the following: 
“Social integration is measured as the maintenance of primary contacts within the 
immigrant community as well as to members of the host society.  Contact with the 
native-born population, which Gordon (1979:168) calls structural assimilation, is thus 
only one element of social integration as here defined.  The term assimilation is used 
to mean conformity to the customs and lifestyle of the host society.”104
 
The Greek population in Germany is based upon the issues of whether or not their children 
should be educated in Greek or German schooling, while there is a definite political alignment 
derived directly from the home country- the socialist party (PASOK) and the conservative 
party (Nea Demokratia) which have a tendency to be aligned with the Orthodox Church.  The 
Greeks are more divided over the assimilation issue in regards to schooling than political 
polarization based upon homeland politics. 
 The Turkish immigrant population is the largest and most polarized group with three 
types: (1) religiously orthodox or fundamentalist (2) strongly conservative or nationalistic (3) 
and socialist or communist that are very much engaged in German organizations, especially 
unions while the other two groups insist that they are not politically partisan.  All of these 
Turkish organizations generally do not cooperate with their consulate and other government 
offices.  Kurds and Armenians have their own organizations and the Turkish government does 
not support Islamic Centers as it believes that they represent religious sects or cooperate with 
extremist parties.  The largest Turkish association is called Sueleymanli, a religious 
association that has about 210 centers in West Germany. 
Italian associations on the other hand are not culturally based and offer social 
assistance and counseling alone, not cultural or social activities, and there is no political 
                                                 
104 Schoeneberg, Ulrike.“Participation in Ethnic Associations: The Case of Immigrants in West Germany”, p. 
418. 
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polarization for governmental support as they cooperate with their consulate and receive 
financial support from two quasi-parliamentary committees and the relatively stable political 
situation in Italy has a stabilizing effect on its immigrant organizations as they remain in 
existence longer and have continuity in their goals and activities.105
Schoeneberg´s study then goes in to measure the integration of immigrants based upon 
their contact with native Germans in order to ascertain whether or not these associations, 
isolate or integrate.  Curiously, those that participate in immigrant associations have more 
frequent contact with native Germans than those that do not, except in the instance of the 
Turks.106  It seems, while participants are more social, their relations are restricted to Turks 
for those that attend Islamic Centers, while leftist groups have practically as many friendly 
relationships with Germans as participants of the immigrant groups of other nationalities do.  
Overall, the results do conclude that participation in an immigrant association is a “primary 
force” for social integration on the part of the immigrant. 
 In conclusion, Germany is a combination of mainly statist and partially corporate 
model of incorporation.  It is corporate because historically and up until now immigrant 
populations have been treated as groups and statist because their treatment is dictated by a 
highly centralized state, although its implementation is handled by a federal administrative 
process.  While immigrant groups are not expected to organize themselves, they are formally 
put into groups by the government itself.  Its immigration process has been long and drawn 
out and only recently has the German government even accepted itself as an immigration 
country and still does not recognize full rights to its immigrants as individuals as seen in the 
2005 Immigration Law and in the Basic Law itself.  At the same time, as we will see in the 
                                                 
105Schoeneberg, Ulrike. “Participation in Ethnic Associations: The Case of Immigrants in West Germany”, pp. 
424-25. 
106 “In none of the nationality groups are participants in ethnic organizations more socially isolated in any way; 
in fact, in almost all cases the participants are more likely to have close friends as well as more frequent contact 
with Germans that the non-participants do.  The Turks are the only exception.” Schoeneberg, 
Ulrike.“Participation in Ethnic Associations: The Case of Immigrants in West Germany”, p. 430. 
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Spanish case, Spain has been transformed quite quickly from an emigration country to an 
immigration country, adapting itself along the way.  Such adaptation, out of necessity mind 
you,  and acceptance of such adaptation has never once been in question—there has been no 
time as of yet.  
Still, while Spain may only allude to full integration as citizens, somewhat ignoring 
differences through omission, Germany is rather transparent in defining what is considered to 
be German, and as a result, integration policy, and regardless of its level of “fairness” or 
equality, is thus more clearly defined.  Whether such clearness is wise or even commendable 
is a completely different story, but outright adherence to strict assimilation through the 
acquisition of citizenship is much more respectable in it forwardness as opposed to its 
avoidance.  Ironically, the initial opening up of naturalization processes would allude to 
Germany’s more liberal treatment of its immigration policy by allowing access to the “club”; 
while in reality access to the club is strictly reserved for those willing to somewhat abandon 
their differences by acquiring what the government deems as adherence to German “culture.”  
Instead of allowing for a widening circle of acceptance, said acceptance is contingent upon 
clearly defined change, supported by a finely engineered process of coursework oriented, and 
explicitly mandatory, towards those willing to become part of the process and gain a 
guarantee and security of equal rights as full citizens.   
On the other hand, Spain may have a guarantee of rights on paper, quite equitable to 
citizenship, so that citizenship may only be considered so as to avoid bureaucratic bother; but 
full integration as citizenship as the ultimate goal is also implied—one is never really 
separated from the other and the extent of implied assimilation, and the resulting negation of 
innate differences within the immigration population, is not clear.  Access to such 
assimilation through the process of naturalization is also limited through discriminatory time 
allowances, as some nationalities may apply after two years of permanent residence and some 
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after ten.  Such differences are also based upon cultural and historical ties, alluding to the fact 
that such populations are already partially assimilated to the culture in the first place so as to 
exclude them from those that must invest more time in the intercultural or partial assimilation 
processes.   
Ultimately, what type of policy is preferable—one that is outright in its proclamation 
of denial of difference and possible conflict in the case of Germany, or one that insists upon 
solely alluding to such denial in the case of Spain?  Is the first really denial anyway, as it 
addresses reality much more clearly even if it insists upon homogenization where there is 
none, but still has the integrity to directly insist; making the avoidance of the second even 
more naïve and unrealistic than the first?  Basically, what makes Spanish policy so very 
reactionary is the fact that it is a liberal, bottom-up policy as opposed to the statist top-down 
approach found in the German model, while idealistically both maintain the acquisition of 
citizenship as a requisite for “complete” integration, whether explicitly or implicitly—two 
different approaches towards a rather similar goal. 
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Before delving in to the specifics of the Spain’s Immigrant Integration policy that have 
already been alluded to, once again it must be said that said policy is always intertwined with 
that of the concept of modern citizenship.  Integration, along with the basic access to social 
services, initial bottom-up policies of aiding an immigrant’s transition into Spanish society by 
subsidizing programs that are established through a number of associations and NGO’s, is 
ultimately a finite goal of converting the immigrant into an equal member of society through 
his or her adaptation to his or her surroundings.  Adaptation, ideally embodied in the idea of 
an equal “intercultural exchange” ends in the eventual naturalization of the immigrant.  Thus, 
the “immigrant is no longer an immigrant,” but a citizen, trusted with the same 
responsibilities and rights as any individual living and working within the present society.  
Spain’s openness in inclusion is somewhat limited in regards to timely access by all those 
willing to undergo such a transformation and commitment, but the intent is still quite clear 
regardless of preferences towards populations that are considered as groups that have an 
innate leaning towards such conversion. 
In 2006, illegal immigrants in Spain were estimated to be up to 1,200,000 but their 
exact number is not certain.107 In 2007, the number went down, according to municipal 
registries in comparison to immigrants with permits, to 540,540 while it is supposed that 1 out 
of every four immigrants are not registered.  The reduction is also due to the increase in 
Romanian and Bulgarian permits, or EU certificates.  Curiously, they are not to be allowed 
their work permits officially until the year 2009, two years after the agreement, but since 
Romania and Bulgaria have strong bilateral agreements they have taken advantage of said 
agreements even more so it seems. For example, in 2006 there were 211,325 Romanians with 
permits and in 2007, 603,889 with permit, a difference of 392,564 Romanians.  In fact , the 
majority of the increase came from the EU in 2007—the total increase being 957,206 and 
                                                 
107  Marcos, Carmen & Sanz, Begoña. Pero¿cuántos inmigrantes irregulares son?; Cuerpo Superior de 
Estadísticas del Estado. 
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885,305 of them coming from European sources.  In comparison, there was an increase of 
only 150,435 Latin Americans and 132,037 from Africa, with the majority of them being 
Moroccans.  The following table is an account of the legal resident population from the year 
2000 to 2007 based on nationality and pinpointing countries that contribute greatly to the 
influx from each continental area.  As one can see, in regards to percentages from various 
areas, the general nature of third-country residency was maintained through the beginning of 
the new millennium, even as the population more than doubled up until the year 2007.  In the 
year 2005 the percentage of European Union members had gone down though only to start to 
increase again in 2006, complimented by a relative increase in percentage of Colombians and 
Ecuadorians.  Outside the European Union, Morocco still continues to be the country with the 
greatest representation in immigrant population in Spain. 
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Table 3.1 - Immigrant national residents in Spain with permits 2000-2007 
 
Continent/ 
Area/ 
Country 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU 306,203 34% 325,511  29% 362,858  27% 406,199  25% 498,875  25% 569,284 20.7% 661,004 22% 1,546,309  39% 
Rest of Europe 54,442 6% 81,170  8% 107,574  8% 154,001  9% 168,900  8.5% 337,177** 12.3% 367,674** 12% 114,936** 2.9% 
*Romania  211,325 7%   
Total Europe 360,64 40.2% 412,522  37% 470,432  35% 560,200 34% 667,775  33.8% 906,461 33.1% 1,028,678 34% 1,661,245 42% 
*Great Britain 73,98 8% 80,183  7% 90,091  7% 105,479  6% 128,283  6% 149,071 5.4 % 175,870 5.8 % 198,638  5 % 
*Romania as EU 
member  603,889 15% 
Latin America 
(including Mexico) 
184,973 20.6% 283,778   26% 364,569 27.5% 514,485   31% 649,122   32.8% 986,178 36% 1,064,916 35% 1,215,351 30.5% 
*Colombia 24,702 2.7% 48,710  4.4% 71,238  5% 107,459  6.5% 137,369  7% 204,348 7.5% 225,504 7.5% 254,301  6% 
*Ecuador 30,878 3.4% 84,699  7.6% 115,30  8.7% 174,289  10.5% 221,549  11% 357,065 13% 376,233 12.5% 395,808  9.9% 
North America  
(Canada & the U.S.) 
14,991      2% 15,020 1%  15,774        1% 16,163   0.98% 16,964     0.9% 17,052 0.6% 18,109 0.6% 19,256 0.5% 
Africa 261,385 29% 304,149  27% 366,518  28% 432,662  26% 498,507  25.2% 649,251 23.7% 709,174 23.5% 841,211  21% 
*Morocco 199,782 22.3% 234,937  21.2% 282,432  21% 333,770  20% 386,958  20% 493,114 18% 543,721 18% 648,735  16% 
Asia 71,807 8% 91,552  8% 104,66  8% 121,455  7% 142,762  7.2% 177,423 6.5% 197,965 6.5% 238,770  6% 
*China 28,693 3.2% 36,143  3.2% 45,815  3.4% 56,086  3.4% 71,881  3.6% 85,745  3% 99,526 3.3% 119,859  3% 
Oceania 902 0.1% 944  0.1% 1,024  0.07% 1,018  0.06% 1,112  0.05% 1,466 0.05% 1,819 0.06% 2,051  0.05% 
Other*** 1,017 0.1% 1,095  0.1% 1,019  0.07% 1,028  0.06% 1,049  0.05% 1,101 0.04% 1,147 0.04% 1,130 0.03% 
Total 895,720 1,109,060 1,324,001 1,647,011 1,977,291 2,738,932 3,021,808 3,979,014 
 
Source: Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2007; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
 
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** Great increase due mainly to increase in Romanian population and decrease in 2007 due to Romania’s entry into the EU 
*** Stateless persons and others(All percentages are based upon the total legal resident population of each year) 
Graphic 3.1 - Immigrant national residents in Spain with permits 2000-2007 
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Table 3.2 - Increment in legal residents in Spain by year 2000-2007 
 
2000- 2001 Continent/
Area/
Country
Total** 
increase  
or 
decrease 
Increase 
in %  
or 
decrease 
2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 
EU +25,149 -4% +37,347 -2% +43,341  -2% +92,676 +0.2% +70,409  -4.3% +91,720  +1.3% +885,305  +17% 
Rest of Europe +26,728 +2% +26,404 +0% +46,427  +1% +168,900   -0.5% +168,277   -3.8% +30,497 -0.3% -252,738 -3.8% 
Total Europe +51,877 -3.2% +57,910 -2% +89,768  -1% +107,575 -0.3% +238,686   -0.7% +122,217 +0.9% +632,567 +8% 
*Great Britain +9,908 -1% +9,908 +0% +15,388  -1% +22,805  ± 0% +20,788    -0.6% +26,799   +0.4% +22,768  -0.8% 
Latin America
(including Mexico)
+98,805 +5.4% +80,791 +1.5% +149,916 +3.5% +134,637  +2.8%  +337,056  +3.2%  +78,738   -1%  +150,435  –4.5% 
*Colombia +24,008 +1.7% +22,528 +0.6% +36,221  +1.5% +29,910  +1% +66,979 +0.5% +21,156  ±0% 28,797 -1.5% 
*Ecuador +53,821 +4.2% +30,602 +1.1% +58,988  +1.8% +47,260  +0.5% +135,516  +2% +19,168   -0.5% +19,575  -2.6% 
North America  
(Canada & the U.S.)
+29 -1% +754 +0% +389 -0.02% +801 +0.02% +88  -0.3% +1057   ± 0%  +1147  -0.1% 
Africa +42,764 -2% +62,369 +1% +66,144 -2% +65,845  -0.8% +150,744 -1.5% +59,923   -0.2% +132,037  -2.5% 
*Morocco +35,155 0% +47,495 -0.2% +51,338  -1% +53,188  ± 0% +106,159 -2% +50,607   ±0% +105,014   -2% 
Asia +19,745 0% +13,113 +0% +16,790  -1% +21,307 +0.2% +34,661 -0.7% +20,542   -0.7% +40,805  -0.5% 
*China +7,450 0% +9,672 +0.2% +10,271  ± 0% +15,795  +0.2% +13,864 -0.6% +13,781  +0.3% +20,333  -0.3% 
Oceania +42 0% +8 -0.01% -6 -0.01% +94 -0.01% +354 ± 0%  +353   +0.1% +232  -0.1% 
Other*** +70 0% -71 -0.01% +9 -0.01% +21 -0.01% +52 -0.01% +46 + 0% -17  -0.01% 
Total +213,332 +214,874 +323,010 +330,280 +761,641 +282,876 +957,206 
 
Source: Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2007; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
 
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** All foreign populations have increased except for Oceania in 2003, Rest of Europe in 2007 due to entry of countries into EU and also Other in 2007..  Still, 
total percentage relative to the total population have either decreased or increased. 
*** Stateless persons and other 
**** Decrease could be accounted for by the naturalization of stateless persons. 
All percentages are based upon the total legal resident population of each year 
Graphic 3.2 - Increment in legal residents in Spain by year 2000-2007 
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Table 3.3 - Immigrant residents in Spain with permits 2000-2007 and immigrants registered in Municipalities (Empadronados) 
 
2000 Continent/ 
Area/Country Legal 
residents 
Municipal 
registry 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU 306,203 375,487 325,511 417,310 362,858 489,813 406,199 --- 498,875 --- 569,284 --- 661,004 979,864 1,546,309 1,749,890 
Rest of Europe 54,442 54,358 81,170 116,095 107,574 211,249 154,001 --- 168,900 --- 337,177 --- 367,674 671,707 114,936 183,108 
*Romania 211,325 394,078   
Total Europe 360,645 436,994 412,522 533,405 470,432 701,062 560,200 936,271 667,775 1,047,206 906,461 1,668,136 1,028,678 1,651,571 1,661,245 1,932,998 
*Great Britain 73,983  99,017 80,183 107,326 90,091 128,121 105,479 161,507 128,283 174,810 149,071 227,187 175,870 261,116 198,638 299,264 
*Romania as EU 
member 603,889 507,736 
Latin America 
(including Mexico) 184,973 189,464 283,778 414,290 364,569 730,460 514,485 1,047,564 649,122 1,237,806
***
986,178 1,445,796
***
1,064,916 1,534,230
*** 
1,215,351 1,617,202 
*Colombia 24,702 --- 48,710 87,209 71,238 191,018 107,459 244,684 137,369 248,894 204,348 271,239 225,504 263,339 254,301 260,989 
*Ecuador 30,878 --- 84,699 139,022 115,30 259,522 174,289 390,297 221,549 475,698 357,065 497,799 376,233 446,111 395,808 415,328 
North America  
(Canada & the U.S.) 14,991 17,374 15,020 28,598 15,774 22,103 16,163 25,963 16,964 24,613 17,052 28,697 18,109 23,374
 
19,256 21,492 
Africa 261,385 268,190 304,149 317,242 366,518 423,045 432,662 522,682 498,507 579,372 649,251 713,974 709,174 725,960 841,211 737,400 
*Morocco 199,782 173,158 234,937** 233,415 282,432 307,458 333,770 378,979 386,958 420,556 493,114 511,294 543,721 513,007 648,735 524,021 
Asia 71,807 88,167 91,552** 75,141 104,665** 98,942 121,455 128,952 142,762 142,828 177,423 186,848 197,965 206,476 238,770 207,850 
*China 28,693 --- 36,143** 27,574 45,815** 37,651 56,086** 51,228 71,881** 62,498 85,745 87,731 99,526 94,942 119,859 95,926 
Oceania 902 1,264 944 1,472 1,024 1,746 1,018 2,105 1,112 1,920 1,466 2,321 1,819 2,555 2,051 2,612 
Other*** 1,017 413 1,095 508 1,019 587 1,028 631 1,049 581 1,101 721 1,147 --- 1,130 --- 
Total 895,720 923,879 1,109,060 1,370,657 1,324,001 1,977,946 1,647,011 2,664,268 1,977,291 3,034,326 2,738,932 3,730,610 3,021,808 4,144,166 3,979,014 4,519,554 
Difference in  
Totals: 
Estimate of illegal 
immigrants 
28,159 261,597 653,945 1,017,257 1,057,035 991,678 1,122,358 540,540 
Sources: Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2007; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/ and Revisión del padrón municipal Instituto Nacional de Estadística www.ine.es
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** less municipal registry than legal residency could be a result of residents that have changed their domiciles but have not reregistered and are in between the renewal of their permits.  Proves unreliability 
of this estimation of undocumented immigrants. 
*** Closing of the gap in between legal residents and those registered in municipalities from 2004 to 2005(especially in regards to Ecuadorians) is most likely due to the Amnesty Bill passed that year. 
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Graphic 3.3 - Immigrant residents in Spain with permits 2000-2004 and immigrants registered in Municipalities (Empadronados) 
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According to the Boletín de Exptranjería e Inmigración as of January 2008, the 
greatest increase in immigrant population in the last year of 2007 has been the 
Romanians, at 185.76% increase, Bulgarians with a 111.15% increase and Polish at 
47.51% increase, and followed closely by the Portuguese with a 40.43% increase.108  
Basically, the increase in the year of 2007 has mainly been that of new and old 
European Union members.   The greatest increase was the Romanian population, that 
along with the Bulgarians have actually received what is termed now as a “certificado 
de residencia,”  or certificate of residence, since EU members no longer receive a 
Spanish identity card like third-country nationals.  Curiously, Romania and Bulgaria 
have not been allowed to enter the EU under the same terms as former members since 
they will not circulate freely until the year 2009.  Even so, Spain has favorable bilateral 
agreements with both countries anyway, as well as the Dominican Republic, 
Mauritania, Poland, Ecuador and Colombia.   Generally, such agreements are the same, 
based upon the need for workers or jobs offered within Spanish borders, stable workers 
for an initial period of one year, seasonal workers for a period that does not exceed nine 
months, interns between the ages 18 and 35, for 12 months with a possible increase of 
six months and not exceeding 50 people a year, and finally businesses that work 
between both countries may send their workers to work in Spain as long as they 
formally ask permission.109
In regards to naturalization by birth, in Spain it is contingent upon residency of 
at least one of the parents and granted after a year of the child’s own legal residency.  
Those immigrant residents from Iberian American countries (former colonies), Andorra, 
Philippines, Guinea Equatorial, Portugal and descendents of Sephardim Jews that were 
                                                 
108 Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.  Boletín Estadístico de Extranjería e  
Inmigración; Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración; January 2008. 
109 Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. Acuerdo entre el Reino de España y Rumania relativo a la 
regulación de los flujos migratorios laborales entre ambos Estados, hecho en Madrid el 23 de enero de 
2002. 
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expelled in 1492 are allowed naturalization but only after a period of two years of legal 
residency.  Political refugees need to reside legally for five years, those married to a 
Spaniard one year, those born outside Spanish territory with a Spanish mother or father, 
or grandparent, one year, widows or widowers of a Spaniard one year, and those 
adopted or under the care of a Spanish institution one year as well.  Once more, if you 
are born in Spanish territory you must also reside legally for one year in order to gain 
access to naturalization, meaning that at least one parent must already have legal 
residency.110  Spanish naturalization can be accessed faster by an immigrant that has 
been born in Spanish territory by reducing the time that one must live as a resident from 
ten years to one, not unlike a third-country national that has married a Spaniard, but 
without some sort of legal residency on the part of the parents, naturalization is not 
guaranteed except in the case that nationality is denied by the parent’s country of birth 
or another nationality cannot be determined.111  Again, it must be noted that 
naturalization access is not the same for everybody.  It is not an equal access for those 
that have legally worked, paid their taxes and suffered through the same bureaucratic 
processes.  Those that marry a native or are born into the country, have native Spanish 
parents or grandparents may apply for naturalization after only one year.  Those that 
                                                 
110 Ley 36/2002, de 8 de octubre, de modificación del Código Civil en materia de nacionalidad 
111 “Los ciudadanos extranjeros pueden solicitar la nacionalidad española cuando han residido en España  
durante un tiempo determinado. 
Pueden obtenerla aquellas personas que residan en nuestro país y dispongan de autorización de residencia. 
El tiempo de residencia exigido es, como norma general, de 10 años.  No obstante, existen determinadas 
excepciones: 
•refugiados políticos: 5 años. 
•Naturales de países iberoamericanos, Andorra, Filipinas, Guinea Ecuatorial, Portugal y sefardíes: 2 años. 
•Nacidos en territorio español o casados con un nacional: 1 año 
•Nacidos fuera de España, de padre o madre, abuelo o abuela que originariamente hubieran sido 
españoles: 1 año. 
•Quienes hayan estado sujetos legalmente a la tutela, guarda o acogimiento de un ciudadano o institución 
española, durante dos años consecutivos, incluso si continuaran en esta situación en el momento de la 
solicitud: 1 año 
•Los viudos o viudas de español o española, si la muerte del cónyuge no existiera separación legal o de 
hecho: 1 año”Ministerio de Justicia, Obtención de la Nacionalidad Española por Residencia, 
www.mju.es/mnacionalidad.htm#
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come from what is referred to as Ibero-America, Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial 
Guinea, Portugal and Sephardim Jews only have to wait two years instead of ten, 
considering that they are specific populations that share historical and cultural 
similarities.  Thus, it can only be so rightfully assumed that these groups are considered 
to be prime candidates to become Spanish citizens simply because it is assumed they are 
already half way there in regards to the integration process in the first place.  As a 
result, taking the final step towards full integration, or citizenship in this case is allowed 
at an earlier time. 
Also, as you can see in the following tables, naturalization in Spain, while it has 
increased quite a bit from 11,996 in 2000 to 42,829 in 2005, proportionally in regards to 
the even greater increase in the amount of legal immigrants within Spanish borders, it is 
not as insignificant as one would assume, partially due to rather recent amnesty bills in 
2002 and 2005, as well as the fact that the Moroccan population must wait 10 years to 
apply as well as the Romanians and Bulgarians that are now considered to be EU 
citizens, making naturalization somewhat unnecessary.  In fact, the percentage of those 
naturalizing relative to the actual total number of residents has decreased in the year 
2005.  Consequently, the percentage of those seeking to become Spanish citizens each 
individual year has been quite static only reaching a slight peak in 2004 with 1.9% and 
then dropping again to 1.5% in 2005. 
Again, one must also take note of where the immigrants are coming from.  
While Morocco leads as a country by 15.71% in total naturalization from 1992-2005, it 
is also the biggest contributor to legal residency in Spain in the year 2005 at 18%.  This 
is also considering that they must wait ten years to even be considered for citizenship.  
The greatest population attaining full citizenship in Spain comes from Latin America at 
62.43% of all naturalized immigrants.  This population also has the ability to maintain 
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their previous citizenship as they do not have to denounce their birthplace and are 
considered to have dual citizenship (Along with Portugal, Andorra, Philippines, and 
Equatorial Guinea).  Therefore, such a situation in which only 12.9% of the Latin 
American born population has attained citizenship (i.e. based on records from 1992-
2005 only) while in doing so does not an any way change their status in their original 
countries—they basically have nothing to lose and everything to gain—leads one to 
believe that their naturalization, as low as it already is relative to the quantity of Latin 
Americans residing legally in Spain (2005: 986,178 or 36% of total legal but not 
naturalized residents and 146,519 naturalized), could be larger.  Still, one must consider 
that those who were regularized in the Amnesty Bill of 2005, after their two years wait, 
can apply for citizenship and it has been said that the Comisarios are seen with 
streaming lines of applicants as of summer 2008, so one will only have to wait for data 
of the past year or so to see if more Latin-American have been able to naturalize 
themselves after in the wake of the Amnesty Bill.  In 2005, 337,056 Latin Americans 
were given their residency permits, so if all of those were to apply for naturalization 
there would be quite an increase in Latin-American double nationality holders from 
146,519 in 2005 to 483,575.   This would mean a leap of total immigrants with Spanish 
nationality from 62.43% in 2005 to 84.58% if no one else naturalized in 2007.  Still, 
even if naturalizations could increase by such a rate due to the Latin-American 
population, the total percentage of immigrants with full-membership rights as 
naturalized citizens in the year 2007, just counting the Latin-American contribution 
which we are considering to be extreme, would only be 8.5%, when in 2005 the 
percentage was 12.9% from that region and in total for all regions at 8.6% anyway. 
(*see tables 1.4, 1,5 and 1.6)  So, the percentage of legal immigrants that have been 
naturalized Spain in comparison actually stays the same regardless of the bombardment 
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solicitation in 2007 and 2008.  This is primarily due to the fact that the increase in 2006 
and 2007 has been so great, by 1,240,082 to be exact so that the Latin-American 
contribution can only have a small effect.  Also, since the majority of new residents are 
from the EU, naturalization is not encouraged and theoretically deemed unnecessary as 
they have access to the electoral system in regards to the municipal vote.  Also, even if 
they wanted to naturalize, they must also wait their ten years to be even considered. 
Waiting periods for almost all members except for Portugal and Andorra are ten years 
anyway.   
So, it brings us back yet again to the conundrum of having such a great 
population of immigrants without full citizenship guaranteeing their full political rights 
and participation.  European Community members do have a municipal vote and 
political participation in this limited sense and considering that they are 39% of total 
legal immigration, it is the other 61% of the immigration population that is the concern.  
According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística in Spain as of January 1st 2007 the 
Spanish population was 45,200,737,112 so considering that there were 4,144,166 
immigrants registered in municipalities (documented and undocumented) that was 9.2% 
of the population.  Of the 9.6% only 22% was from the EU at the time, so the other 78% 
was 9.6% (including the million or so without documentation) of the total municipally 
registered population without political rights in the form of formal suffrage.  Supposing 
the increase in population in 2007 can be solely represented by the increase in 
immigrant population (not counting birthrate) a population increase of 375,388 
(45,576,125 total) has occurred.  As a result of the increase in EU population within the 
immigrant population is 39%, then the other 61% is 6.5% of the supposed population is 
not represented politically in the form of political suffrage.  Children under 18 are not 
                                                 
112 Instituo Nacional de Estadística, http://www.ine.es/
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either but one is to congest that their political rights are at least represented in the form 
of their parents’ political participation while the interests of the immigrant are not 
strictly represented by anyone in the form of a formal vote.  Such misrepresentation of a 
country’s population, even if one disregards the very presence of undocumented 
immigrants which has decreased significantly does not effect the percentage that much 
(bringing it down from 6.5% to 5.3%) one must admit that such a lack of participation 
through formal suffrage is quite notable. 
One might also notice Morocco as a country that could demonstrate some 
significance in naturalization considering that they are unable to attain dual citizenship 
and must technically denounce their birthplace, although it is quite a normal practice to 
maintain both citizenships even after such denouncement.  Still, looking closely at the 
numbers in the same fashion: 15.71% of total naturalized citizens only comes out to 
36,870 naturalized Moroccan born Spanish citizens out of a total of 493,114 legal 
Moroccan residents+ 36,870= total Moroccan born population: 529,984 which makes a 
total of 6.95% naturalization rate for all Moroccans (i.e. based on records from 1992-
2005 only).  This is still not incredibly significant and would definitely be increased if 
dual nationality was allowed like in the Latin American case, and especially if the wait 
was not ten years.   
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Table 3.4 - Simple percentage of naturalization in Spain 1992-2005 
Continent / Area / Country 1992-2005 
EU 5.3% 
Rest of Europe 1.68% 
Total Europe 6.98% 
Latin America (including Mexico) 62.43% 
*Colombia              8.45% 
*Ecuador 9.10% 
*Peru 10.96% 
North America  (Canada & the U.S.) .57% 
Africa 20.66% 
*Morocco    15.71% 
Asia 8.66% 
 *China 1.33% 
Oceania 0.02% 
Other** 0.25% 
Total 100%= 234,694 
Total vs Total Immigrant 
population in 2005 
8.6%  of immigrants 
naturalized 
Source: Plan Ciudadanía e Integración 2007- 2010; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** Stateless persons and others 
 
Table 3.5 - Percentage of concessions of naturalization each year versus legal resident 
population in that year 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
# Naturalizations 11,996 16,735 21,805 26,555 38,335 42,829
Total Legal 
Residents 895,720 1,109,060 1,324,001 1,647,011 1,977,291 2,738,932
Combined # of 
naturalized and 
legal residents 
907,716 1,125,795 1,345,806 1,673,566 2,015,626 2,781,761
% of 
naturalization 
vs. legal 
residents 
1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.9% 1.5% 
Sources: Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2005; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
                Plan Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
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Graphic 3.5 - Percentage of concessions of naturalization each year versus legal resident population in that year 
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Table 3.6 - Percentage of naturalization in Spain 2005 vs. foreign country-born population   
 
2005 
Continent/ 
Area/Country Total legal 
residents 
***2005 
naturalized 
citizens 
2005 3rd-
crountry 
residents 
+naturalized 
citizens 
2005 
% of 
naturalization 
for each region 
or country 
EU 569,284 20.7% 12,439 581,723 2.1%
Rest of Europe 337,177** 12.3% 3,943 341,120 1.2%
Total Europe 906,461  33.1% 16,382 922,843 1.8%
Latin America 
(including Mexico) 986,178 36% 146,519 1,132,697 12.9%
*Colombia 204,348 7.5% 19,714 224,062 8.8%
*Ecuador 357,065 13% 21,357 378,422 5.6%
North America  
(Canada & the U.S.) 17,052 0.6% 1,338 18,390 7.3%
Africa 649,251 23.7% 48,488 697,739 6.9%
*Morocco 493,114 18% 36,870 529,984 6.95%
Asia 177,423 6.5% 20,324 197,747 10.3%
*China 85,745 3% 3,121 88,866 3.5%
Oceania 1,466 0.05% 47 1,513 3.1%
Other*** 1,101 0.04% 587 1,688 34.8%
Total 2,738,932 234,694 2,973,626 
****Average by 
region: 
7% 
 
Source: Plan Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
              Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2005; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
 
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** Stateless persons and others 
*** based on records from 1992 - 2005 
**** 
This is not including stateless persons and others.  This percentage based on region is rather 
high in comparison to the overall percentage because the European population represents about 
one third of the population and has a low naturalization since 1992.  Also, this is an overall rate 
from 1992 —2005, not a yearly rate.Rainer Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship p 247 
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Spanish Judiciary: How exactly are immigrants considered to 
be equal? 
 
 
Since up until quite recently Spain has been known as a country of emigrants, 
not immigrants, it has been lagging behind in its approaches towards its incorporation of 
third-country nationals within its borders.  In order to fully understand the formation of 
its present-day legislation on foreigners’ rights and integration, one must look back to 
Spain’s 1985  legislation on is more detailed in regards to the subject and how they both 
relate to the Spanish Constitution of 1978.   
 In the First Title of the 1985 legislation, passed by the socialist government, 
PSOE, states that foreigners in Spain will have the rights and liberties recognized in the 
First Title of the Spanish Constitution by the terms that are stated in this same law.  In 
other words, they have the same rights in the Constitution, but they are restricted by the 
Law of 1985.  It states, “Los extranjeros gozaran en España de los derechos y libertades 
reconocidos en el Título 1 de la Constitución, en los términos establecidos en la 
presente Ley y en las que regulan el ejercicio de cada uno de ellos.” (Ley Orgánica 
7/1985 Art. 4)  Basically, except for the right to suffrage which is limited to those that 
come from countries where there is a reciprocal agreement, allowing municipal voting 
(EU state agreements as an example) rights are granted to foreigners, but not under 
totally equal conditions.  Also under Article 4, it states that foreigners will be subject to 
tasks and obligations allowed by the Juridical Order except for those that exclusively 
correspond to Spaniards.  Throughout, foreigners are referred to when they are legally 
residing in the country and those without documentation are not mentioned. 
 Article 6 allows for the right to free movement within Spanish borders while 
allowing that the ministry of Interior may individually control such movement by 
determinant reasons of public security  by: first, periodic presentation before competent 
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authorities; second, staying away from frontiers or certain populated areas; and third, 
obligatory residence in a determined area.  Article 7 allows for the right to meeting, 
always keeping in mind that one resides legally within Spanish territory and in order to 
celebrate private meetings behind closed doors or in public spaces, like a protest, one 
must ask for authorization from the Province’s governor.  The governor has the right to 
change the date, place, duration and itinerary at will.  When compared to the 
Constitution and how the right to meeting is allowed to Spaniards, yes they must be 
communicated to the authorities, but they can only be prohibited if there are existing 
reasons founded in the alteration of public order, putting in danger people or goods.113
 The right to association for Spaniards is restricted by the following: that which is 
seen as with criminal intent are illegal, those associations under the protection of the 
same article should be registered, associations can only be dissolved by a judicial 
resolution, and secret associations and paramilitary associations are prohibited.114  On 
the other hand, the right to association for third-country residents is different in the 
sense that any association that has half of the total and one member more that are third-
country nationals must be reported within 15 days to the Ministry of Interior.115  The 
Judicial Authorities also reserve the right to cancel activities.  Article 9 allows for the 
right to education to those that reside legally within Spanish borders as well as the right 
to the creation and direction of educational centers.  Article 10 allows for the right to 
syndicate affiliation and strike under the same conditions of Spaniards.  Not present in 
the 1985 legislation, but in the Regalement of 1986, is the changes in alterations of 
                                                 
113 Constitución Española de 1978, Título Primero, Capítulo Primero, Artículo 21. 
114 Constitución Española de 1978, Título Primero, Capítulo Primero, Artículo 22. 
115 Reglamento de ejecución de la Ley Orgánica 7/1985, de 1-7-1985, sobre derechos y libertades, 
Capítulo 5, Artículo 71. 
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situation and communication where legal foreign residents must inform the Police 
Commission of any change in residency, nationality or employment within 15 days.116
 Clearly the law of 1985 was quite restrictive in the sense that it did not fully 
allow the same rights to third-country nationals as it did to its citizens.  What is 
interesting is how the law changed in 1996 and 2000, while it always concentrates on 
legal residents, not illegal, non-documented residents.  In the 1996 law, in Article 1, the 
second point states that foreigners are equal to Spaniards by law according to 
International Treaties, specifically the International Pact of Civil and Political Rights of 
December 19th 1966.  In Article 2, rights of the person are defined as rights “inherent to 
people,” again mentioning that they are equal to Spaniards, along with the right to 
education in the same condition as Spaniards and right to legal representation if 
arrested, assisted by an interpreter, if needed, and without charge.  The evident change 
here, is the legislation’s insistence on “rights as a person” that are equal to a Spaniard’s.  
Another clarification, while not outright change, is the right to movement (Art. 3) where 
it is more clearly specified that a legal foreign resident has the right to change residency 
without limit, but still maintaining that such residency can be controlled regarding 
Article 6 of the 1985 law.  On the other hand, there was a definite change in the right of 
meeting in Article 19 that specifies that foreign residents may meet behind closed doors 
without prior authorization, while the same rules apply to them in regards to public 
manifestations as stated in the Constitution and the Law of 1985.  Another change, is 
the declaration of the right to assistance and social “lending” in Article 8, which refers 
to Social Security matters such as unemployment.  Article 9 refers to the right to 
Healthcare, 9 to the right of the foundation of businesses and 11 to the access of the 
exercise of professional degrees following the set rules of each individual profession. 
                                                 
116 Reglamento de ejecución de la Ley Orgánica 7/1985, de 1-7-1985, sobre derechos y libertades, 
Capítulo 5, Artículo 73. 
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 In the year 2000, the 1985 law was replaced and even more interesting is the 
Reform of that law the same year.117 Here, the real significance in the fact that Spain is 
recognized as a country of migratory destination as well as a transitory admittance into 
the European Union borders.  Most interesting is its change in title from that of simply 
rights and liberties to that of integration of immigrants as well.  In Chapter IV of the 
same preamble, it states that the governments of the European Union in October of 1999 
came to the agreement that third-country nationals should receive just treatment in 
Member States and that a policy of integration should allow for rights and obligations 
comparable to that of citizens of the Union so that there would be an absence of 
discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and a development of methods 
against racism and xenophobia.118  
 Article 6 of the 2000 Immigration Law is about Public Participation and is of 
great interest in regards to the central theme of this paper.  It states that foreign legal 
residents that are unable to vote, but can elect through democratic forms their 
representatives so that they may take part in debates and municipal decisions that 
concern them, conformed with local legislation.  Also, local city halls are required to 
maintain an up to date register of foreigners in their locality and even facilitate the 
exercise of suffrage of foreigners in their country of origin.  Thus, the Spanish 
government is encouraging a possibly collective manner in which to participate in the 
                                                 
117 “La reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000 parte de la situación y características de la población 
extranjera en España, no sólo en la actualidad, sino de cara a los años venideros, regulándose la 
inmigración desde la consideración de ésta como un hecho estructural que se ha convertido a España en 
un país de destino de los flujos migratorios y, por su situación, también en un punto de tránsito hacia 
otros Estados, cuyos controles fronterizos en las rutas desde el nuestro han sido eliminados o reducidos 
sustancialmente.  Por otra parte, esta normativa forma parte de un planteamiento global y coordinado en 
el tratamiento del fenómeno migratorio en España, que contempla desde una visión amplia todos los 
aspectos vinculados al mismo, y, por ello, no sólo desde una única perspectiva, como pueda ser la del 
control de flujos, la dela integración de los residentes extranjeros, o la del codesarrollo de los países de 
origen, sino todas ellas conjuntamente.” (Reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, Exposición de Motivos 
Capítulo I) 
118 Reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11-1-2000 (RCL 2000\72 y 209), sobre derechos y libertades 
de los extranjeros en España y su integración social. 
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public sphere. The collective groups are not clearly identified as ethnic groups as in 
other corporate models but as they increase in numbers and further generations, could 
become collective groups in the future.  In a sense, this still maintains itself within the 
definition of  the Liberal Model of Incorporation.  In regards to the right of meeting and 
association, all legal foreign residents follow the exact same rules as Spaniards.  While 
they continue to have the right to education, Infantile Education is also a concern in that 
the Spanish government guarantees a sufficient number of voluntary placements to 
assure the school enrollment of the population that solicits it (nursery school starting at 
age three).  Third-country nationals also have the right to advanced voluntary education 
as well as any scholarships or financial aid.  Even more important is the right to 
education for the betterment of social integration, recognizing and respecting their 
cultural identity.119  In Article 10, they have the right to work as contracted personnel in 
Public Administration but not as civil servants. 
 While National Forums working in an effort to deal with the immigration issue 
in Spain started in 1994, officially legislated in 1995 (Real Decreto 490/1995)120, the 
latest is from the Ministry of the Presidency, in Real Decreto 3/2006 on the 16th of 
January 2006, a Forum on the Social Integration of Immigrants.  It is outlined as an 
organ of consulting, information and assessment along with immigrant associations and 
social support organizations such as worker unions and business organizations that have 
an interest in immigration.  There are thirty members to the Forum, ten from the Public 
Administration, ten from immigrant and refugee representatives belonging to legal 
associations and ten belonging to worker unions and businesses with an interest in 
immigration.  The forum is meant to be an organization that tracts the integration of 
                                                 
119 Reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11-1-2000 (RCL 2000\72 y 209), sobre derechos y libertades 
de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, Artículo 9. 
120 Ministerio de trabajo y asuntos sociales. Memoria 2006 Foro par la Integración 
Social de los inmigrantes, http://www.mtas.es
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immigrants, develops reports on the state of their integration, and plans and programs at 
a national and international level.121  Depending upon its ultimate outcome, this could 
be the first step towards a corporate system of integration and incorporation of the 
immigrant minority in the Spanish system. 
                                                 
121 Real Decreto 3/2006, Ministerio de la Presidencia. 
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 Autonomous Regions and Integration 
 
In regards to the integration of immigration, agreements (convenios) were signed 
with various Autonomous Communities, including Andalucía, Aragón, Asturias, 
Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y Leóan, Cataluña, 
Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, Murcia, Rioja, Comunidad Valenciana and the 
Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla located on the African coast.  For example, 
there is a  program called GRECO (Global de Regulación y Coordinación de la 
Extranjería y la Inmigración en España for the period of 2002-2004.  In the year 2004 it 
had a budget of 3,785,890 euros where each Autonomous Community should have 
contributed at least 50 percent for any subsidized programs including: information, 
orientation and socio-labor assessment; basic reception; sensitivity programs fighting 
against discrimination and promotion of citizen participation.122
For example, in Madrid there is a Regional Plan for Immigration currently for 
the years 2005-2008 (formerly 2001-2004) which plans to define the actual state of 
immigration in Madrid, realize a diagnostic of their reception, generate a process of 
investigation and open dialogue involving the administration, social entities 
associations, and implicated actors in order to promote tolerance and integration and 
come to a consensus within the Madrid Community in regards to immigration policy.  
Those involved are a group of university affiliates and mainly volunteer associations. 
(For instance: Universidad Compultense, Cruz Roja, IESA, FEMP; PROVIVIENDA; 
APOI; CEAR etc)  As such, this applies again to the liberal model of immigrant 
integration, which sees immigrants as individuals, and generally allows the private 
                                                 
122 Dirección General de Integración de los Inmigrantes, Convenios con las Comunidades Autónomas 
para la realización de programas de integración social de inmigrantes, solicitantes de asilo, refugiados y 
desplazados 
117 
sphere to rely on NGOs to deal with the immigrant situation.  While the Spanish 
government subsidizes these organizations, this does not exactly qualify it as a Statist 
Model in that it is not the state that coordinates everything, but private entities.  OFRIM 
(Oficina Regional para la inmigración de la Comunidad de Madrid) is a center that is 
linked to the Dirección General de Inmigración, Cooperación al Desarrollo y 
Voluntariado de la Consejería de Familia y Asuntos Sociales de la Comunidad de 
Madrid, but it is managed by the Red Cross and its function is information, orientation, 
support and technical assessment.  APOI is an NGO that is dedicated to the integration 
of Eastern Europe immigrants and works with the Spanish Catholic Association and the 
Red Cross.  The EMSI is another NGO that is affiliated with the Madrid Government 
but again it is managed by the Red Cross and involved in the education of intercultural 
sensitivity.  CASI (Centros de Atención Social a Inmigrantes) seems to be the only 
organization that is clearly organized by the Community of Madrid and deals with the 
urgency of immigrants that find themselves especially vulnerable.  There is also a 
housing program for immigrants in regards to renting, mortgages and shared flats. In the 
case of buying a house or flat an immigrant must be a regular resident  in Madrid and 
have a savings of 20 to 30 percent of the price of the house or flat.  In regards to sharing 
a flat, the immigrant must be in a state of special vulnerability, social exclusion, 
emergency in regards to their sex, age, work precariousness, sickness or incapacity or be 
professionals that are in contact with this population.  There is also a program specially 
designated for support to those female immigrants that are victims of abuse and it is 
coordinated and managed by CASI.  Finally, CASI is also involved in a program to help 
immigrants in the case of social exclusion in coordination with NGOs such as the RAIS 
Foundation as well as the Spanish Red Cross and Caribú.123  Overall, it seems that 
                                                 
123 Dirección General de Inmigración, Cooperación al Desarrollo y Voluntariado, Plan Regional para la 
Inmigración de la Comunidad de Madrid 2005-2008 
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integration is concentrated mainly on extreme cases of violence, exclusion and initial 
receiving of the immigrant population in need and is not exactly clear in how it attempts 
to integrate any immigrants on a permanent basis.  Still, they do allow for interested 
parties to have a formal circle in which to inform and act on a regional basis. 
In regards to education, immigrants are guaranteed the right to education for the 
betterment of social integration while recognizing and respecting their cultural identity, 
by the 2000 law.124  Following the Ley Orgánica 10/2002 students unfamiliar with the 
Spanish language or those that are of economic need, should be assisted by specialized 
programs in order to facilitate their integration and educational level.  At all times, it is 
specified that immigrant children are guaranteed the same rights as Spanish students to 
the incorporation into the Spanish school system.  The actual implementation is again 
up to the Autonomous Communities, except for Melilla and Ceuta, that are coordinated 
directly by the Ministry of Education.   
 Currently, there are seven programs including: extraordinary support to 
immigrants for Spanish language instruction, special courses and workshops for 
immigrants that are in danger of being marginalized, sexual education against 
phenomenon such as pornography, sexual offences and prostitution, plan against 
infantile abuse, action for socio-community development locally, action to favor social 
and scholarly integration (prevention of racism and the fomentation of tolerance) and 
social and scholarly integration of minors affected by judicial measures and high risk.  
There also several plans in regards to the formation of young and adult immigrants in 
the following areas: the reinforcement of school enrollment aimed at those of 14-18 
years of age, a Formation and Insertion Plan into the workforce for those of 16-24 years 
of age, a separate plan for women’s entry into the workforce, plan of entry and school 
                                                 
124 Reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11-1-2000 (RCL 2000\72 y 209), sobre derechos y libertades 
de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, Art 9. 
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enrollment for those 25 and older and finally a plan for basic formation such as 
computer skills for those 25 and older. 125
Since 1992, there has been an agreement signed by Spain and Morocco in which 
a mixed group of experts coordinate a Program of Education of the Arab language and 
culture in Spanish public schools.  Spain must facilitate the educational facilities and 
classrooms necessary and Morocco must supply the teachers necessary for the program.  
Autonomous Communities included in the program are: Andalucía, Aragón, Islas 
Baleares, Canarias, Castilla de al Mancha, Cataluña, Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, La 
Rioja, Valencia, and the Basque Country.  The amount of schools and Moroccan 
teachers is based upon the number of Moroccan students in the schools.  With very few 
students, the Moroccan teacher teaches outside of normal school hours in various 
schools while in areas that have a greater number of Moroccan students, classes are 
given during normal school hours.  The greatest number is in Cataluña with 38 schools, 
15 Moroccan teachers and 978 Moroccan students and Madrid with 29 schools, 11 
Moroccan teachers and 604 Moroccan students.  Similarly, there is another program 
based on an agreement signed in 1970 that deals with Portuguese speaking foreign 
students and allows for 96 schools throughout the autonomous communities in which 
native Portuguese speaking teachers teach simultaneously with Spanish teachers.126
In regards to Spanish political parties, there does not seem to be any direct 
coalition with immigrant association.  UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) the leftist 
coalition is indignant with the Spanish government’s treatment of illegal aliens without 
documentation and with its recent Amnesty legislation, which it claims to be excluding 
and restrictive.127  One complaint is the recent allowing of access by the municipal 
                                                 
125 Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Programas de Inmigrantes 
126 Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Programas de Inmigrantes 
127 López, Susana. (Responsable del Area Federal de Migraciones de IU) El PSOE, la  
inmigración y la Ley de Extranjería 
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police to the “padrón municipal,” information that is protected from the police in the 
case of nationals.  In regards to the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), there 
does not seem to be any formal declaration as to its position although it does suggest 
that immigrants should have the right to vote in municipal and autonomous elections, 
regardless whether or not they are from a European Union member state.128  On the 
right, the PP (Partido Popular) concentrates mainly on errors that the current 
government has made in regards to Amnesty, and insists in the party’s lack of racial 
discrimination within its organization, and the necessity of its lack thereof within 
Spanish society.  The PP even directly mentions that the birth rate is going down in 
Spain, making it necessary economically to integrate immigrants into Spanish society 
while recognizing its numerical limitations.  In fact there seems to be a “‘pacto de 
silencio’” in general and a social fear of addressing the immigration situation in Spain 
by all political parties involved, the right’s message overly simple and clear and the 
left’s not completely formed.129  At all times, such immigration must be legal and 
respect the law.130  In each instance, the immigrant population is treated on an 
individual basis, not corporate or collective and while the left may wish for a further 
opening of Spanish immigration policy, the government’s actual policy under PSOE 
and PP is and was that of economic necessity, and its geographical location as an entry 
state into the EU.  In any case, it is the autonomous regions that are seen as the principal 
actors in regards to integration on a local level.131  In other words, localities are the true 
                                                 
128 El PSOE quiere que los extranjeros extracomunitarios voten en las autonómicas y municipales 
http://www.psoe.es
 
129 Zapata Barrero, Ricard. “Bases para interpretar la multiculturalidad en España.” pg. 223. 
130Díaz de la Mera, Augustín. El problema de la inmigración: Su dimensión europea. 
131 Joaquín Giró Miranda insists:“Entretanto son los Ayuntamientos las primeras instituciones públicas 
quienes por su proximidad a la ciudadanía deben desarrollar las políticas de acogida.  Y también es el 
caso de la red de asociaciones de apoyo a los inmigrantes (voluntariado y ONGs, además de sindicatos y 
un cierto asociacionismo étnico que aún está en sus prolegómenos) que con el tiempo se ha consolidado 
hasta el punto de impulsar y ofrecer políticas de integración ciudadana a los colectivos de inmigrantes que 
se han asentado en la geografía española.” (Giró Miranda 159) 
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nuclei of incorporation and integration for immigrant populations.  While that state may 
recommend and finance treatment and programs, it is the autonomous communities and, 
above all, the city halls that are meant to bring about integral action.  
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Collective Treatment of Immigrant Populations in Spain 
 
Collectives groups of immigrants in the form of associations have been in 
existence for quite some time and they have had a limited voice in the government in 
the form of representatives in the Foro para la integración, since the mid-nineties.  
Even so, while their groups were originally based upon finite countries of origin, most 
have branched out in offering their services to all those that may require assistance, 
regardless of their origins simply out of need for assistance based upon the great 
numbers of new immigration.  Also, there does not seem to be a clear and defined act of 
the Spanish state that indicates the treatment of immigrant minorities as collective 
entities.  The Spanish state may expect them to organize themselves and apply to the 
state for representation as opposed to automatically putting them into subgroups, but 
such encouragement for immigrant associations to organize themselves into subgroups 
is only for the sake of competing for state subsidies, not necessarily as a direct focus for 
immigrant integration policy. 
 The Boletín Estadístico de Extranjería e Inmigración of 2007 states that the 
those paying into Social Security has increased by 4.1 million people since 2001 in 
which 41% of that increase (1.7 million) has been from foreign workers.  There has also 
been a descent in unemployment since December of 2006, as of July 2007 from 12.69% 
to 7.56% of the total of unemployed among foreign workers.132  On the 16th of February 
2007, the PSOE led government, to be exact the Ministry Council, approved the 
proposal from the Ministry of Work and Social Issues suggesting a Plan Estratégico de 
Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010.133
                                                 
132Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.  Boletín Estadístico de Extranjería e Inmigración; 
Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración; July 2007. 
http://extranjeros.mtas.es/es/general/BoletindeExtranjeria-num-13-Web.pdf 
133The plan is based upon three points: 
“· El plan va dirigido al conjunto de la población y está orientado a potenciar la cohesión social a través 
de las políticas basadas en la igualdad de oportunidades y la igual dad de derechos y deberes. 
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Also, the plan is part of the four pillars that make up the “política integral de 
inmigración” that was put in place by the government in 2004.  The first pillar is the 
integration of immigrants, the second the fight against illegal immigration, the third 
being the linking of legal immigrant necessities of the job market and the fourth the 
cooperation of the development of the countries of origin.  What strikes one as 
interesting in regards to the plan is firstly, its title Strategic Plan of Citizenship and 
Integration.  It is not just a plan for the integration of its immigrants, but supposedly one 
of citizenship.  Secondly, in its first point, rights are mentioned, as well as 
responsibilities.  Finally, in the third point, it is outright pointed out that the cooperation 
of independent actors, such as the Autonomous Communities, city halls, social agents, 
immigrant associations and NGOs, is to be expected.  Straight out, the focus is all at 
once liberal, because of its bottom up structural dependence upon local entities.   
 All at once, when the reader is lead to believe that such state organization could 
really constitute a labeling of the Spanish treatment of immigrants as statist, in the very 
“Nota de Prensa” sent out by the Ministry of Employment and Social Issues  announces 
that the plan is just an outline of possible action, not a direct order on how to act. 
“El Gobierno ha diseñado este Plan Estratégico de Integración con el objetivo de 
que no sea un proyecto exclusivo del Estado, sino que se configure como un 
marco de cooperación en el que se incluyan las iniciativas de las distintas 
Administraciones Públicas y de la sociedad civil.”134
 
As a result, all ideas that the state is issuing a direct plan on how the government, local 
and federal is to deal with their sudden increase in immigration, is right there and then 
eliminated in almost every sense of the word.  The true approach then, still is 
                                                                                                                                               
· El presupuesto alcanza los 2.005.017.091 euros, destacando las áreas de educación, acogida y empleo. 
· Con la máxima participación y concertación social e institucional. En su elaboración han colaborado 
CC.AA, ayuntamientos, agentes sociales, asociaciones de inmigrantes y ONGs y cuenta con el informe 
favorable del Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes.”Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos 
Sociales.  Nota de Prensa: El Gobierno aprueba el Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-
2010; www.tt.mtas.es/periodico 
134 Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.  Nota de Prensa: El Gobierno aprueba el Plan Estratégico de 
Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010; www.tt.mtas.es/periodico 
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represented in its purest form as liberal, down-up and dependent upon private forces 
such as associations and NGOs.  Yes, quite a bit of money will be thrown at the 
situation by the state itself, but again, most of it will concentrate on the initial 
welcoming and assistance of the immigrant, education and their insertion into the 
workplace.  For the Spanish government, up until now these quite obviously are their 
most important, and needed areas of concern.  In order for this to take place, it will be 
done by those who are closest to the situation, the towns, villages, cities and 
autonomous regions.  Such an approach does make sense, considering the de-centralized 
nature of the Spanish state in general.  In effect, the actual organization and spending of 
the budget will be left to local authorities under state supervision. 
 Another interesting aspect of the plan are its ten objectives,  none of which are 
especially surprising except for the very first one, in that it wishes to guarantee the 
exercise of civil, social, economic, cultural and political rights.  Immigrant political 
rights, currently non-existent in any direct form, are mentioned, though briefly in the 
area of “Participation” in the plan which will be the focus of an endeavor to take a 
closer look at the project. 
 All eleven “medidas de intervención” of the plan, again, follow the treatment of 
immigrants as separate entities to the population that are guaranteed almost all civil 
rights, all social rights and basically no political rights except for the section that covers 
“Participation.”  The twelve “medidas”, or measures, are : Initial welcome into the 
country (acogida), education, employment, housing, social services, health, infancy and 
young people, equal treatment, women, participation, public sensitivity 
(sensibilización), and co-development.  The following is a table that summarizes briefly 
each objective or measure. 
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Table 3.7- Measures of Intervention for the Strategic plan for Citizenship and Immigration 2007-2010  
Medidas de Intervención del Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Inmigración 2007-2010 
Initial Welcome 
? Supply immigrants with tools necessary to become sufficiently 
autonomous in order to have access to goods and services in 
equal conditions as those of the native population. 
? Articulate a nation-wide welcoming network able to provide 
integral solutions to those immigrants that are particularly 
vulnerable or those that have special needs. 
Education 
? Guarantee an equal obligatory education in equal conditions with 
that of the native population. 
? Guarantee a quality obligatory education to all students 
regardless of condition or background of each student. 
? Transform the educational system so that it may be adequate for 
the needs of a diverse student body, acquiring knowledge and 
intercultural competence. 
? Transform schools into environments in which communication, 
cooperation and integration can thrive. 
? Facilitate the immigrant further, non-obligatory education. 
? Better the access to adult education and training. 
? Better the transfer of foreign academic degrees. 
Employment 
? Guarantee the equality of rights and responsibilities of 
employment and Social Security. 
? Better the management of migratory flows. 
? Promote the maintenance of employment. Professional 
promotion and training and competence of the immigrant
workers for job opportunities. 
? Better the devices of intermediation in the job market. 
? Fight the irregular hiring and contracting of immigrants in the 
“illegal” market. 
? Fight against discrimination and for equal access of opportunities 
for immigrants in the job market and in businesses. 
? Foment a diverse management in businesses. 
Housing 
? Increase protected housing and promote a greater equilibrium for 
collectives with lower incomes. 
? Prevent neighborhoods that are solely those of low-income 
inhabitants. 
? Fight discrimination of immigrants in the housing market. 
? Better the co-existence and prevent residential segregation. 
Social Services 
? Adjust the public social service system to the needs of a more 
diverse society in order to guarantee an equal minimal amount of 
access to all citizens.*135 
? Supply equal social services to all citizens that are in special need 
of help. 
? Develop methods of institutional coordination of management 
and information so that different administrations and entities that 
work in the social service sector will have access to. 
?  
 
                                                 
135 *Here there is a bit of confusion, and responsibility, as to the use of the word “citizen” as it is assumes 
that access to social citizens is open not just to actual citizens but also to permanent residents by law. 
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Health 
? Guarantee the right to the protection of their health to all 
immigrants. 
? Better the identification of the health necessities of the immigrant 
population. 
? Better the training of health personnel and management 
techniques for the health of the immigrant population. 
Infancy and Young People 
? Favor the access of immigrant minors and young people for 
programs for children and young people. 
? Promote the attention and social intervention for immigrant 
children and young immigrants in vulnerable situations. 
? Support the social participation of immigrant children and young 
people 
Equal Treatment 
? Fight against the discrimination for racial or ethnic reasons so as 
to guarantee equal opportunity. 
? Include equal treatment in all public policy. 
? Start the promotion of instruments of equal treatment against 
discrimination for racial or ethnic reasons. 
 
Women 
? Incorporate the theme of different sexes into all the phases of 
migratory policy. 
? Favor the normalized access of immigrant women into programs 
made especially for women in general. 
? Facilitate the integration of especially vulnerable immigrant 
women. 
Participation 
? Consolidate the immigrant association movement and their 
interaction with the already existing associations. 
? Increase the level of participation of immigrants in general 
associations. 
? Increase and better the political participation of immigrant 
citizens. 
Public Sensitivity 
? Better the public image of immigration and promote positive 
aspects of a diverse society. 
? Generate attitude changes towards immigration. 
Co-Development: 
Migrations and Development 
? Identify and promote development opportunities in countries of 
origin. 
? Incorporate the co-development perspective into the process of 
immigrant integration. 
 
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.   
Nota de Prensa: El Gobierno aprueba el Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010; 
www.tt.mtas.es/periodico 
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Overall, as one can see, the plan seems to be an enormous undertaking in a 
sense, especially considering that it is set forth as a simple “reference” for autonomous 
communities and localities to follow.  Even so, it seems to deal with practically every 
immediate topic imaginable in relation to the integration of immigrants into the social, 
civic, and even political realms.  Still, while its title may allude to the fact, it is not as 
outright as it should be in defining absolute integration as the acquirement of 
citizenship.  Such lack of clarity through omission shows a resultant lack of 
transparency and responsibility.  The fact that a minimal equality of social services is 
stated as a guarantee to citizens only, is actually contrary to the very constitution.  It can 
be assumed that such misuse of the term citizen is solely an accident, but if it is not, 
there is a call for even more concern in regards to the plan.    Assuming that the misuse 
of the term citizen is simply a fleeting mistake, let us recall Marshall’s three parts of 
true citizenship: civil freedoms of person, speech, thought, religion, choice of  work and 
justice; political rights such as the right to participate in the exercise of political power 
either as a member or a voter in parliaments or councils; and social rights such as access 
to the social welfare state.  Within the plan, all aspects are addressed and it even goes so 
far as to treat immigrants directly as citizens by referencing the rights towards them as 
such.  Even the political aspect as such is treated by suggesting the possibility of the 
local vote to third-country nationals in hope of further integrating themselves into the 
society. 
If one is to look closer into the plan at the specifications of furthering immigrant 
participation, one will find that such participation, in direct imitation of the values of 
citizenship within a society, is considered to be an integral part of an immigrant's 
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integration.136  Not only is it an integral part on immigrant integration, but it is actually 
a way in which to measure said integration, along with all other policy.  Without it, an 
immigrant can never be fully integrated.  Still, does that mean that the immigrant is 
really integrated, or simply that the possibility of further integration is offered?  The 
government still will not be able to force anyone to participate, but at least the option is 
an open one.  The plan even refers to the concept of “civic citizenship” which is an idea 
from the European Commission in which immigrants could slowly gain rights and 
obligations over a period of several years so that they may eventually have the same 
rights and obligations of citizens even though they have not been naturalized.  This 
could somehow be a first step in the process of naturalization.  The plan also refers 
positively to the readiness of more European countries to allow naturalization in general  
but it does not mention dual nationality. 
 Later on, in the section of Participation under Objectives and Programs, the 
corporate approach again comes to light.  The state does not create immigrants 
associations, but instead helps (apoyo) to create them, or facilitate their creation and 
maintenance.137  It seems that the idea of increasing the support of existing associations 
                                                 
136 “La participación activa de las personas inmigrantes en todos los ámbitos sociales y en los asuntos 
públicos es el elemento clave, más allá de la igualdad en derechos y deberes con la población autóctona, 
para hablar propiamente de que han accedido a la condición de ciudadanos y ciudadanas. Sólo una 
sociedad en la que las personas inmigrantes participan en pie de igualdad con la población autóctona 
podrá considerarse una sociedad inclusiva, cohesionada y capaz de generar un sentimiento de pertenencia 
entre la población inmigrada. De ahí que el grado de participación social se convierta en la piedra de 
toque que permite medir el éxito o el fracaso de una sociedad a la hora de integrar a los nuevos 
ciudadanos, así como de las políticas de integración desarrolladas por los poderes públicos.”Ministerio de 
Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Inmigración 2007-2010; 
http://www.mtas.es; 8.10. Participación. 
137 “Es preciso reforzar el aún incipiente tejido asociativo inmigrante.  Simultáneamente, se trata de 
asegurar que el movimiento asociativo inmigrante no evolucione en un sentido aislacionista o de 
repliegue identitario, sino, al contrario, que sirva para multiplicar las interacciones con la población 
autóctona y mejorar el conocimiento, el aprendizaje y la adaptación mutua. Para ello, es preciso fomentar 
las acciones de intercambio de conocimientos y de parten arriado con asociaciones y organizaciones 
sociales de ámbito más general, y, en particular, con las organizaciones de apoyo a la inmigración. 
Igualmente, resulta de especial importancia incidir en el asociacionismo de ámbito local, por su 
vinculación con la convivencia y las interacciones cotidianas de personas autóctonas e inmigrantes, y por 
ser un ámbito privilegiado de participación ciudadana.”Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Plan 
Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Inmigración 2007-2010; http://www.mtas.es; 8.10. Participación 2. 
Objetivos y programas: Objetivo 1. 
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and supporting the creation of new associations is directly linked to the perceived 
interaction of such associations with existing Spanish associations, so that its principle 
is not solely to give the immigrant a voice in his/her representation, but also to facilitate 
a close relationship between associations, immigrant or native.  Isolationism is what is 
to be hoped to be avoided. 
 The foremost intent to avoid such isolation of existing association is the “Foro 
para la integración social de los inmigrantes”.  On the 16th of January 2006, the Ministry 
of the President decreed the objective, nature and function of the Foro.  The  “Objeto” is 
considered to be as a  “…finalidad de servir a la participacióm y la integración de 
éstos[los inmigrantes] en la sociedad española.”  Its judicial nature is one of “...consulta, 
información y asesoramiento, adscrito al Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, a 
través de la Dirección General de Integración de los Inmigrantes.”  It functions include: 
the formulating of proposals for integration; receiving information of programs and 
activities in Autonomous Communities and localities; asking for information about 
social organizations involved in immigration in order to facilitate co-existence  of the 
native and immigrant populations; formulating an annual report about the immigrant 
and refugee integration; formulating reports about proposals, plans and programs; 
promoting and investigating subjects related to said integration; cooperating with 
international, autonomous or local organizations; or any other acts that are considered 
necessary in dealing with the integration of legal immigrants in Spain.  Any proposal, 
plans or acts are to be sent through the Secretary of State of Immigration and 
Emigration (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración) and passed by the 
General State Administration (Administración General de Estado)  for approval. 
 Even more important is the composition of the Foro which is headed by the 
president, appointed by the Minister of Employment and Social Issues.  The first vice-
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president is elected by the members and the second will be the General Director of 
Integration of Immigrants of the Ministry of Employment and Social Issues.  The 
secretary is the Sub director of International Relations of the General Directors of the 
Integration of Immigrants.  Basically, the heads of the Foro are all appointed except for 
one of the vice-presidents who is voted in by all members.  That said, the members are 
six representatives of the General State Administration, two representatives of the 
Autonomous Communities, two representatives of the local administration, ten in 
representation of immigrants and refugees through associations, and ten in 
representation as social support groups(six of those from NGOs, two from unions, and 
two from business organizations).  The members of the Foro are expected to serve the 
following functions: participate in debates and offer proposals, participate in 
committees and work groups; exercise the right to vote (the members may abstain 
except for those representing the administration); provide information; formulate 
questions and petitions and any other functions deemed necessary for the members.  
Observers are also welcome, not from the administration but from social support groups 
or associations that are in some way able to contribute to integration, although they have 
no vote, just a voice. 
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 On the 12th of May 2006 the Foro members were officially chosen after an 
extensive application process for the associations: 
Table 3.8 - Chosen members for participation in the Foro para la integración social de los inmigrantes 
 
Immigrant and Refugee Associations Social Support Oraganizations 
? Asociación de trabajadores e Inmigrantes   
Marroquíes en España (ATIME) 
? América-España Solidaridad y Cooperación 
(AESCO) 
? Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta (ASCIB) 
? Voluntariado de Madres Dominicanas-
Voluntariado Integración Colectivos 
Internacionales de Trabajadores (VOMADE-
VINCIT) 
? Asociación de Refugiados e Inmigrantes 
Peruanos (ARI-PERÚ) 
? Asociación Rumiñahui Hispano-Ecuatoriana 
para Colaboración al desarrollo de África y 
América Latina 
? Asociación de Chinos en España (ACHE) 
? Asociación de Cooperación Bolivia-España 
(ACOBE) 
? Federación de Asociaciones de Inmigrantes 
Rumanos en España (FEDROM) 
? Asociación de Inmigrantes Búlgaros en España 
(AIBE BALSAN) 
? Cruz Roja Española 
? Cáritas Española 
? Asociación Comisión Católica Española 
de Migración (ACCEM) 
? Consorcio de Entidades para la Acción 
Integral con Inmigrantes  
? Red Acoge 
? Asociación de Solidaridad con los 
trabajadores Inmigrantes (ASTI) 
? Comisiones Obreras 
? Confederación Española de 
Organizaciones Empresariales 
? Confederación Española de la Pequeña y 
Mediana Empresa 
? Unión General de Trabajadores 
 
Overall, while it is clear that they represent their associates, not the entire immigrant 
population, mathematically there is not such a bad representation of immigrants in 
Spain since Latin America does represent the biggest population presence as a region 
(while Moroccans are the biggest as a country) in Spain at  36%, followed by Africans 
at 23.7% with Moroccans at 18% although the Chinese only really represent 3% of the 
6.5% of the Asians, (2005-not including EU immigrants who already have at least a 
municipal vote).  The Romanians and Bulgarians are a curious choice as they have 
become part of the European Union but do not have all the same rights as regular 
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members to vote in municipal elections, migratory rights, free movement of goods, 
taxation etc. and are so  restricted that they cannot be piled onto the same category as 
other EU state members.138  Finally, the associations will exist as members for three 
years, not counting the members from the Public Administration. 
The Foro has at least three meetings a year.  As of February 2007, it has decreed 
that it should follow the guidelines set out by the European Parliament that has 
established the year 2007 as the European Year for Equality and of Opportunities for 
All.  The decision outlines four objectives for the year: rights, representation, 
recognition and respect.  In June, four commissions or work groups were formed: 
Education and Sensitivity, Employment and Training, Integration Policy and 
Participation, and Judicial, European Union and Issues.  A permanent commission was 
also formed with President Lorenzo Cachón, Vicepresident Kamal Rahmouni as 
representative of the Moroccan ATIME, Vicepresident Estrella Rodríguez Pardo as 
General Director of Immigrant Integration and Secretary Irene García Suárez also from 
the Administration.  The six members are from FEDROM (Romania), UGT (Workers 
Union), AESCO (América-España), ACCEM (Spanish Catholic Commission), 
CEPAIM (Immigrant Consort) and FEMP ( Spanish Municipal and Provincial 
Federation). 
Another state organization worth mentioning is the Observatorio Permanente de 
la Inmigración which is basically an institution dedicated to gathering and dispersing 
information through offering statistics, publications and documents to the public.  Also, 
there is the Observatorio Español del Racismo y la Xenofobia which is another 
institution that provides dialogues and activities dealing with racism and xenophobia. 
                                                 
138 Official Journal of the European union. L 363 Volume 49 20 December 2006 
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Before moving on, let us take a quick look back to the defining questions as to 
the classification of a state’s dealings with their immigrant populations as statist, 
corporate, or liberal:  
 
Table 1.7 - Classifying Factors of Incorporation Models 
 
 
Relationship between 
state and individual? Statist Corporate Liberal 
Type of right assigned 
as? individual group individual 
Who organizes the 
relationship? State through the state 
Private group through 
the state 
Private group/individual 
through private 
group/individual 
How is the right 
exercised? individually 
Individually and 
collectively individually 
  
 
As one can see, as each question is asked: the type of right is assigned as an 
individual(liberal) and a group through the Foro (corporate), the relationship is 
organized by the state private groups and the individual (statist, corporate and liberal) 
and the right is exercised individually and collectively(liberal and corporate).  It is the 
Foro that brings the corporate aspect into light more than ever, but the liberal side is not 
abandoned since immigrants are, as of now, seen as basically individuals with equal 
rights(except of course for the educational treatment that is offered to the Portuguese 
and the Moroccans in the public school system as noted before) and allowing that their 
entrance is based upon market needs each year.  As the Foro evolves, with its corporate 
system in place, it could be that the system becomes more and more corporate.  The 
immigrant associations could fight for special treatment of the groups that they are there 
134 
to represent, and since the state has organized this corporate relationship it would be 
only natural that the groups represented will receive some sort of directed treatment of 
their populations.   
 Even so, after interviewing the majority of the actors involved in the Forum, that 
does not seem to be the case.  Practically all those involved are more interested in 
treating the immigrant as a citizen like anyone else, a “normalized” individual.  While 
the term “Normalization” may sound somewhat patronizing in English, giving one the 
impression that immigrants must not be normal in the first place, it simply means in 
Spanish that their situation be normalized in the sense that they become an integrated 
part of society with the same rights and responsibilities as anyone else.  The word 
“Intercultural” came up quite often in defining an intermediate concept of integration 
between what is known as the French and Anglo-Saxon models (Assimilation vs. 
Multicultural) which has also been classified in this paper as Statist and Liberal.  The 
difference between the Liberal Model of Great Britain and the Liberal Model  of Spain 
may be expressed in more cultural terms.  While in great Britain, the term 
Multiculturism has meant a sort of respect, but separation, the idea that most Immigrant 
Associations and NGOs in Madrid, as well as local and community level 
administrations, is that there be a cultural exchange, a mixing or molding if you will 
into something new (reminiscent of the American melting pot that eventually turned 
into a mixed salad). 
 Before even explaining the focus of my interviews and eventual analysis, I 
would like to present two figures of Spanish society based upon Thomas Janoski’s 
figures of Citizenship and Civil Society, mentioned before, representing the four 
spheres of society: the state, public, market and private spheres.  Not all general actors 
are present in the figures (left out are such entities as defense contracting, regulation, 
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police, military, secret police, espionage, Union Federations, Consumer Associations, 
Political Parties, Self-help groups, Private Media, Education and Health etc) not 
because they are not important actors, but they are not the actors that determine the 
treatment of the immigrant population as Liberal or Corporate.  It is the relationship 
between the following actors that determines more so the model of incorporation.   
For example, while political parties are of course present in the entire process, I 
am more interested in the set structure of present administration, not necessarily the 
politician’s view.  Ironically, in Spain there does not seem to be much of a difference in 
treatment of the immigration issue from either the PP or the PSOE.  All entities I had 
the opportunity to talk with, except for the two interviews with the local and community 
administrations, have complained with the lack of the political parties’ ability to take a 
stand either way, and when they do make comments, they speak of waves or invasions 
of immigrants that only serves to bring about public alarm.  While the PSOE has 
recently voted to allow third-country permanent immigrants to vote in municipal 
elections, it is based upon a reciprocal relationship in the Spanish Constitution that 
insists that said third-countries allow Spaniards to vote abroad in the elections under the 
same circumstances—might become difficult in its execution especially in countries 
where even the native population does not have the right to vote.139
Regardless, in relation to this study, the following actors that have been 
interviewed are those that appear in the two figures.  In Figure 3.1, all actors are 
represented as they now take part in what is deemed as a Liberal Model of 
Incorporation, which is bottom-up at all times except for the one arrow coming from the 
                                                 
139“1.Los extranjeros gozarán en España de las libertades públicas que garantiza el presente Título en los 
términos que establezcan los tratados y la ley. 2.Solamente los españoles serán titulares de los derechos 
reconocidos en el artículo 23, salvo lo que, atendiendo a criterios de reciprocidad, pueda establecerse por 
tratado o ley para el derecho de sufragio activo y pasivo en elecciones municipales.”139 Constitución 
Española, Título 1. Capítulo Primero. De los españoles y extranjeros. 
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state administration to the NGOs and Immigrant Associations which represent funds, or 
subsidies, that allowed to these entities in order to manage the services that are needed 
due to the great increase in the immigrant population since the turn of the millennium.  
Figure 3.2 shows how the different spheres would interact if the model was Corporate 
instead of Liberal, making it a top-down system in which while the relationship is 
organized by private entities, such organization is directed at the collectives by the state.   
This is simply not the case in regards to Spanish incorporation, even in the face 
of its National Forum, this last one created in 2006 (the first one was actually created in 
1994)140  On the Autonomous Community level a Foro Regional para la Inmigración 
was also created in 1998.141  Municipally in Madrid, a forum was recently created in 
May of 2006 called the Foro Madrid de Dialogo y Convivencia.  All of these forums are 
consultative with participation from basically the same actors as the National Forum.  
Practically all of the entities interviewed are either part of all three, have been or are 
part of two of them (usually the National of course and the local City Hall forum.)  
Overall, all treatments of the collectives are based upon the government’s funding of its 
services that are evaluated and handed out by the Autonomous Community while the 
City Hall does directly offer some funding also.  In other words, it is the NGOs and 
Immigrant Associations that make the initiative to form programs and apply for 
subsidies and while the associations are based upon nationality originally, as the 
immigrant population has become bigger and bigger, and while some associations focus 
on regions such as Latin America, generally they are all open to help any immigrant 
looking for help in regards to legal documentation work, employment, formation, 
                                                 
140 Memoria 2007: Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes; Naturaleza, pg. 11, www.mtas.es
141 El Foro Regional para la Inmigración fue creado mediante Decreto 64/1998 (BOCM nº 108, de 8 de 
mayo de 1998), www.madrid.org
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language course, housing, etc.  Immigrants are always treated as individuals in every 
instance although these Associations participate in forums and fight for the immigrant 
as a collective, this collective is generally the entire immigrant population, not just 
certain nationalities.  As a result, the Spanish approach towards Immigrant Integration 
Policy is by no means corporate in any sense of the word.  Simply, any traces of 
corporate treatment are the consequence of its liberal approach comprised of bottom-up 
organization that competes for state subsidies—it is its liberal approach that 
pragmatically calls for some sort of categorization when it comes to its immigrant 
population.  The liberal relationship between actors is demonstrated in Figure 3.1, and if 
it were to be Corporate, which it is not, in Figure 3.2.  
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Interviews with Forum Participants 
 
Before moving on to the results of the interviews conducted with the entities 
present in the two figures above, one must put into perspective what the situation of said 
immigrants really is in Spain based upon somewhat scarce information due to the recent 
phenomena of immigrants within Spanish borders in the first place.  Still, a few studies 
have been conducted that might shed light upon the general situation before entering 
into theoretical specifics of incorporation.  Based upon a study by Juan Díez Nicolas, 
Las dos caras de la inmigración,142 3 of every 4 immigrants was registered municipally 
and have a medical card.  In regards to getting help in getting their residence card, 50% 
simply had help from friends and family, 25% had absolutely no help from anybody and 
only 14% had help from an NGO in the year 2004.  More than likely this has increased 
due to the Amnesty Bill in 2005 and thus an increase in solicitation of residency, but 
even so, the increase may not be that great.  Also, 1 out of 5 immigrants that have 
partners live with Spanish partners, less than 5% that can send children to school do not, 
more than 80% of immigrants live in neighborhoods with mainly Spaniards, 41% of 
Spaniards have had a conversation with an immigrant from South America lessening to 
11% with a Chinese, less than 20% of Spaniards have an immigrant friend, and less than 
10% work with immigrants.143  3 out of 4 would come again to Spain if given the 
opportunity and 3 out of 4 would stay if given the opportunity to go back to native land.  
Finally, their biggest problem is work and money and the best thing they like is people’s 
treatment and their relationship with Spaniards.144
 While unspecific, such a general view sets one up to the following analysis of 
the societal actors in the Spanish Incorporation Model, a model that does not necessarily 
                                                 
142 Díez Nicolás, Juan. Las dos caras de la inmigración, pg. 86-87. 
143 Díez Nicolás, Juan. Las dos caras de la inmigración, pgs.328.333. 
144 Díez Nicolás, Juan. Las dos caras de la inmigración, pgs. 362-363. 
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mean true integration, which is a concept dealt with in every interview, but instead, the 
administration’s simple approach to dealing with the immigrant population in regards to 
services and access to the structure.   Also, it is worthwhile to mention that while a  
definition of integration is something that is summed up within analysis of societal 
structures, its spheres, etc. but it is also something less outright, more personal and 
within another dimension, not just of interaction but of social relationships and feelings 
of belonging.  
 In regards to interviews conducted, First of all, the rationale behind such a 
qualitative approach has been to get to know how the actors involved in the 
incorporation process consider the entire situation.  While each interview was not 
limited to set questions, and there was an intent to allow exploration into different 
interest of conversation, each interview was based upon the same questions/ topics:  
1. How the Immigrant Association/ Organization /Administration began 
working with immigrants in the first place, its evolution, and types of 
services offered. 
2. What sort of Political Voice the Immigrant has whether individually or 
collectively with the National Forum (although the Community and 
Municipal levels were also discussed) 
3. Each was asked to define the term “integration”. 
4. Each was also asked to comment on what their perception of the treatment of 
immigrants is and the opinion of the native population in regards to the issue. 
5. Finally, each was asked how they saw an immigrant’s strength in the future: 
through individual participation or collective participation within immigrant 
associations. 
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Secondly, sampling was limited to those participating in the National Forum for the 
Social Integration of Immigrants and I was able to speak with the majority of the chosen 
members from table 3.2 cited again below: 
Table 3.8 - Chosen members for participation in the Foro para la integración social de los inmigrantes 
 
Immigrant and Refugee Associations Social Support Organizations 
? Asociación de trabajadores e Inmigrantes   
Marroquíes en España (ATIME) 
? América-España Solidaridad y Cooperación 
(AESCO) 
? Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta (ASCIB) 
? Voluntariado de Madres Dominicanas-
Voluntariado Integración Colectivos 
Internacionales de Trabajadores (VOMADE-
VINCIT) 
? Asociación de Refugiados e Inmigrantes 
Peruanos (ARI-PERÚ) 
? Asociación Rumiñahui Hispano-Ecuatoriana 
para Colaboración al desarrollo de África y 
América Latina 
? Asociación de Chinos en España (ACHE) 
? Asociación de Cooperación Bolivia-España 
(ACOBE) 
? Federación de Asociaciones de Inmigrantes 
Rumanos en España (FEDROM) 
? Asociación de Inmigrantes Búlgaros en España 
(AIBE BALSAN) 
? Cruz Roja Española 
? Cáritas Española 
? Asociación Comisión Católica Española 
de Migración (ACCEM) 
? Consorcio de Entidades para la Acción 
Integral con Inmigrantes  
? Red Acoge 
? Asociación de Solidaridad con los 
trabajadores Inmigrantes (ASTI) 
? Comisiones Obreras 
? Confederación Española de 
Organizaciones Empresariales 
? Confederación Española de la Pequeña y 
Mediana Empresa 
? Unión General de Trabajadores 
 
Everyone was interviewed except for ATIME and ACHE in regards to Immigrant 
Associations; Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (CEPYME) 
which is really part of Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales 
(CEOE) whom I did interview; Consorcio de Entidades para la Acción Integral con 
Inmigrantes, Red Acoge, Asociación de Solidaridad con los trabajadores Inmigrantes 
(ASTI) in regards to the Social Support Organizations; but I did interview CEAR and 
MPDL which are expert participators although without a vote.  Additionally, I had the 
chance to interview a representative both from the Ayuntamiento de Madrid (Dirección 
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General de Inmigración y Cooperación al Desarrollo) and a representative from the 
Autonomous Community of Madrid (Observatorio Regional de Inmigración 
Consejería de Inmigración y Cooperación).  Overall, I was able to speak with the 
principal actors: the majority of NGOs (CEAR, Cruz Roja, ACCEM, Cáritas); 
Immigrant Associations, (AESCO,ASCIB, VOMADE, ARI-PERU, Rumiñahui, 
ACOBE, FEDROM, BALCAN); Unions (UGT & CC.OO.); Employer Association 
(CEOE) and the Municipal and Community Administrations.  All of those finally 
interviewed were openly available to being recorded in a face-to-face interview 
although some were more difficult to set a date than others.  After interviewing 16 of a 
possible 23 organizations that I put myself in contact with, the sample reached its 
saturation and all types of actors had been questioned along with the two administrative 
representatives, making the entire sample that of 18 interviews. 
 In regards to its analysis, the following tables are a record of the responses to the 
five mains themes/ questions above.  In keeping with the concept of Grounded 
Theory145 in that hypothesis are generated during the process, not necessarily before, 
and that one encounter/ interview can generate it very own theory, I have coded each 
interview based on its five categories, properties and possible hypothesis for each theme 
in regards to the Immigrant Associations.  When it comes to the Social Support 
Organizations (NGOs, Employer Association, and Unions) as well as the Municipal and 
Community Administrations a clearer response to said themes is the approach in which 
the same singular hypothesis came about in every interview while there was some 
differences in regards to the various themes that in the end did not generate an array of 
hypothesis as in the case of the immigrant associations.  Finally, the reader must keep in 
mind that each generated hypothesis has come about as an interpretation of evidence, 
                                                 
145 Glaser, Barney G. & Strauss, Anselm L. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research 
143 
144 
                                                
the evidence being the properties of each category/ theme.  Also, this study is not an any 
sense an attempt to generalize on any population; instead it is a generalization of the 
very process.146  As a result, each hypothesis holds true for each subject, each 
circumstance within its own sphere of interaction and cannot be generalized to the 
general population but they can be compared in order to reach a general consensus of 
properties and consequences. 
 They have been separated into three different groups: the first being the 
Immigrant Associations (Tables 3.8-3.15); the second the Social Support Groups 
(Tables 3.16-3.23) and the Municipal and Community Administration (Tables 3.24 & 
3.25)  Within each group, each table is in the order of when the interview took place 
over a period of about a month’s time. 
 
146 To explain, Strauss and Corbin state: “in terms of making generalizations to a larger population, we 
are not attempting to generalize as such but to specify…the condition under which our phenomena 
exist, the action/interaction that pertains to them, and the associated outcomes or consequences.  This 
means that our theoretical formulation applies to these situations or circumstances but to no others.  
(1990:191, bold in the original text)Gobo, Giampietro, “Sampling, representativeness and 
generalizability”; Qualitative Research Practice, p 421. 
Table 3.8 Asociación Rumiñahui Hispano-Ecuatoriana para Colaboración al desarrollo de África y América Latina 147
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: • Based on need for 
services/Amnesty Bill 
• “…nuestras demandas y 
nuestras necesidades al 
gobierno de 
España…servicios 
específicos...” 
• legal help/ documentation 
• psychological help 
• education/school 
enrollment 
• entertainment activities 
• development in countries 
of origin 
• The Forum is solely a 
consultative body because 
they really do not have a 
majority vote on order to 
change anything. 
“…no somos un foro…” 
“...un espacio de 
participación mínimo...” 
“...por lo menos...para 
expresar su opinión...” 
• Process of constructing and 
creating tools to ask for 
integration 
• “No hay un modelo de 
integración acá.” 
• Intercultural: respect 
between cultures and 
getting to know one 
another.  Respect without 
discrimination. 
• Mutual respect to be able 
to say that one feels as if 
they are part of society. 
• Not treated equally within 
any sphere. 
• Thinks Foreigner Law 
allows for 
institutionalization of 
difference between the 
native and the immigrant. 
• last 4 years the public’s 
opinion has changed and 
the immigrant is made to 
feel different. 
• Political discourse has 
changed opinion of people. 
• Dual nationality is an 
option if one feels it to be 
convenient but does not 
mean full rights. 
 
i.e. family reunion EU       
Directive (even though    
effects natives the same) 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for service not 
necessarily offered by the state 
administration making the 
association an entity in and of 
itself, an institution by filling a 
void. 
Having a consultative body may 
offer a taste of participation but 
could frustrate in the end  in the 
absence of direct control. 
Since there is no defined 
model on integration, therefore 
integration is a simple mutual 
respect between both sides. 
Public discourse has changed 
due to political discourse in the 
Media. 
When rights are taken away, 
regardless of whether they are 
taken from natives also, it 
reinforces collective, fighting 
nature of discourse.  
 
                                                 
147 Aguirre Hidalgo, Dora. Asociación Rumiñahui Hispano-Ecuatoriana para Colaboración al desarrollo de África y América Latina.  
Personal Interview. 1 July 2008. 
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Table 3.9 Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta (ASCIB)148
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1994 in 
Barcelona/Madrid past 5 
years 
• legal/documentation 
• employment 
• social orientation 
• community level: 
integration of immigrants
• sensitizing: respect & 
tolerance 
• works with NGOs in a 
network 
 
• In National and Municipal 
Forums 
• Want to work in a network 
• Right to vote necessary but 
naturalization is an option 
in 10 years 
• Do not want to limit the 
immigrant to its 
associations 
• Want immigrants to be 
neighbors with rights and 
responsibilities 
• Maintain contact with 
country of origin and 
country of residence 
• The advantage of richness 
of both cultures and learn 
new things so as to create 
something new. 
• Great deal of 
discrimination: same 
bureaucratic infrastructure 
as 10-15 years ago so that 
immigrants cannot get 
documentation renewed, 
thus no access to 
employment and 
unemployment 
• Housing 
• Negative commentaries 
heard on the street 
• Do not want to limit the 
immigrant to its 
associations 
• Do not want to limit the 
immigrant to its 
associations 
• Immigrants need a sense of 
belonging to this society 
• If immigrants have the vote 
then politicians will fight to 
get their vote 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for service not 
necessarily offered by the 
state administration making 
the association an entity in 
and of itself, an institution by 
filling a void and not limited 
to one nationality. 
Least amount of participation 
makes the right to vote very 
important . 
The least amount of 
participation makes integration 
more of a cultural thing, not a 
political fight—also least 
amount of cultural similarity to 
host country. 
Lack on institutions can be 
interpreted as a form of 
discrimination. 
When the level of individual, 
direct participation is limited, 
the future of immigrant’s 
participation is within the 
individual. 
 
                                                 
148 Oukhiar, Samira & Allaouzi, Abdel Asis. Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta (ASCIB).  
Personal Interview. 2 July 2008. 
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Table 3.10 Voluntariado de Madres Dominicanas-Voluntariado Integración Colectivos Internacionales de Trabajadores (VOMADE-
VINCIT)149
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1985 started to work 
with domestic service: 
Dominican women. 
• 1994 started to work 
with all nationalities 
• Welcome/Reception and 
information 
• employment insertion 
• computer 
courses/hairdresser 
training 
• Want to work in a network 
• Part of National Forum 
since its beginnings 
• Consultative body to study 
situation, not any further 
• 33% of Dominican 
collective naturalized 
• With women working in 
Spanish houses there was 
an “automatic integration” 
• Normalization: rights and 
responsibilities in a 
“normal life” 
• Not treated the same: will 
also try to play them since 
they are immigrants 
• Contracts are not equal 
• Political clientism 
• Called delinquents 
• same bureaucratic 
institutions and more 
immigrants 
• racist and xenophobic 
language 
• Individual: should be 
regarded as a citizen like 
everyone else 
• “reconocimiento pleno del 
inmigrante como 
ciudadano” 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for service not 
necessarily offered by the 
state administration making 
the association an entity in 
and of itself, an institution by 
filling a void and not limited 
to one nationality 
Higher level of individual 
participation renders Forum 
inadequate consultative body. 
The more integrated culturally, 
the more integration is a simple 
“Normalization” of rights and 
responsibilities. 
Regardless of level of 
perceived cultural integration, 
there is still a high level of 
discrimination on other levels. 
The fact that there are obvious 
discriminations does not create 
the tendency towards isolation 
on the basis of the immigrant 
associative movement: instead 
it is the concept of 
“Normalization”. 
 
                                                 
149 Álvarez, Pedro. Voluntariado de Madres Dominicanas-Voluntariado Integración Colectivos Internacionales de Trabajadores (VOMADE-VINCIT). Personal Interview. 3 
July 2008. 
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Table 3.11 Federación de Asociaciones de Inmigrantes Rumanos en España (FEDROM) 150
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of  
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 4 years as a Federation 
• In 2005 went from 4 to 
11 associations and now 
there are 27 
• Associations originally 
started out as religious 
organizations: Adventist 
religion is 40% of 
associations’ population. 
• cultural, social and 
confessional (religious) 
nature although legal 
services are offered 
• Now part of the EU and 
this Community members 
with the right to municipal 
vote 
• Forum is a platform where 
over 80 entities come 
together: -to work and 
express their opinions 
-elaborate an opinion for 
society, not just the 
administration 
-create a network 
 
• Acceptance within the 
society in the face of other 
societies like France and 
Germany where it seems to 
have not worked out—more 
of a rejection instead of an 
acceptance. 
• Again, here there are some 
difficulties but in the face 
of greater difficulties in 
France and Germany, they 
do not seem so negative. 
• Fear of economic crisis 
• Idea of permanent resident 
suffrage at all levels 
(national and municipal) 
regardless of naturalization 
• Associations are there more 
for cultural reasons, not 
political reasons. 
 
Hypothesis: 
The reasons for these 
immigrant associations were 
originally for religious lack 
of acceptance in their home 
country although economic 
immigration is taking place 
recently from Romania, thus 
its roots and perspective is a 
cultural, social and religious 
one. 
The less this association, or in 
this case a federation, fights for 
political rights, the more the 
Forum is a consultative body in 
the positive sense and the more 
the focus of the association is 
on cultural issues. 
The more this association 
concentrates on social and 
cultural services, the more its 
definition is simpler—the idea 
of simply not being rejected. 
In the face of greater  
difficulties/ discriminations in 
other societies, Spain does not 
seem all that bad although 
difficulties in the future due to 
economic strain are there. 
Even if the associations are less 
political, voting is just as 
important. 
                                                 
150 Fonda, Miguel. Federación de Asociaciones de Inmigrantes Rumanos en España (FEDROM). Personal Interview. 9 July 2008. 
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Table 3.12 Asociación de Cooperación Bolivia-España (ACOBE)151
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 2004: Mixed association 
of Bolivians and 
Spaniards came about in 
the Amnesty process 
• legal/documentation 
• psychological help 
• social workers 
• Belongs to Forums on all 
levels: National, Community 
and Municipal 
• Wants Immigration issue to be 
treated properly 
• Immigrant “voices” are heard 
• Thinks the immigrant vote is 
important and that a great deal 
of Latin Americans that 
received documentation 
during the Amnesty Bill of 
2005 are now applying for it. 
 
• Getting to know one 
another 
• Getting past the fear of 
something different 
 
• Most societies are 
perceived as similar: in 
Spain it is the same for 
everyone as it depends on 
who you get at the 
“ventanilla” and whether or 
not you carry with you the 
proper documentation. 
• The infrastructure is what it 
is and they assume a 5-
month wait for processing 
of renovations of residency 
cards. 
• Media and political 
discourse can have a 
negative effect 
• At the same time, 
Spaniards do make friends 
with immigrants even while 
“social alarm” exists 
• Thinks in near future 
its associates will have 
the vote as they 
naturalize in greater 
numbers. 
• “Normality” within the 
Spanish society 
 
Hypothesis: 
Since this organization was 
simply and recently created 
out of legal need, then it is 
more concentrated on 
offering services, not 
culturally based. 
The more politically involved in 
the forums and the younger this 
association is, makes it believe 
itself to be a representative 
“voice”—assumption of 
representation but they do not see 
the individual vote as 
unnecessary.  It is natural. 
Simply getting to know one’s 
surroundings is a result of the 
short period this association has 
been working for simple 
documentation.  Political 
involvement, paired with recent 
creation results in a simple 
definition of integration. 
Treatment here is considered to 
be understandable since the 
association has dealt with the 
same problems since its recent 
beginnings and sees them to be 
almost normal. 
While general treatment is 
considered to be good, 
“Normalization” here is 
also the goal. 
                                                 
151 Santiestevez, Paola. Asociación de Cooperación Bolivia-España (ACOBE). Personal Interview. 11 July 2008. 
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Table 3.13 Asociación de Inmigrantes Búlgaros en España (AIBE BALSAN)152
 
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 5 years ago got together 
principally for social 
reasons 
• motivation 
• legal/documentation 
• employment 
• permanent follow-up 
• weekend school for 
children 
• dance group 
• Spanish classes 
 
• Belongs to National 
Municipal Forums 
• Opinion is seen as 
important 
• Believes want to 
individually vote is a 
natural result, and choice, 
of an immigrant being part 
of the society 
 
• Adaptation 
• Getting to know one’s 
surroundings 
• Language is an extreme 
barrier 
• Culture exchange between 
neighbors 
i.e. sharing traditional 
dishes  
 
• There are discriminations 
but the same hold for 
Spaniards (does admit that 
physically Bulgarians blend 
in with native population) 
 
• There is no word in the 
future for the word 
“immigrant” 
• They will vote if they feel it 
comes naturally to them 
since they feel part of 
society 
 
Hypothesis: 
Since this organization was 
recently created simple 
services are offered out of 
need. 
The more recent this 
association this is, sees forums 
as positive venues of opinion. 
Since political rights, although 
limited, are present in the 
individual form, integration is 
simply an exchange with a 
discussion of rights and 
responsibilities. 
Feels that treatment is based 
upon one be treated well 
themselves. Thinks those that 
discriminate are being 
discriminated themselves and 
thus finds no difference 
between treatment of native 
and of Bulgarian population. 
Here there is a limited political 
participation and therefore 
integration becomes an 
individual endeavor of getting 
to know one another-not 
fighting for political rights. 
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Table 3.14 Asociación de Refugiados e Inmigrantes Peruanos (ARI-PERÚ)153
 
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: Individual vs. 
Collective Association 
Property: 
• 1993 began as a cultural 
organization 
i.e. trips to museums 
• In 1994 economic 
integration turned it into a 
more legally focused 
entity: offered asylum help 
to economic immigrants 
because it was a linger 
process that allowed 
immigrants to reside in the 
country while being 
processed. 
• study the reality of 
immigration 
• accompany the law-
making process 
 
• Has been part of all 
Forums 
“nosotros no somos 
españoles y siempre 
hemos intentado 
visibilizar esa 
diferencia” 
• Consultative body 
 
• Equilibrium 
• Circular movement 
• Equality of enjoyment 
of rights and liberties 
 
• Immigrants need 
geographic mobility and 
some do not have it. 
• Immigrants have less 
money, less time for a 
social life 
• Poor immigrants are 
“tolerated” 
“…la tolerancia no es 
bueno en la perspectiva de 
la igualdad” 
• The majority of Peruvians have 
dual nationality. 
“…pero no porque no quieren ser 
peruanos…porque tienen menos 
dificultades para convivir en el 
sentido de quitarse de encima todo 
el rollo de papel…se faculta el 
ejercicio de derechos.” 
• Associations are manipulated 
politically 
• There are a lot of new ones (80% 
in a study of Peruvian associations 
they have conducted) that offer no 
activities at all 
• Federation they have tried does 
work well 
• Peruvians are integrated and 
involved in general associations 
too. 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more services offered to fill 
the void and the more political 
involvement for this 
association. 
The more politically 
involved this association 
has been for relatively 
more time, has made its 
focus a  fight more for 
demands and rights.  
Since this association has 
been around longer and is 
politically active, then 
integration is more based 
upon the idea of equality 
and rights, not cultural. 
Treatment here is based upon 
the idea of lack of equal 
opportunity in society as a 
whole, not just said instances of 
difficulties. 
Even though this is a very politically 
involved association, it still comes 
down to individual voting, dual 
nationality, involvement in other 
associations and a realization that the 
associations have their limits.  
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Table 3.15 América-España Solidaridad y Cooperación (AESCO)154
 
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 20 years ago started as an 
association to help in the area 
of Columbian refugees, but 
then turned to Latin-
American economic 
integration 
• legal/ documentation 
• programs for women, 
education, employment, 
mediators between 
employees and employers, 
formation 
• work with countries of origin 
to prevent “unordered 
immigration” (Colombia, 
Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia) 
• Networks within the 
immigrant community 
• Belongs to Forums on 
all levels: National 
Community and 
Municipal 
• see it as a sphere of 
participation in a 
moment where the 
immigrant is incapable 
of having one voice 
• Is adamant that the 
association represents 
itself, not immigrants as 
a while 
 
• Cycle dependent on the 
“biology of the person” 
•  Not assimilation/no 
ghettos/no ethnic focus 
• “Normalization” 
• Bi-directional 
• Access to society 
 
• Barriers to access of 
society: employment, 
housing and education 
• History of Spain is one of 
rejecting what is different
i.e. expulsion of moors 
and jews 
“el racismo sociológico 
también está 
institucionalizado” 
 
• Thinks all 
participation is 
important: 
immigrant and 
public associations 
BUT problem is that 
such participation is 
no fomented in 
Spanish society in 
general, thus making 
such participation 
difficult 
 
Hypothesis: 
Since this organization was 
recently created simple services 
are offered out of need. 
Since this association has 
been around quite a bit and 
has been politically active, 
there is a realization of its 
lack of its representation of 
the immigrant collective. 
There are a great deal of 
political rights here: possible 
dual nationality and political 
involvement through the years 
in forums and thus the 
discourse comes down to the 
idea of “Normalization”, not 
culturally based. 
Perception of treatment here 
is based upon an overall view 
of centuries of rejection and 
not at all based upon 
nowadays reality and 
therefore a pessimistic view 
of future. 
Here there is 
participation at all levels 
and it comes down to the 
individual again having 
access to the society as a 
whole. 
 
                                                 
154 Rois, Juan Carlos. América-España Solidaridad y Cooperación (AESCO). Personal Interview. 23 July 2008. 
 
Overall, each association’s response to all themes was quite relatively positive.  All 
seem to understand the immigration phenomena as something quite recent and agree 
that the reception of the Spanish population has been a good one in most senses.  
According to their own personal experiences, although Spaniards more and more see 
immigration as a problem, with the help of mass media and political discourse it seems, 
natives are individually quite friendly and open to the immigrant once they develop a 
relationship with them.  In fact, at least according to the ESE (Encuasta Social 
Europea) 2002-2003, Spain was the fifth country behind Luxembourg, Switzerland, 
Austria and Sweden that considered immigration to be positive for the economy.155  It is 
also understood that immigration in Spain has taken place in rapid succession and the 
institutions that deal with them do run behind in catching up with the need for a 
bureaucratic answer, but most are aware that the bureaucratic run-around is one that 
Spaniards are confronted with themselves on a daily basis also.  Unfortunately, waiting 
up to nine months to get a resident card renewed can keep an immigrant from work and 
unemployment benefits, and one must admit that such treatment is not equally shared by 
Spaniards by the simple fact that they do not need a residency card in order to work and 
receive unemployment benefits due to them.  Also, they are not also geographically 
limited by the type of residency card that they carry. 
 Other shared general complaints of the associations are lack of personnel, lack of 
funds, lack of networking, and lack of physical space.  Some are completely funded by 
the state and others with a percentage of associate dues paid.  In the case of AESCO, it 
is partially funded by a housing intermediary venture in the selling of real estate 
between countries of origin and Spain.  Still, survival for all associations is based upon 
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subsidies from the government, of course setting a clear competitive playing field for all 
those involved.   
 In the following figures, I would like to demonstrate some very general 
correlations between response to the five themes already mentioned, specifically dealing 
with Antiquity, (when the association was formed), Political Voice in the National 
Forum (which has been translated to Collective Forum Participation Contentment), 
Definition of Integration, and the tendency towards Individual or Associative 
Representation.  First, take a look at Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.2: Perception of Rights vs. Antiquity Immigrant Associations 
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When dealing with responses to certain questions, for example the concept in the 
following figures termed as “perception of equal treatment” one might ask as to how 
such perception is measured after taking a look at the first figure dealing with 
interviewee variables (Figure 3.2).  Simply put, it has been measured by the first 
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reaction in asking the question, “Do you think immigrants are treated as equals?”  
Sometimes the question was elaborated by mentioning the work place, in regards to 
bureaucratic structures, housing, day-to-day treatment etc.  Some interviewees 
responded adamantly “No, no”  that they are not treated equally and then proceeded to 
repeat a long list of how they are not treated equally.  Others responded, “Not any 
differently than Spaniards”, or “better than in other countries”.  The first are put into the 
category of “Low level of perception of equal treatment” and the second in “High level 
of perception of equal treatment”.  Those in between that rather diplomatically 
discussed individual situations in which there are difficulties, but not necessarily 
outright discriminations are in the category “Medium level of perception of equal 
treatment”  Curiously, such responses do not have much to do with nationality, since 
Latin Americans appeared in all categories.  Muslims on the other hand, could have 
more to do with nationality simply because of the greater difficulties that they have, and 
the two interviewees from ASCIB said as much from their point of views.  Still, I would 
like to insist that as these associations do not represent faithfully their nationalities as a 
whole, then one cannot take away with them any conclusions as to how these 
nationalities think or are treated as collectives.  These interviews simply reflect the 
perceived reality that each interviewee has lived, and intends to make some general 
correlations between these singular realities. 
Before continuing, I would like to insist that such perception is just that: 
perception and nothing more since this entire study is based upon the perceptions of all 
of those involved, in the hope of finding some correlations within those perceptions.  It 
does not signify by any means that Bolivians are treated better than Dominicans, or 
Moroccans are treated worse that Romanians—far from it.  It simply means that the 
associations that deal with these collectives have that impression.  Such impressions are 
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also effected by the length of time that each association has been in existence as seen 
also in the figures below.  It seems that the longer the association has been around, the 
more they are concerned with rights and obligations in regards to their definition of 
integration and also their perception of equal treatment.  As one can see in Figure 3.2, 
the older the association, the lower the level of perception of equal treatment.  One 
could conclude by simple common sense that these associations, having lived through 
the time period since the 1985 Foreigner’s Law, and thus the slow gaining of rights and 
Amnesty Bills through the years, would naturally have a more negative perception 
towards their perception of treatment, even though all believe that the overall opinion 
towards immigrants has worsened in the 4-5 years—they still are treated more equally 
than before, probably because of improved protection under the law and simply because 
of the clear fact that they have had more access to legal documentation and thus more 
rights as “almost” full citizens. 
Another obvious correlation, or lack thereof, is that of the “Perception of Equal 
Treatment” and the “Definition of Integration”  (Figure 3.4) as it seems that in general, 
most, when asked about how they would define integration, specified cultural aspects, 
cultural exchange, cultural “melting” and there really was no correlation between the 
two variables.  Instead, it seemed that the older associations were the ones that referred 
to integration as a combination of cultural exchange and rights and obligations.  Again, 
through common sense it seems, possibly the longer an association has been around, the 
more it has been exposed to the political aspects of integration, the fight for equal rights 
and obligations over the years, as opposed to more recent associations that entered the 
playing field with said rights and obligations already installed into the system, thus the 
focus upon cultural aspects only.  The only exception would be Rumiñhui, that came to 
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be involved around the same time as ARI-PERU in the beginning of the 1990s, which is 
an in between point anyway. 
Finally, one must wonder as to how the concept of “Collective Forum 
Participation Contentment” was considered in each interview.  Again, it came about in 
the reaction to another question: “How do you see the level of participation in the 
National Forum?”  Some associations’ initial response was one of excitement and pride 
in the work that was being done as well as their participation in it, and thus they are 
considered to have a “High level participation”.  Others, on the other hand responded 
almost in a disappointed sense, explaining that it has changed over the years, converted 
into a body in which they are powerless to really get anything done, some even 
expressing their disappointment in the collective immigrant movement in their inability 
to come together and express themselves in one voice.  These were put into the category 
of “Low level participation”.  Those in the middle, possibly more diplomatic in seeing 
the overall  evolution, that might have worsened, but improved in some senses lately are 
labeled as those with “medium level participation”.  All are aware that it really is 
nothing more than a consultative body, but some are more content with said function 
than others.  Again, it seems the older associations (AESCO and Vomade) are the most 
frustrated along with ASCIB.  Rumiñahui and ARI-PERU again are in the middle 
ground between content with participation and frustrated too.  ASCIB appears in the 
“Low level participation” when it comes to the Forum simply because they are quite 
frustrated in general with their lack of participation at all levels since most of their 
members must wait ten years in order to even apply for the naturalization process—in 
general, they do not feel as if they are taken at all that seriously.  It is the most recent 
associations that seem quite content and even proud of their participation in all 
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consultative forums, maybe because of their lack of politicization born out of their brief 
involvement overall. 
As a final point, it is quite curious that in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 it seems that the 
levels of participation and perception of treatment are completely interchangeable as 
shown in the combination of the two in that last two figures.  It could lead one to 
conclude that each association’s perception of the immigrant’s treatment has a direct 
effect onto their contentment with their collective, consultative participation in the 
forums.  Again, common sense leads one to the conclusion that those that believe the 
immigrant’s treatment to be fair are content with simple consultative participation and 
those of a different opinion are not.  Mind you, one must keep in mind that those same 
associations have a collective memory of times that were not so as equal as the present, 
and that will more than likely have an influence on their view of equal treatment.  Even 
so, it seems that immigrant association that perceives the immigrant to be treated 
equally are less likely to seek a more active form of participation.   
Thus, the key here to gaining a feeling of contentment in their part in the entire 
scheme is equal treatment, not necessarily further participation.  It only makes sense 
that those who are treated equally are not as politicized, not as frustrated and can 
dedicate their time to other endeavors—in this case possibly more cultural ones.  Still, a 
lack of direct or even indirect participation could lead to treatment becoming unequal in 
the future for a population that is dependent upon its host country continuing to treat 
them as equals.  In the face of recent European Directives, especially that of detainment 
of undocumented immigrants (and here we are talking about illegal residents without 
any specific rights to equal treatment.)  Spain now can only hold them up to forty 
days156—while the current administration under the PSOE regime would like to 
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increase it to 60 days and due to the EU Directive, undocumented immigrants may be 
held up to 18 months until they are deported.157  In 2002 Human Rights Watch was 
asked by the Academy of European Law to discuss EU immigration and asylum policy.  
While they did mention that in Great Britain, undocumented immigrants were detained 
for no reason and kept for long periods with no hope of true resolution simply for 
administrative purposes at times, the Spanish and Greek treatment of undocumented 
detainees was also mentioned.” 158  Even so, when it comes to legislation guaranteeing 
resident immigrant rights,  Spain is considered to successfully guarantee such rights 
better than most EU countries.  Still, the rights of those undocumented obviously do not 
have the same guarantees.  They can be detained, sometimes in unbearable conditions 
for long periods of time and even if Spain still insists upon raising the limit to only 60 
days, under Eu Directive they could take the entire 18 months if they see fit in the 
future. 
In regards to legal immigration, it is naturalization which is the ultimate goal of 
Spanish Immigrant Policy and not all have the same access to such a level of 
integration.  In the face of an economic crisis where immigrants could be seen as 
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competition for jobs instead of those occupying jobs no one else seems to want, 
immigrants could be looked upon in quite another fashion.  These same immigrants are 
not all allowed to fully participate within the society and polity in which they live and 
work, regardless of their numbers.  In regards to the Spanish government’s policy, such 
difference seems to be exacerbated while at the same time other differences are ignored 
in hopes of the concept of semi-assimilation as represented by the idea of an 
Intercultural exchange between the Spanish society and those from third-country 
origins. 
 Getting back to the analysis of the immigrant associations in regards to 
individual participation and leading one into the role of naturalization as the ultimate 
form of participation, another curious observation is the fact that all associations believe 
in a combination of both individual participation and all types of associational 
participation regardless of their “Perceptions of Equal Treatment” of the “Contentment 
of Forum Participation”.  While competition for funds between them may exist, while 
politicization may vary among them, while political parties may play favorites and 
while associations may cater to these political realities, all declare that individual 
representation and associative participation are important.  And while their level of the 
importance of such a combination may vary, none argue as to the importance of the 
concept of “Normalization”.  Again, not because immigrants are not normal, but in the 
Spanish sense that they should have all rights and obligations as any other native.  
Curiously, only the older associations named such “Normalization” in their definitions 
of integration while others limited their response to cultural aspects, but it did appear in 
discussion of their “Political Voice” and “Individual vs. Collective Association”. 
Figure 3.3 Perception of Equal Treatment vs. Individual or 
Associative Representation 
 
Rights Perception 
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Figure 3.4 Perception of Equal Treatment vs. Definition of Integration 
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Figure 3.5 Collective Forum Participation Contentment vs.  
Individual or Associative Representation 
Participation level 
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Figure 3.6 Collective Forum Participation Contentment vs. Definition of Integration 
Participation level 
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Figure 3.7 Combination of Collective Forum Participation Contentment/ 
Perception of Equal Treatment  
vs. Definition of Integration 
Participation level 
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Figure 3.8 Combination of Collective Forum Participation Contentment/ 
Perception of Equal Treatment  
vs. Individual or Associative Representation 
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Overall, the vague sense of Intercultural exchange combined with the idea that 
immigrants should naturalize seems to be shared not only within the Spanish 
government but all associations and NGO’s as well.  Ironically, while the associations 
do state this as their goal, the idea that all become citizens may inadvertently mean that 
their very existence as immigrant associations be deemed unnecessary eventually unless 
the immigration rate continually increases without stop in the near future—something 
that has become impossible because of recent unemployment and economical 
difficulties in general throughout the world, not just within Spanish borders.  An 
alternate route for immigrant associations “when immigrants are no longer immigrants 
but citizens” would be a cultural existence only, not a political or even bureaucratic one, 
but such a future would only be possible if all immigrants had the same access to 
citizenship anyway.   
As one can observe in the following tables, the resulting conversations with the 
different organizations involved, as well as the local and autonomous community 
administrations, were quite similar, with each having a bit of their own point of view 
and implications.  The most obvious difference was that of the two unions (UGT and 
CC.OO.) in that they view immigrants simply as workers.  Their objective overall is to 
defend workers in general in order to create a similar reality of equality between them 
all, regardless of whether or not they are immigrants or not.  Of course it is not in their 
interest that undocumented workers work for less under worse conditions just as it 
would not be in their interest that non-affiliated workers did the same.  When discussing 
the definition of integration, the terms rights and responsibilities are present, with no 
real allusion to cultural terms.  Again, “Normalization” is the goal. 
Another case that stands out is that of the Employer Association (CEOE) that 
also just refers to immigrants as workers, as it is in their plain interest to gain access to 
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labor in general when needed.  Here, the difference between the employer and the 
unions is that the employer more than likely looks for cheap labor, with or without the 
unions and is not one to express the concern for rights although “Normalization” to 
work within the parameters of legal employment is obviously in their interest also, not 
just simple cheap labor, but trained professionals with their documentation and degrees 
in order.  All three, the two unions and the employer association see the Forums as 
positive consultative bodies although the CC.OO. states a deficit in Municipal elections 
since their forum is the youngest (he suggested that since they expected the municipal 
vote to be granted that it was deemed as unnecessary)  All also agree that the Media has 
had a great deal to do with a recent social alarm and both express in one way or another 
that the possible recession could have an effect upon treatment of immigrants.  The 
CEOE expressed the concern that the politicians have failed to properly address the 
situation to a public that more and more is preoccupied with concern over the topic of 
immigration. 
In regards to the NGOs, the interviews were quite similar, except that they of 
course had a more immigrant targeted service-based relationship in general.  All believe 
that the Forum is basically a positive consultative body that allows for participation in 
that sense, although CEAR admits that it is more passive then it has been in previous 
years and the representative from Cáritas believes it to act in a more reactive, than 
active nature.  All mention public perceptions as dangerous, untrue or exaggerated 
either by the Media or public discourse.  Cruz Roja and MPDL suggest that an increase 
in public resources such as public school meal tickets be increased due to the increased 
population so as not to add to the public’s conception that the immigrants are taking 
what is theirs. 
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All organizations and administrations (NGOs, Unions, Employer Association, 
Municipal and Community Administrations) agree that the future of the immigrant lies 
in participation of all forms: individual and the associative movements of all kinds.  The 
unions, both UGT and CC.OO. did make it clear that while associations are part of a 
democracy, and that the union looks for the equality for all workers.  While they are not 
incompatible with associations, their unions cannot be split by nationalities.  So it 
seems, at least to the degree that all interviewed parties “practice what they preach,” that 
all eighteen are in agreement that the immigrant should participate in all forms, a 
normalized citizen like anyone else—and yet all agree that there is no actual Spanish 
model for Integration.  Ironically, that is the exact model for Integration—the eventual 
naturalization of the immigrant into a citizen so that they are no longer considered to be 
immigrants, but citizens.  One might argue that yes, there is not a straightforward 
“Model for Integration” on a national level in regards to implementation simply because 
it is blatantly liberal.  Ultimately, the immigrant is not treated as such, but instead as a 
normalized individual and citizen, encouraged on a collective level to participate in 
grass-roots organizations of any kind available to them.  Also, the very evidence of such 
lack of implementation is the fact that those entities involved do have a clear idea as to 
its purpose, or at least from where its purpose is coming from.  Plus, yet again it must be 
mentioned that not all immigrants have the same access to citizenship, so that their ideal 
participation as citizens like everyone else is limited depending upon their country of 
origin.   
As a replacement for direct participation, the idea of associative action is put 
forward as a viable via of communication within society—another way that immigrants 
could participate as citizens while they are unable to participate in other way.   Even so, 
when speaking of associative participation as an ideal form of integration for the 
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immigrant in neighborhood and parent associations would be exactly that: ideal.  As the 
immigration population that works for less money, generally in manual labor, it hardly 
seems all that fair that all the society offers is the attendance to long, drawn-out 
meetings that the immigrant cannot understand because of language barriers in the first 
place.  While this could be complimentary, it is not a substitute and may be the only 
venue that the biggest immigrant population has access to in their first ten years living 
in Spain—the Moroccans. 
Though the immigrant association has made a collective voice audible up till 
now, all seem to arrive at the conclusion that it may not be all that representative of 
every immigrant.  In fact, none made a claim to represent every immigrant, only to fight 
for the further granting of equality in rights and responsibilities.  All claim to believe 
that the immigrant should be treated as any other native, and while some are proud to be 
different and even make a proud point to the outside world that they are not natives, and 
others see no reason why they must still be labeled as immigrants, that does not seem to 
effect the ultimate conclusion that immigrant or not, naturalized or not, the concept of 
equality is upheld. 
In regards to defining the term integration, the Community of Madrid was the 
only interviewee that mentioned an adaptation of basic values of the community, and 
while recently such words are not that clear to what they refer to, the general leaning is 
towards an Intercultural exchange, quite like that mentioned by the NGOs (except the 
MPDL that focused on action within the society and ACCEM and Cáritas that 
mentioned the concept of a “sense of belonging” as well) and both administrative 
representatives when asked about their definition of the term integration.  Both 
administration representatives also mentioned the Media as a negative factor towards 
contributing to social alarm in regards to the immigration issue, while refraining from 
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any mention of political discourse in contributing to such negativity.  The Municipal 
representative, while admitting naturalization as an important aspect for the future of 
immigrant representation, insisted that since the granting of the municipal vote is not in 
their hands to give to the immigrants, that they really had not thought of the 
implications that it might have, and while it is in the national administrations power to 
grant it, obviously it would function within the municipal administration’s sphere and it 
frankly seems doubtful that that they have not even thought about it.   
Finally, while the previous tables dealing with the immigrant associations had a 
possible hypothesis in regards to each theme, individually with some leading to 
correlations between certain variable of the themes/questions, the only true conclusion 
drawn when discussing the topic with the NGOs, unions, employer association and 
administration are those discussed above.  Also it is true that as immigration 
incremented, services offered, and funded by the government, incremented greatly also.  
Organizations that had originally dealt with the topic of emigration, or just asylum, 
came to deal with the impact of economic immigration and in greater numbers, 
demonstrating even further the liberal relationship of incorporation of immigrants in 
Spain, while not necessarily clearly defining what is its model of integration.  Also, 
there is a definite difference in the treatment of the topic from the employer association 
and unions’ standpoints as they generally deal with the individual as a worker only, 
while administrations and NGOs alike have a more broad view of the immigrant not 
only as a worker, but as a cultural contributor to society as well as an individual with 
rights and responsibilities. 
 Therefore, it is more so conclusions based upon the role of these social actors in 
regards to the immigration issue that come about as the result of these interviews 
conducted, not necessarily correlating variables based upon each experience.  All those 
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involved have been part of the immigration experience in Spain from the very beginning 
of the transition from emigration to immigration or during the recent surge of 
immigration.  Through financing from the administrations with the Autonomous 
Community acting as intermediary between the National and Municipal levels, these 
organizations have almost organically taken part in what many call a the Spanish 
immigration phenomena, but it most likely better described as the Spanish immigration 
reality.  It may not be as quite as dramatic as the term phenomena, but it is the reality 
that has come to settle within the Spanish society, economic crisis or not.  Even while a 
small percentage of the immigrant population may take advantage of the available help 
through these associations and organizations—funded although not directed by the 
government—and representation concerns aside, the help is there, the demand for rights 
and obligations also, along with the hope for full access to total participation socially as 
well as politically.  
What is not absolutely clear is the extent of the Spanish government’s intent in 
regards to its actual policy and implementation.  In fact, when only 14% of immigrants 
in 2005 actually took part of the help offered by NGO’s, it seems improbable to assume 
that the government’s implementation is at all effective really, unless its intent is just 
that: to not directly deal with the immigrant population in any other form except that of 
those “immigrants that are no longer immigrants” but citizens.  Once more, Spain’s 
ultimate goal, though not as directly stated as that of Germany’s policy, is to give equal 
rights and responsibilities, including suffrage, to citizens, not just permanent residents 
(with the exception of the EU reciprocal municipal vote of course).  Therefore, as long 
as the ultimate goal of the immigrant is to eventually naturalize, Spain’s Integration 
Policy is quite thorough in the most part.  If an immigrant does not wish to naturalize, or 
must wait a considerable time to do so, then their possibilities for full integration are 
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existent but limited: one, third-country nationals have access to social benefits; two, 
responsibilities in the form of taxes; three, extra aid is available through private venues 
subsidized by the state even but they reach a small sector of the population; four, all 
have a free right to speech and association; fifth, immigrants only have access to 
political consultative representation through associational affiliation and such political 
participation is scarce, limited and generally based upon competing for subsidies, not 
actual representation.  Finally, eventually all permanent residents have access to 
naturalization, but some must wait ten years in order to apply for it. Thus, all points for 
integration are touched upon, but not clearly spelled out and definitely not directly 
applied in equal fashion.  All in all, it is not completely lacking in regards to policy, but 
definitely lacking in regards to actual implementation.  In the end, citizenship can never 
be taken from the picture, because without it, integration in its purest form will be 
denied.
Table 3.16 Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)159
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1991 set a up a legal 
network but started to 
seriously work the issue 
in 1996 
• legal documentation 
• 1996 focus on 
employment and 
influence of legislation 
 
• Part of the National Forum 
since its beginnings 
• good form of participation 
• holds a privileged position 
on a permanent 
commission 
“una asociación de 
inmigrantes nunca va a 
tener el peso que puede 
tener un interlocutor 
social” 
• Equality of rights and 
respect same as a national 
or EU community worker= 
“Normalization” 
• Integration n all 
associations 
• Someday they will no 
longer be immigrants 
• Union is a mirror of 
society:  If everything goes 
well—everyone has a 
job—then everything is ok 
BUT if not, the weaker 
immigrant may be blamed 
• Associations represent 
their associates 
• Equal treatment of all 
workers 
• Do not go backwards in 
regard to EU Directives 
• less rights for immigrants 
makes them more 
vulnerable which is not 
good for them or the native 
worker when the cheapest 
worker is hired. 
“a largo plazo la igualdad 
de derecho es garantía de 
paz social” 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
 
                                                 
159 Roc, Pilar. Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). Personal Interview. 3 July 2008. 
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Table 3.17 Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE)160
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Always worked with it 
within the Social 
Security Department 
 
• Received a letter from the 
Ministry saying they had to 
name a representative for 
the National Forum 
• Thinks it to be a useful 
Forum that interests them 
•  “Normalization” 
• Proper documentation is in 
their interest strictly from 
an employment point of 
view they need workers to 
hire. 
• Immigration worries 
Spaniards: think they are 
collapsing the Social 
Security system, taking 
school places therefore 
there is a necessity for 
politicians to quell the 
public alarm 
• Sees participation of 
associations as active and 
positive 
• Normalization of workers 
in general so they are 
available for contract 
Hypothesis: Very straight forward need for labor—no hypothesis, only the commentary. 
 
Table 3.18 Asociación Comisión Católica Española de Migración (ACCEM)161
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1996 seriously involved 
with immigrants 
• asylum 
• legal assistance 
• psychological 
• Spanish classes 
• women in vulnerability 
• housing 
 
• Part of the Forum since 
1996 
• Consultative body to 
express opinions 
• good participation: very 
active 
• Belonging to a community 
of neighbors 
-parent associations 
-participation 
-equal rights an
responsibilities 
d 
• Housing 
• Work conditions are worse 
• Nationality and gender 
discrimination 
• Political discourse 
dangerous: public 
perceptions that re not 
necessarily true 
• Fear of Recession 
• The vote is important but 
not the only participation. 
• Associations make 
immigration visible making 
its work a positive 
• Immigrant associations can 
be immature and compete 
for public resources but 
they are helping their 
collectives. 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
 
                                                 
160 De Mar, Maria. Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE). Personal Interview. 3 July 2008.  
 
161 Barbero, Enrique. Asociación Comisión Católica Española de Migración (ACCEM). Personal Interview. 4 July 2008. 
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Table 3.19 Cáritas Española 162
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Started to really be 
involved in 1986/87 
• Social advice, 
psychological, legal 
network, housing and 
employment 
• Three basic ascpects 
1.get immigrants in 
touch   
with friends and family 
2.employment 
3.housing 
• Part of the Forum and 
considers it to have a 
reactive focus, not a clear 
agenda for work 
• personal option 
• long process 
• feeling of belonging 
• recognition of value of 
one’s different culture 
• Media can be negative: talk 
of an “invasion” 
• At the same time, 
Spaniards generally get 
along with immigrant 
neighbors 
• In favor of immigrant 
associations to a certain 
degree 
• Immigrants should take 
part in all kinds of 
associations but it is 
difficult when the native 
population is not active 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
                                                 
162 Gutierrez, Augustín. Cáritas Española. Personal Interview. 9 July 2008. 
 
173 
Table 3.20 Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.)163
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Became involved in 
1988, after the 
Foreigner’s Law of 1985 
• Opened CITE (Centros 
de Información para 
Trabajadores 
Extranjeros) 
• Legal/Documentation 
• Everything to do with 
employment 
“Todo la dramática 
laboral que es apropiado 
de un sindicato” 
• All nationalities 
• Interesting Participation 
• Consultative body 
• Deficit in municipal 
participation 
• Recognition of equal 
treatment 
• Rights and Responsibilities 
 
• Not equal treatment 
• Fear and discrimination 
• Different opinions but there 
is a lack of information in 
the Media 
• Associations are part of 
democracy 
• The Union cannot be 
fractioned into pieces based 
upon nationality 
• The Unions and 
Associations are not 
incompatible 
• Immigrants should become 
part of society as citizens 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
                                                 
163 Jiménez, José Antonio. Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.). Personal Interview. 9 July 2008. 
 
174 
Table 3.21 Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL) 164
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Since 1994 dealing with 
economic immigration 
• isolated issues 
• legal/ documentation 
• Spanish classes 
• Women 
• Consultative body • Outright action in social 
and political circles 
 
• Media can be negative 
i.e.-meal tickets taken by 
immigrants when in reality 
only 13% in Madrid 
• earn less money 
• cannot get housing 
 
• Participation of any kind is 
necessary: anything they 
have access to 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
Table 3.22 Comisión Española para la Ayuda al Refugiado (CEAR) 165
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1979 created between 
Religious Organizations, 
Evangelistic Church, 
Muslim Community, 
Unions (/UGT CC.OO.), 
Human Rights 
Associations, and Political 
Parties (PP/PSOE/IU) 
• Went from legal help to 
employment and 
psychological help 
• Consultative body: originally 
more active but now more 
passive 
• There’s no model in Spain yet 
• Equal rights and 
Responsibilities 
• Intercultural: social 
transformation for Spain and 
for immigrants=reciprocal 
process 
• New Concept of Citizenship: 
Nationality is more where you 
live than where you were born 
• Extreme labor exploitation 
• Housing prices can form 
ghettos 
• Irresponsible attitude on part 
of the political parties 
• Media 
 
• Immigrant participation is 
small 
• Municipal vote reciprocity: 
difficult to execute 
• Immigrants should be part of 
schools, unions, neighborhood 
associations etc. 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the more 
need for services managed by 
organizations and financed by 
the state administration. 
                                                 
164 Sanchez, Enrique,  Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL). Personal Interview. 14 July 2008. 
 
165 Jiménez, José Antonio. Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.). Personal Interview. 9 July 2008. 
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Table 3.23 Cruz Roja 166
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Started in the 1960s 
dealing with refugees 
• 1991 started dealing with 
immigrants 
• Reception 
• Family/Friend network 
• Medical check-up 
• Employment (legal 
formation or send 
undocumented 
immigrants toward other 
work) 
• language 
• legal/documentation 
• get children signed up 
for school 
• Good participation in 
Forum in general 
• Exchange of cultures and 
knowledge 
• Mutual respect: both 
natives and immigrants 
• Part of all association: 
parent, neighborhood and 
volunteers 
• Learning experience 
because both parties want 
to. 
• Spain is not a xenophobic 
country in general 
• Problems such as school 
meal tickets should solved 
by increasing resources to 
match demand in general 
• Media and politicians can 
cause harm by speaking of 
an “invasion” 
 
• Should have right to vote as 
citizens so as to participate 
as individuals 
• Personal opinion is concept 
of citizenship as a 
permanent resident  
• allows for right to vote 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
                                                 
166 De la Rocha, Maruxa. Cruz Roja Española. Personal Interview. 21 July 2008. 
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Table 3.24 Ayuntamiento de Madrid, Dirección General de Inmigración y Cooperación al Desarrollo 167
Category: Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1990-95 quantity of 
immigration increased but 
2000-06 constituted the 
biggest quantity 
• Social services incremented 
along with increment of 
immigrants 
• Reception and Welcome for 
vulnerable populations 
especially sub-Saharan and 
Bulgarian gypsies 
• All services are principally 
managed by the Red Cross, 
CEAR and ACCEM 
• Recent Forum has brought 
together native neighbors and 
immigrants: undocumented 
immigrants and minors and 
while recent shows great 
promise 
 
• Madrid has a very specific 
model 
• Between French and Anglo-
Saxon models: Intercultural 
• New neighbors and old 
neighbors 
• Respect of rights  
• Conservation of culture 
•  “Convivencia” coexistence 
 
• Reaction to recession a fear 
but thinks madrileños are 
welcoming in general because 
they are form other areas 
themselves 
• Slowness in renewing resident 
permits is a national level but 
says that administration needs 
time to catch up (compares it 
to a big elephant) 
• View on municipal vote is 
non-existent since it is a 
national decision 
• Naturalization is important 
• Relation neighbor to neighbor 
is important 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the more 
services offered  and managed by 
private organizations. 
 
Table 3.25 Comunidad de Madrid 168
Category: Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• All services are principally 
managed by the Red Cross, 
CEAR and ACCEM 
• Financial intermediary 
between the National level and 
Municipal levels: municipal 
projects are analyzed and 
subsidies are handed out 
• Community Forum works with 
representation of the 
immigrant associative 
movement: immigrant 
associations are only one via 
of participation 
(neighborhood, parent and city 
halls) 
 
• Bi-directional: development of 
society and immigrant 
• Adaptation of basic values of 
community 
• Contribution to its progress 
• Long process 
• Citizen like any other 
• ”Normalization” 
 
• Recession is a fear. 
Discriminations could come 
about 
• Media talks of an invasion, 
criminality when prisons are 
full of natives, not immigrants 
• Participation in all spheres, not 
just immigrant associations 
• Associations have become 
politicized because of 
Foreigner’s Law 
• Associations want to speak in 
name off all immigrants but 
they are not representative 
•  “Normalization” as any 
citizen 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the more 
services offered  and managed by 
private organizations. 
 
                                                 
167 Moreno Lopez, Gregorio.  Ayuntamiento de Madrid, Dirección General de Inmigración y Cooperación al Desarrollo. Personal Interview. 15 July 2008. 
168 Tshitshi, Kayamba. Comunidad de Madrid. Personal Interview. 16 July 2008. 
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 Citizenship, in and of itself is a simple concept that can only be defined and 
reduced into two categories: who is a citizen and who is not.  Still, the question remains 
is what does such a plain actually idea entail.  Inversely, and more importantly in 
regards to this thesis, what are the ramifications of a system based upon this ideal for 
the individuals that do not fit within the outline of those who belong and those that do 
not.  Through modern history, if civil rights resulted in political ones, ultimately leading 
to social rights, then citizenship was the framework from within all rights and 
responsibilities came to be.  A minimum welfare for all is existent because of the 
process within the framework of citizenship, and without the process, guarantees of 
such rights and responsibilities are fragile, if not non-existent.  Populations are 
separated into citizens, in this case including EU citizens, and non-citizens.  Non-
citizens with guaranteed fluidity of all social rights are permanent residents, but these 
residents do not have access to the political rights that generated said social rights.  In 
order to become part of the process and framework of citizenship, they must be 
naturalized and thus proclaimed as full members. 
 In the case of the German experience, even access to permanent residency was 
initially denied and temporary workers spread out through three generations.  When 
their permanence became unavoidable, access to eventual naturalization was allowed to 
those that earlier were not even considered to be worthy of full membership.  Initially, 
exclusion was clear and when inclusion was offered as an alternative, its access was 
equally distributed to its immigrant population, along with its clear intent of a form of 
assimilation to cultural norms.  Lack of access to naturalization was used as a method, 
or outright denial, against permanent immigration, just as the Spanish’s government 
uses different timetables for different immigrant populations based on origin today. 
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 In the case of Spain, it is an implied denial of differences that guarantees rights 
to all legal residents within its constitution and then refers to them as citizens within its 
plan for integration.  This could simply be an irresponsible misuse of terms or a 
purposeful implying of assimilation, considering that normalization as a citizen is the 
path towards integration.  Regardless, it is the lack of outright definition of its purpose 
and goals that lacks transparency and responsibility.  When it comes to representation 
on the part of various immigrant associations, they really have no direct corporate 
representation, and their role, though necessary as a result of bottom-up, reactionary 
policy implementation, is not meant to involve participation on the part of permanent 
residents.  Instead, such associations as well as NGO’s are subsidized in order to 
provide a service that the government has no intention of actually implementing 
themselves.   
 In accordance with the Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía y Inmigración, 
permanent residents are encouraged to become part of the framework of citizenry to the 
point that they are referred to as such before the fact.  Also, some third-country 
nationals are considered to be even more so prepared for such a transition based upon 
their country of origin than others, as in the case of Latin Americans, while others must 
wait as long as ten year, as in the case of Moroccans.  In fact, the consensus between 
most organizations involved in the plan is that there is not a clear plan at all, when in 
fact, it is its very lack of clarity that is the actual plan.   
 By passively ignoring integration head on through a clear and equalizing policy, 
a supposed Intercultural Exchange is reduced to assimilation through naturalization.  
Additionally, naturalization is directly offered to those that are considered to already 
have historical and cultural ties to Spanish society to begin with—not jus soli or jus 
sanguinis—simply an assumption of cultural pliability.  Regardless of one’s views on 
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how open an immigration policy should be for those wishing to take part, whether it is 
based upon assimilation, multiculturalism or intercultural exchange, one thing that a 
policy should be is clear and effective.  The Spanish government’s policy is neither of 
those things, and while it may include practically all of the points necessary to achieve 
integration (access to social benefits, responsibilities, aid and support through transition 
period, free right to association and speech, some political involvement, and 
naturalization access) it is weak in regards to its implementation of aid and support as it 
reaches a small number of immigrants, political involvement is limited really to true 
members through naturalization and that naturalization is not offered to all on the same 
terms or timetable.  Effectively, the policy in fact pinpoints certain populations as being 
encouraged to be permanent members while others must hold out longer in order to gain 
such a right. 
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A Final Look at Immigrant Integration Policy in Spain 
Third-country nationals, or legal permanent residents, are constitutionally 
allowed the same legal rights as Spaniards except for some geographic mobility 
limitations, for the right to vote and access to public posts, along with their lack of 
obligation towards the state in regards to military service.  Again, as stated in Article 13 
of the Spanish Constitution:  
          “1.Los extranjeros gozarán en España de las libertades públicas que garantiza el  
presente Título en los términos que establezcan los tratados y la ley. 
2.Solamente los españoles serán titulares de los derechos reconocidos en el  
artículo 23, salvo lo que, atendiendo a criterios de reciprocidad, pueda  
establecerse por tratado o ley para el derecho de sufragio activo y pasivo en  
elecciones municipales.”169
 
Article 23 clearly states that only citizens have the constitutional right to suffrage and 
public service, the only exception being “tratado o ley” which in this case refers to 
citizens of European Member States who have the right to vote in municipal elections. 
In this sense, the exclusionary essence of citizenship consistently avails.   
In regards to the actuality in Spain, its liberal and individualistic treatment to its 
immigrant population is in the first stages of development.  Regarding the number of 
immigrants coming from specific countries to Spain, while most populations have been 
maintained as a total percentage of immigrants, it seems that third-country national 
Colombians and Ecuadorians have been gaining in not only numbers but also in 
percentile(Colombians 6%, Ecuadorians 9.9% 2007).  Still, the Moroccan population 
accounted for 16 percent of the total immigrant population in 2007 and was still the 
largest group.  Constitutionally, Spain treats its documented immigrants liberally in that 
they are offered the same individual rights, except for suffrage, as Spaniards.  In relation 
to Spain’s political parties, immigrants are treated mainly as individuals in accordance 
with the liberal model.  The conservative PP party sees them in the purest liberal model 
                                                 
169 Constitución Española, Título 1. Capítulo Primero. De los españoles y extranjeros. 
182 
sense, in that they are to hold to an economic model of necessity, integrated from an 
individual economic standpoint.  The socialist PSOE seems to vie for their integration 
while it is only specific in regards to hoping for third-country national municipal 
suffrage, a reciprocal impossibility for those immigrants that originate from non-
democratic societies.  Finally, the leftist IU still sees immigrants as individuals, 
individuals with the same rights regardless of documentation or lack thereof.  While the 
Spanish government has consistently contributed to what is known as the European 
Fortress by making it more and more difficult to acquire documentation outside Spanish 
borders, it has recently passed not one but two Amnesty bills through the parliament, 
admitting to its necessity for the immigrant workers within its borders.  As of late, such 
necessity has declined as a result of economic crisis.  Overall, conservative or socialist, 
the Spanish government’s standing in regards to immigrant entry does not differ much, 
although in regards to integration, the PSOE’s proposal of municipal suffrage, at least 
for legal immigrants, would be a step towards a limited further integration.  While its 
reciprocal contingency in the Spanish constitution may keep many from actually voting, 
it is a step forwards toward political participation. 
When one looks to public welfare, both the legal and illegal immigrant is 
allowed health care, but worker’s compensation and pension is only for legal 
documented immigrants.  In this sense, legal third-country nationals, as long as they 
continue their residency, are guaranteed the same public welfare as a citizen on an 
individual basis.  Throughout all of this is the presence of voluntary associations that 
generally address the immediate needs of the immigrants in regards to asylum, housing, 
and protection against domestic violence, again classifying the Spanish system of 
Integration as liberal, because of its constant reliance upon these private organizations. 
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 Generally, alternate options to naturalization are not at all that viable.  Such 
concepts as Cosmopolitan Citizenship170 and European Citizenship as a solution for 
third-country nationals to allow their inclusion into a society—and polity—may in 
theory function as an alternative, but in reality may not directly contribute to any form 
of actual integration.  European Citizenship could be seen as yet another European 
exclusionary tactic since it is only offered to EU member citizens, and Cosmopolitan 
Citizenship could be considered to be a vague solution to a very complex, multicultural 
situation, especially when cultural identification seems to be the foremost 
preoccupation.  By its very nature, citizenship is an exclusionary social contract 
identifying one, not just to a polity, but also to a citizenry and society that is culturally 
defined and blurred within the nation-state.  Some citizens within the same nation-states 
continually find themselves unable to identify themselves fully with their own 
citizenship, but instead may identify themselves by their religion or ethnic origin.  
Nationalistic tendencies transcend these territorial lines and at the same time, migratory 
flows seem to be opening yet another source of multiculturalism in an even more 
extreme sense to the playing field.  Culture, relative only in its comparison to its 
counterpart, has never been clearly defined, leading one to the conclusion that 
everything must be reduced to a common denominator in order to bring sense to such a 
complex situation.  Personhood, basic human rights and inclusion, not only in nation-
states that are receivers of migratory flows but also in emigrant nation-states, must be 
re-evaluated and defined in order to form a hypothesis as to what direction such global 
interaction is actually heading, and whether or not its true direction coincides with 
liberal democratic requirements. 
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 Integration in and of itself represents the individual’s ability, or at least his/her 
possibility, of becoming a member in the society in which he/she resides.  Consent 
plays a crucial part in all of this, on the part of the immigrant and on the part of the 
receiving society as well.  It must be said that immigrants should have access to some 
sort of legal residency if their presence is needed and the circle of those that may benefit 
from a host country’s prosperity should be widened as much as possible.  Again, there 
exists always the fear that “they” will all come and the prosperity will be weakened in 
itself, a fear that has of yet to realize itself since generally immigrants come as a result 
of continued prosperity, not the prospect of its absence.  Yes, there is a definite limit to 
the circle and a circle it remains, identifying who belongs and who does not.  The 
nation-state defines who it identifies with and how, and the world is far from 
international cooperation in some sort of universal citizenship.   
Still, a democratic state holds the responsibility of defending its workers’ rights, 
citizen or not, and workers should have the right to some type of basic equal 
conditions—illegal immigrants do not have access to these equal conditions.  Such 
conditions as a minimum pay, access to health care, education, and worker’s 
compensation should be guarantees towards citizens as well as those that work along 
side them.  As said before, integration must be approached by both sides—that of the 
immigrant and that of the host society.  As such, being part of a society, being a 
member means contributing to the general welfare, in other words paying one’s taxes, 
not just the employer but the employee also so that he/she may benefit from basic and 
equal conditions.  This brings us back to Caren´s definition of justice and right: “… the 
provision of some minimum level of welfare to all…”  Most democratic societies would 
agree upon the basic concept of rights and justice, and the fact that illegal immigration 
allows for a large quantity of the population to not have access to its benefits and its 
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responsibilities is simply incongruent.  Membership is a bundle of rights and a bundle of 
responsibilities that ideally should not be separated from each other.   
Returning to the Spanish experience, in regards to legal residents from third 
countries, most responsibilities have been assumed, but the rights may not be all present 
as citizenship remains to be a requisite for full membership.  Also, immigrant 
associative movements do not seem to want to monopolize immigrant representation, 
but instead admit the importance of individual incorporation into society.  Up until now, 
the Spanish government’s lack of clarity in regards for its wish for complete 
normalization of its immigrant population in terms of naturalization has not negatively 
effected the population, considering that the need for workers was so great and jobs 
were available for plenty.  One must consider the possible competition that could result 
as a reaction to the economic crisis or recession that Spain has embarked upon in 2008, 
but again, the positive is that there is no sense either in the NGOs, administrations, 
unions, employer association, or immigrant associations that there is any sign of any 
extreme xenophobic, racist or bigoted reaction to the immigration reality in Spain.  
While there may be isolated incidences of ignorance, a worsening of public opinion in 
general terms of the issue, Spanish society up until now has seemed to adjust quite 
nicely to an extremely rapid succession of economic immigrant inflow, extreme 
economic growth and necessity or not. 
Still, Spanish government’s lack of “proactiveness” also allows for a lack of 
equality, slowing down the equalizing process of naturalization, which is the ultimate 
goal of the administration to begin with. If simple naturalization is not offered within a 
reasonable time period, along with the ability to maintain dual nationality, political 
participation in and of itself is nonexistent.  Spain’s actual policy is naturalization as a 
path towards full integration means that citizenship is the only viable access road.  An 
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answer to such a void of participation, may be participation in community associations 
of all forms as well as unions, but such participation should not be mandatory for 
anyone and depends upon other priorities in one’s life.  Plus, it can never be a 
substitution for full membership into a society: civil, political and social.   
 If one is only to take into account the actualities of Spanish and German 
immigration policy, the full political participation of residents without naturalization is 
impossible.  Again, Spain has brought up the issue in regards to municipal elections, but 
such participation must be reciprocal, making such an idea difficult to execute as 
mentioned before.  In regards to Germany, they have just recently accepted the idea that 
residents living within its borders up to three generations have the right to even 
naturalize—their entire concept of what it is to be German has been revolutionized, not 
a small feat by any means. 
 In conclusion, full integration for a simple permanent resident is impossible if 
such integration is based upon the principle of equality as full access to rights and 
responsibilities as a full member—basically full citizenship. Thus it can be assumed that 
if such access is impeded, entirely or partially, the possibilities of integration are of 
course limited.  In the case of Spain, yes there is an immigration integration policy, but 
its finite goal, that of normalization through naturalization is not clearly set forth.  Also, 
those that have immediate access to what is considered to be total integration in the 
form of citizenship are those that are considered to have a historical relationship from 
the onset, even before they set foot on Spanish territory in the first place.  In sharp 
contrast, some are required to have completed ten years of legal residency in order to 
become full members of society.  Granted that such consideration is up to each 
individual government and such a point is not to be argued here, but it is its lack of 
equal access which makes it inconsistent, along with its outright lack of proclamation in 
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regards to its ultimate goals.  In other words, its policy should be more straightforward 
in its terms, and such straightforwardness would go a long way in furthering its 
implementation.  On the other hand, its lack of efficacy in regards to implementation 
could very well be part of executing its unwillingness to allow full membership to 
recent arrivals; and in that case, its methods could result in some sort of vague 
congruence.  Still, such vagueness in regards to a policy that is of utmost importance in 
a nation-state that has recently undergone a great change of demographic proportions 
does not sit well.  Its lack of transparency, and thus resulting lack of responsibility, in 
times of economic progress leads one to wonder how it will react, instead of act, in 
times of economic pressure. 
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Table 1.1- Classifying Factors of Incorporation Models 
 
 
Relationship between 
state and individual? Statist Corporate Liberal 
Type of right assigned 
as? Individual Group Individual 
Who organizes the 
relationship? State through the state 
Private group through 
the state 
Private group/individual 
through private 
group/individual 
How is the right 
exercised? Individually 
Individually and 
collectively Individually 
 
 
Table 2.1 - Naturalization in Germany 1998-2005 
 
Country 
1998 
               % of total  
              immigrant  
             population 
1999 
             % of total  
            immigrant
           population
2000 
            % of total  
            immigrant
           population
2001 
% of total 
immigrant 
population 
2002 
% of total
immigrant
population
2003 
% of total
immigrant
population
2004 
% of total
immigrant
population
2005 
% of total 
immigrant 
population 
Turkey 59,664 .8% 103,900* 1.4% 82,861 1.1% 76,573 1% 64,631 .9% 56,244 .8% 44,465 .7% 32,661 .7% 
Iran 1,171 <.1% 1,529 <.1% 14,410 .2% 12,020 .16% 13,026 .17% 9,440 .1% 6,362 <.1% 4,482 <.1% 
Afghanistan 1,200 <.1% 1,355 <.1% 4,773 <.1% 5,111 <.1% 4,750 <.1% 4,948 <.1% 4,077 <.1% 3,133 <.1% 
Morocco 4,981 <.1% 4,312 <.1% 5,008 <.1% 4,425 <.1% 3,800 <.1% 4,118 <.1% 3,820 <.1% 3,684 <.1% 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
2,404 <.1% 3,120 <.1% 9,776 .1% 12,000 .16% 8,375 .1% 5,504 <.1% 3,539 <.1% 8,824 <.1% 
Lebanon 1,782 <.1% 2,491 <.1% 5,673 <.1% 4,486 <.1% 3,300 <.1% 2,651 <.1% 2,265 <.1% 1,969 <.1% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3,469 <.1% 3,745 <.1% 4,002 <.1% 3,791 <.1% 2,357 <.1% 1,770 <.1% 2,103 <.1% 1,907 <.1% 
Croatia 2,198 <.1% 1,536 <.1% 3,316 <.1% 3,931 <.1% 2,974 <.1% 2,048 <.1% 1,689 <.1% 1,287 <.1% 
Vietnam 3,452 <.1% 2,270 <.1% 4,489 <.1% 3,014 <.1% 1,482 <.1% 1,423 <.1% 1,371 <.1% 1,278 <.1% 
Other 
Countries 26,469 .4% 18,412 .3% 52,380 .7% 52,747 .7% 49,852 .7% 52,585 .7% 57,462 .9% 57,462 .9% 
Total 106,790 1.5% 142,670 1.9% 186,688 2.6% 178,098 2.4% 154,547 2.1% 140,731 1.9% 127,153 1.9% 117,241 1.9% 
 
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook Annual Report 2006 
*Note the height of naturalization for the Turkish population was in 1999, the year before the 2000 law took effect and foreign births were no longer “foreign” 
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Table 2.2 - Foreign national residents in Germany 1998-2005 
 
 
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook Annual Report 2006 Edition/2007 Edition 
*Note change in 2004—relatively stable number of foreign residents up until that time: change due to AZR register cross check and decline in number of foreign births (result 
of 2000 law granting of nationality at birth for children with one parent resident of eight years and right to permanent residence) 
Country 1998 
% of total 
1999              
% of total 
2000 
% of total 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
% of total % of total % of total % of total % of total 
Turkey 2,110,200 28.8% 2,053,600 28%   1,998,500 27.4% 1,947,900 26.6% 1,912,200 26.1% 1,877,700 25.7% 1,764,300 26% 1,764,000 26% 
Italy 612,000 8.4% 615,900 8.4% 619,100 8.4% 616,300 8.4% 609,800 8.3% 601,300 8.2% 548,200 8.1% 540,800 8% 
Former  
Yugoslavia --------- ------- --------- ----- ---------- ------- ---------- ------- ---------- ------- ----------- -------- 381,600 5.6% 196,900 2.9% 
Greece 363,500 5% 364,400 5% 365,400 5% 362,700 5% 359,400 4.9% 354,600 4.8% 316,000 4.7% 309,000 4.6% 
Poland 283,600 3.9% 291,700 4% 301,400 4.1% 310,400 4% 317,600 4.3% 326,900 4.5% 292,100 4.3% 326,600 4.8% 
Croatia 208,900 2.9% 214,000 2.9% 216,800 3% 223,800 3% 231,000 3.1% 236,600 3.2 229,200 3.4% 228,900 3.4% 
Russian  
Federation 81,100 1.1% 98,400 1.3% 115,900 1.5% 136,100 1.9% 155,600 2.1% 173,500 2.4% 178,600 2.7% 185,900 2.8% 
Austria 185,200 2.5% 186,100 2.5% 187,700 2.5% 189,000 2.6% 189,300 2.6% 189,500 2.6% 174,000 2.6% 174,800 2.6% 
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina 190,100 2.6% 167,700 2.3% 156,300 2.1% 159,000 2% 163,800 2.2% 167,100 2.3% 156,000 2.3% 156,900 2.3% 
Ukraine 63,800 .9% 76,800 1% 89,300 1.2% 103,500 1.4% 116,000 1.6% 126,000 1.7% 128,100 1.9% 130,700 1.9% 
Serbia and  
Montenegro 719,500 9.8% 737,200 10% 662,500 9% 627,500 8.6% 591,500 8% 568,200 7.7% 125,800 1.9% 297,000 4.4% 
Portugal 132,600 1.8% 132,600 1.8% 133,700 2% 132,600 2% 131,400 2% 130,600 1.8% 116,700 1.7% 115,600 1.7% 
Netherlands 112,100 1.5% 110,500 1.5% 110,800 1.5% 112,400 1.5% 115,200 1.6% 118,700 1.6% 114,100 1.7% 118,600 1.8% 
Spain 131,100 1.8% 129,900 1.8% 129,400 1.8% 128,700 2% 127,500 1.7% 126,000 1.7% 108,300 1.6% 107,800 1.6% 
France 105,800 1.4% 107,200 1.5% 110,200 1.5% 111,300 1.5% 112,400 1.5% 113,000 1.5% 100,500 1.5% 102,200 1.5% 
Other  
Countries 2,020,100 27.6% 2,057,800 28% 2,099,800 28.8% 2,157,300 29.5% 2,203,000 30% 2,225,200 30.3% 2,005,300 30% 1,999,300 29.6% 
Total 7,319,600 7,343,600 7,296,800 7,318,600 7,335,600 7,334,800 6,738,700* 6,755,800 
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Table 3.1 - Immigrant national residents in Spain with permits 2000-2007 
 
Continent/ 
Area/ 
Country 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU 306,203 34% 325,511  29% 362,858  27% 406,199  25% 498,875  25% 569,284 20.7% 661,004 22% 1,546,309  39% 
Rest of Europe 54,442 6% 81,170  8% 107,574  8% 154,001  9% 168,900  8.5% 337,177** 12.3% 367,674** 12% 114,936** 2.9% 
*Romania  211,325 7%   
Total Europe 360,64 40.2% 412,522  37% 470,432  35% 560,200  34% 667,775  33.8% 906,461 33.1% 1,028,678 34% 1,661,245 42% 
*Great Britain 73,98 8% 80,183  7% 90,091  7% 105,479  6% 128,283  6% 149,071 5.4 % 175,870 5.8 % 198,638  5 % 
*Romania as EU 
member  603,889 15% 
Latin America 
(including Mexico) 
184,973 20.6% 283,778   26% 364,569 27.5% 514,485   31% 649,122   32.8% 986,178 36% 1,064,916 35% 1,215,351 30.5% 
*Colombia 24,702 2.7% 48,710  4.4% 71,238  5% 107,459  6.5% 137,369  7% 204,348 7.5% 225,504 7.5% 254,301  6% 
*Ecuador 30,878 3.4% 84,699  7.6% 115,30  8.7% 174,289  10.5% 221,549  11% 357,065 13% 376,233 12.5% 395,808  9.9% 
North America  
(Canada & the U.S.) 
14,991      2% 15,020 1%  15,774        1% 16,163   0.98% 16,964     0.9% 17,052 0.6% 18,109 0.6% 19,256 0.5% 
Africa 261,385 29% 304,149  27% 366,518  28% 432,662  26% 498,507  25.2% 649,251 23.7% 709,174 23.5% 841,211  21% 
*Morocco 199,782 22.3% 234,937  21.2% 282,432  21% 333,770  20% 386,958  20% 493,114 18% 543,721 18% 648,735  16% 
Asia 71,807 8% 91,552  8% 104,66  8% 121,455  7% 142,762  7.2% 177,423 6.5% 197,965 6.5% 238,770  6% 
*China 28,693 3.2% 36,143  3.2% 45,815  3.4% 56,086  3.4% 71,881  3.6% 85,745  3% 99,526 3.3% 119,859  3% 
Oceania 902 0.1% 944  0.1% 1,024  0.07% 1,018  0.06% 1,112  0.05% 1,466 0.05% 1,819 0.06% 2,051  0.05% 
Other*** 1,017 0.1% 1,095  0.1% 1,019  0.07% 1,028  0.06% 1,049  0.05% 1,101 0.04% 1,147 0.04% 1,130 0.03% 
Total 895,720 1,109,060 1,324,001 1,647,011 1,977,291 2,738,932 3,021,808 3,979,014 
 
Source: Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2007; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
 
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** Great increase due mainly to increase in Romanian population and decrease in 2007 due to Romania’s entry into the EU 
*** Stateless persons and others(All percentages are based upon the total legal resident population of each year) 
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Table 3.2 - Increment in legal residents in Spain by year 2000-2007 
 
2000- 2001 Continent/
Area/
Country
Total** 
increase  
or 
decrease 
Increase 
in %  
or 
decrease 
2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 
EU +25,149 -4% +37,347 -2% +43,341  -2% +92,676 +0.2% +70,409  -4.3% +91,720  +1.3% +885,305  +17% 
Rest of Europe +26,728 +2% +26,404 +0% +46,427  +1% +168,900   -0.5% +168,277   -3.8% +30,497 -0.3% -252,738 -3.8% 
Total Europe +51,877 -3.2% +57,910 -2% +89,768  -1% +107,575 -0.3% +238,686   -0.7% +122,217 +0.9% +632,567 +8% 
*Great Britain +9,908 -1% +9,908 +0% +15,388  -1% +22,805  ± 0% +20,788    -0.6% +26,799   +0.4% +22,768  -0.8% 
Latin America
(including Mexico)
+98,805 +5.4% +80,791 +1.5% +149,916 +3.5% +134,637  +2.8%  +337,056  +3.2%  +78,738   -1%  +150,435  –4.5% 
*Colombia +24,008 +1.7% +22,528 +0.6% +36,221  +1.5% +29,910  +1% +66,979 +0.5% +21,156  ±0% 28,797 -1.5% 
*Ecuador +53,821 +4.2% +30,602 +1.1% +58,988  +1.8% +47,260  +0.5% +135,516  +2% +19,168   -0.5% +19,575  -2.6% 
North America  
(Canada & the U.S.)
+29 -1% +754 +0% +389 -0.02% +801 +0.02% +88  -0.3% +1057   ± 0%  +1147  -0.1% 
Africa +42,764 -2% +62,369 +1% +66,144 -2% +65,845  -0.8% +150,744 -1.5% +59,923   -0.2% +132,037  -2.5% 
*Morocco +35,155 0% +47,495 -0.2% +51,338  -1% +53,188  ± 0% +106,159 -2% +50,607   ±0% +105,014   -2% 
Asia +19,745 0% +13,113 +0% +16,790  -1% +21,307 +0.2% +34,661 -0.7% +20,542   -0.7% +40,805  -0.5% 
*China +7,450 0% +9,672 +0.2% +10,271  ± 0% +15,795  +0.2% +13,864 -0.6% +13,781  +0.3% +20,333  -0.3% 
Oceania +42 0% +8 -0.01% -6 -0.01% +94 -0.01% +354 ± 0% +353   +0.1% +232  -0.1% 
Other*** +70 0% -71 -0.01% +9 -0.01% +21 -0.01% +52 -0.01% +46 + 0% -17  -0.01% 
Total +213,332 +214,874 +323,010 +330,280 +761,641 +282,876 +957,206 
 
Source: Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2007; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
 
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** All foreign populations have increased except for Oceania in 2003, Rest of Europe in 2007 due to entry of countries into EU and also Other in 2007..  Still, 
total percentage relative to the total population have either decreased or increased. 
*** Stateless persons and other 
**** Decrease could be accounted for by the naturalization of stateless persons. 
All percentages are based upon the total legal resident population of each year 
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Table 3.3 - Immigrant residents in Spain with permits 2000-2007 and immigrants registered in Municipalities (Empadronados) 
 
2000 Continent/ 
Area/Country Legal 
residents 
Municipal 
registry 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
EU 306,203 375,487 325,511 417,310 362,858 489,813 406,199 --- 498,875 --- 569,284 --- 661,004 979,864 1,546,309 1,749,890 
Rest of Europe 54,442 54,358 81,170 116,095 107,574 211,249 154,001 --- 168,900 --- 337,177 --- 367,674 671,707 114,936 183,108 
*Romania 211,325 394,078   
Total Europe 360,645 436,994 412,522 533,405 470,432 701,062 560,200 936,271 667,775 1,047,206 906,461 1,668,136 1,028,678 1,651,571 1,661,245 1,932,998 
*Great Britain 73,983  99,017 80,183 107,326 90,091 128,121 105,479 161,507 128,283 174,810 149,071 227,187 175,870 261,116 198,638 299,264 
*Romania as EU 
member 603,889 507,736 
Latin America 
(including Mexico) 184,973 189,464 283,778 414,290 364,569 730,460 514,485 1,047,564 649,122 1,237,806
***
986,178 1,445,796
***
1,064,916 1,534,230
*** 
1,215,351 1,617,202 
*Colombia 24,702 --- 48,710 87,209 71,238 191,018 107,459 244,684 137,369 248,894 204,348 271,239 225,504 263,339 254,301 260,989 
*Ecuador 30,878 --- 84,699 139,022 115,30 259,522 174,289 390,297 221,549 475,698 357,065 497,799 376,233 446,111 395,808 415,328 
North America  
(Canada & the U.S.) 14,991 17,374 15,020 28,598 15,774 22,103 16,163 25,963 16,964 24,613 17,052 28,697 18,109 23,374
 
19,256 21,492 
Africa 261,385 268,190 304,149 317,242 366,518 423,045 432,662 522,682 498,507 579,372 649,251 713,974 709,174 725,960 841,211 737,400 
*Morocco 199,782 173,158 234,937** 233,415 282,432 307,458 333,770 378,979 386,958 420,556 493,114 511,294 543,721 513,007 648,735 524,021 
Asia 71,807 88,167 91,552** 75,141 104,665** 98,942 121,455 128,952 142,762 142,828 177,423 186,848 197,965 206,476 238,770 207,850 
*China 28,693 --- 36,143** 27,574 45,815** 37,651 56,086** 51,228 71,881** 62,498 85,745 87,731 99,526 94,942 119,859 95,926 
Oceania 902 1,264 944 1,472 1,024 1,746 1,018 2,105 1,112 1,920 1,466 2,321 1,819 2,555 2,051 2,612 
Other*** 1,017 413 1,095 508 1,019 587 1,028 631 1,049 581 1,101 721 1,147 --- 1,130 --- 
Total 895,720 923,879 1,109,060 1,370,657 1,324,001 1,977,946 1,647,011 2,664,268 1,977,291 3,034,326 2,738,932 3,730,610 3,021,808 4,144,166 3,979,014 4,519,554 
Difference in  
Totals: 
Estimate of illegal 
immigrants 
28,159 261,597 653,945 1,017,257 1,057,035 991,678 1,122,358 540,540 
Sources:Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2007; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/ and Revisión del padrón municipal Instituto Nacional de Estadística www.ine.es
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** less municipal registry than legal residency could be a result of residents that have changed their domiciles but have not reregistered and are in between the renewal of their permits.  Proves unreliability 
of this estimation of undocumented immigrants. 
*** Closing of the gap in between legal residents and those registered in municipalities from 2004 to 2005(especially in regards to Ecuadorians) is most likely due to the Amnesty Bill passed that year. 
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Table 3.4 - Simple percentage of naturalization in Spain 1992-2005 
Continent / Area / Country 1992-2005 
EU 5.3% 
Rest of Europe 1.68% 
Total Europe 6.98% 
Latin America (including Mexico) 62.43% 
*Colombia              8.45% 
*Ecuador 9.10% 
*Peru 10.96% 
North America  (Canada & the U.S.) .57% 
Africa 20.66% 
*Morocco    15.71% 
Asia 8.66% 
 *China 1.33% 
Oceania 0.02% 
Other** 0.25% 
Total 100%= 234,694 
Total vs Total Immigrant 
population in 2005 
8.6%  of immigrants 
naturalized 
Source: Plan Ciudadanía e Integración 2007- 2010; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** Stateless persons and others 
 
Table 3.5 - Percentage of concessions of naturalization each year versus legal resident 
population in that year 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
# Naturalizations 11,996 16,735 21,805 26,555 38,335 42,829
Total Legal 
Residents 895,720 1,109,060 1,324,001 1,647,011 1,977,291 2,738,932
Combined # of 
naturalized and 
legal residents 
907,716 1,125,795 1,345,806 1,673,566 2,015,626 2,781,761
% of 
naturalization 
vs. legal 
residents 
1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.9% 1.5% 
Sources: Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2005; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
                Plan Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
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Graphic 3.5 - Percentage of concessions of naturalization each year versus legal resident population in that year 
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Table 3.6 - Percentage of naturalization in Spain 2005 vs. foreign country-born population   
2005 
Continent/ 
Area/Country Total legal 
residents 
***2005 
naturalized 
citizens 
2005 3rd-
crountry 
residents 
+naturalized 
citizens 
2005 
% of 
naturalization 
for each region 
or country 
EU 569,284 20.7% 12,439 581,723 2.1%
Rest of Europe 337,177** 12.3% 3,943 341,120 1.2%
Total Europe 906,461  33.1% 16,382 922,843 1.8%
Latin America 
(including Mexico) 986,178 36% 146,519 1,132,697 12.9%
*Colombia 204,348 7.5% 19,714 224,062 8.8%
*Ecuador 357,065 13% 21,357 378,422 5.6%
North America  
(Canada & the U.S.) 17,052 0.6% 1,338 18,390 7.3%
Africa 649,251 23.7% 48,488 697,739 6.9%
*Morocco 493,114 18% 36,870 529,984 6.95%
Asia 177,423 6.5% 20,324 197,747 10.3%
*China 85,745 3% 3,121 88,866 3.5%
Oceania 1,466 0.05% 47 1,513 3.1%
Other*** 1,101 0.04% 587 1,688 34.8%
Total 2,738,932 234,694 2,973,626 
****Average by 
region: 
7% 
 
 
Source: Plan Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
              Anuarios Migraciones 2000-2005; www.extranjeros.mtas.es/
 
* Countries that contribute most to migratory influx in Spain 
** Stateless persons and others 
*** based on records from 1992 - 2005 
**** 
This is not including stateless persons and others.  This percentage based on region is rather 
high in comparison to the overall percentage because the European population represents about 
one third of the population and has a low naturalization since 1992.  Also, this is an overall rate 
from 1992 —2005, not a yearly rate.Rainer Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship p 247 
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Table 3.7- Measures of Intervention for the Strategic plan for Citizenship and Immigration 2007-2010  
Medidas de Intervención del Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Inmigración 2007-2010 
Initial Welcome 
? Supply immigrants with tools necessary to become sufficiently 
autonomous in order to have access to goods and services in 
equal conditions as those of the native population. 
? Articulate a nation-wide welcoming network able to provide 
integral solutions to those immigrants that are particularly 
vulnerable or those that have special needs. 
Education 
? Guarantee an equal obligatory education in equal conditions with 
that of the native population. 
? Guarantee a quality obligatory education to all students 
regardless of condition or background of each student. 
? Transform the educational system so that it may be adequate for 
the needs of a diverse student body, acquiring knowledge and 
intercultural competence. 
? Transform schools into environments in which communication, 
cooperation and integration can thrive. 
? Facilitate the immigrant further, non-obligatory education. 
? Better the access to adult education and training. 
? Better the transfer of foreign academic degrees. 
Employment 
? Guarantee the equality of rights and responsibilities of 
employment and Social Security. 
? Better the management of migratory flows. 
? Promote the maintenance of employment. Professional 
promotion and training and competence of the immigrant 
workers for job opportunities. 
? Better the devices of intermediation in the job market. 
? Fight the irregular hiring and contracting of immigrants in the 
“illegal” market. 
? Fight against discrimination and for equal access of opportunities 
for immigrants in the job market and in businesses. 
? Foment a diverse management in businesses. 
Housing 
? Increase protected housing and promote a greater equilibrium for 
collectives with lower incomes. 
? Prevent neighborhoods that are solely those of low-income 
inhabitants. 
? Fight discrimination of immigrants in the housing market. 
? Better the co-existence and prevent residential segregation. 
Social Services 
? Adjust the public social service system to the needs of a more 
diverse society in order to guarantee an equal minimal amount of 
access to all citizens.*171 
? Supply equal social services to all citizens that are in special need 
of help. 
? Develop methods of institutional coordination of management 
and information so that different administrations and entities that 
work in the social service sector will have access to. 
 
 
                                                 
171 *Here there is a bit of confusion, and responsibility, as to the use of the word “citizen” as it is assumes that access to 
social citizens is open not just to actual citizens but also to permanent residents by law. 
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Health 
? Guarantee the right to the protection of their health to all 
immigrants. 
? Better the identification of the health necessities of the immigrant 
population. 
? Better the training of health personnel and management 
techniques for the health of the immigrant population. 
Infancy and Young People 
? Favor the access of immigrant minors and young people for 
programs for children and young people. 
? Promote the attention and social intervention for immigrant 
children and young immigrants in vulnerable situations. 
? Support the social participation of immigrant children and young 
people 
Equal Treatment 
? Fight against the discrimination for racial or ethnic reasons so as 
to guarantee equal opportunity. 
? Include equal treatment in all public policy. 
? Start the promotion of instruments of equal treatment against 
discrimination for racial or ethnic reasons. 
 
Women 
? Incorporate the theme of different sexes into all the phases of 
migratory policy. 
? Favor the normalized access of immigrant women into programs 
made especially for women in general. 
? Facilitate the integration of especially vulnerable immigrant 
women. 
Participation 
? Consolidate the immigrant association movement and their 
interaction with the already existing associations. 
? Increase the level of participation of immigrants in general 
associations. 
? Increase and better the political participation of immigrant 
citizens. 
Public Sensitivity 
? Better the public image of immigration and promote positive 
aspects of a diverse society. 
? Generate attitude changes towards immigration. 
Co-Development: 
Migrations and Development 
? Identify and promote development opportunities in countries of 
origin. 
? Incorporate the co-development perspective into the process of 
immigrant integration. 
 
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.   
Nota de Prensa: El Gobierno aprueba el Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010; 
www.tt.mtas.es/periodico 
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Table 3.8 - Chosen members for participation in the Foro para la integración social de los inmigrantes 
Immigrant and Refugee Associations Social Support Oraganizations 
? Asociación de trabajadores e Inmigrantes   
Marroquíes en España (ATIME) 
? América-España Solidaridad y Cooperación 
(AESCO) 
? Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta (ASCIB) 
? Voluntariado de Madres Dominicanas-
Voluntariado Integración Colectivos 
Internacionales de Trabajadores (VOMADE-
VINCIT) 
? Asociación de Refugiados e Inmigrantes 
Peruanos (ARI-PERÚ) 
? Asociación Rumiñahui Hispano-Ecuatoriana 
para Colaboración al desarrollo de África y 
América Latina 
? Asociación de Chinos en España (ACHE) 
? Asociación de Cooperación Bolivia-España 
(ACOBE) 
? Federación de Asociaciones de Inmigrantes 
Rumanos en España (FEDROM) 
? Asociación de Inmigrantes Búlgaros en España 
(AIBE BALSAN) 
? Cruz Roja Española 
? Cáritas Española 
? Asociación Comisión Católica Española 
de Migración (ACCEM) 
? Consorcio de Entidades para la Acción 
Integral con Inmigrantes  
? Red Acoge 
? Asociación de Solidaridad con los 
trabajadores Inmigrantes (ASTI) 
? Comisiones Obreras 
? Confederación Española de 
Organizaciones Empresariales 
? Confederación Española de la Pequeña y 
Mediana Empresa 
? Unión General de Trabajadores 
 
Figure 3.1 Function of the Liberal Model in Spain                                  Figure 3.2 Non-existent Change to Function of the Corporate Model 
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Table 3.8 Asociación Rumiñahui Hispano-Ecuatoriana para Colaboración al desarrollo de África y América Latina 172
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: • Based on need for 
services/Amnesty Bill 
• “…nuestras demandas y 
nuestras necesidades al 
gobierno de 
España…servicios 
específicos...” 
• legal help/ documentation 
• psychological help 
• education/school 
enrollment 
• entertainment activities 
• development in countries 
of origin 
• The Forum is solely a 
consultative body because 
they really do not have a 
majority vote on order to 
change anything. 
“…no somos un foro…” 
“...un espacio de 
participación mínimo...” 
“...por lo menos..para 
expresar su opinión...” 
• Process of constructing and 
creating tools to ask for 
integration 
• “No hay un modelo de 
integración acá.” 
• Intercultural: respect 
between cultures and 
getting to know one 
another.  Respect without 
discrimination. 
• Mutual respect to be able 
to say that one feels as if 
they are part of society. 
• Not treated equally within 
any sphere. 
• Thinks Foreigner Law 
allows for 
institutionalization of 
difference between the 
native and the immigrant. 
• last 4 years the public’s 
opinion has changed and 
the immigrant is made to 
feel different. 
• Political discourse has 
changed opinion of people. 
• Dual nationality is an 
option if one feels it to be 
convenient but does not 
mean full rights. 
 
i.e. family reunion EU       
Directive (even though    
effects natives the same) 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for service not 
necessarily offered by the state 
administration making the 
association an entity in and of 
itself, an institution by filling a 
void. 
Having a consultative body may 
offer a taste of participation but 
could frustrate in the end  in the 
absence of direct control. 
Since there is no defined 
model on integration, therefore 
integration is a simple mutual 
respect between both sides. 
Public discourse has changed 
due to political discourse in the 
Media. 
When rights are taken away, 
regardless of whether they are 
taken from natives also, it 
reinforces collective, fighting 
nature of discourse.  
 
                                                 
172 Aguirre Hidalgo, Dora. Asociación Rumiñahui Hispano-Ecuatoriana para Colaboración al desarrollo de África y América Latina.  
Personal Interview. 1 July 2008. 
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Table 3.9 Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta (ASCIB)173
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1994 in 
Barcelona/Madrid past 5 
years 
• legal/documentation 
• employment 
• social orientation 
• community level: 
integration of immigrants 
• sensitizing: respect & 
tolerance 
• works with NGOs in a 
network 
 
• In National and Municipal 
Forums 
• Want to work in a network 
• Right to vote necessary but 
naturalization is an option 
in 10 years 
• Do not want to limit the 
immigrant to its 
associations 
• Want immigrants to be 
neighbors with rights and 
responsibilities 
• Maintain contact with 
country of origin and 
country of residence 
• The advantage of richness 
of both cultures and learn 
new things so as to create 
something new. 
• Great deal of 
discrimination: same 
bureaucratic infrastructure 
as 10-15 years ago so that 
immigrants cannot get 
documentation renewed, 
thus no access to 
employment and 
unemployment 
• Housing 
• Negative commentaries 
heard on the street 
• Do not want to limit the 
immigrant to its 
associations 
• Do not want to limit the 
immigrant to its 
associations 
• Immigrants need a sense of 
belonging to this society 
• If immigrants have the vote 
then politicians will fight to 
get their vote 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for service not 
necessarily offered by the 
state administration making 
the association an entity in 
and of itself, an institution by 
filling a void and not limited 
to one nationality. 
Least amount of participation 
makes the right to vote very 
important . 
The least amount of 
participation makes integration 
more of a cultural thing, not a 
political fight—also least 
amount of cultural similarity to 
host country. 
Lack on institutions can be 
interpreted as a form of 
discrimination. 
When the level of individual, 
direct participation is limited, 
the future of immigrant’s 
participation is within the 
individual. 
 
                                                 
173 Oukhiar, Samira & Allaouzi, Abdel Asis. Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta (ASCIB).  
Personal Interview. 2 July 2008. 
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Table 3.10 Voluntariado de Madres Dominicanas-Voluntariado Integración Colectivos Internacionales de Trabajadores (VOMADE-VINCIT)174
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1985 started to work 
with domestic service: 
Dominican women. 
• 1994 started to work 
with all nationalities 
• Welcome/Reception and 
information 
• employment insertion 
• computer 
courses/hairdresser 
training 
• Want to work in a network 
• Part of National Forum 
since its beginnings 
• Consultative body to study 
situation, not any further 
• 33% of Dominican 
collective naturalized 
• With women working in 
Spanish houses there was 
an “automatic integration” 
• Normalization: rights and 
responsibilities in a 
“normal life” 
• Not treated the same: will 
also try to play them since 
they are immigrants 
• Contracts are not equal 
• Political clientism 
• Called delinquents 
• same bureaucratic 
institutions and more 
immigrants 
• racist and xenophobic 
language 
• Individual: should be 
regarded as a citizen like 
everyone else 
• “reconocimiento pleno del 
inmigrante como 
ciudadano” 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for service not 
necessarily offered by the 
state administration making 
the association an entity in 
and of itself, an institution by 
filling a void and not limited 
to one nationality 
Higher level of individual 
participation renders Forum 
inadequate consultative body. 
The more integrated culturally, 
the more integration is a simple 
“Normalization” of rights and 
responsibilities. 
Regardless of level of 
perceived cultural integration, 
there is still a high level of 
discrimination on other levels. 
The fact that there are obvious 
discriminations does not create 
the tendency towards isolation 
on the basis of the immigrant 
associative movement: instead 
it is the concept of 
“Normalization”. 
 
                                                 
174 Álvarez, Pedro. Voluntariado de Madres Dominicanas-Voluntariado Integración Colectivos Internacionales de Trabajadores (VOMADE-VINCIT). Personal Interview. 3 July 2008. 
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Table 3.11 Federación de Asociaciones de Inmigrantes Rumanos en España (FEDROM) 175
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of  
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 4 years as a Federation 
• In 2005 went from 4 to 
11 associations and now 
there are 27 
• Associations originally 
started out as religious 
organizations: Adventist 
religion is 40% of 
associations’ population. 
• cultural, social and 
confessional (religious) 
nature although legal 
services are offered 
• Now part of the EU and 
this Community members 
with the right to municipal 
vote 
• Forum is a platform where 
over 80 entities come 
together: -to work and 
express their opinions 
-elaborate an opinion for 
society, not just the 
administration 
-create a network 
 
• Acceptance within the 
society in the face of other 
societies like France and 
Germany where it seems to 
have not worked out—more 
of a rejection instead of an 
acceptance. 
• Again, here there are some 
difficulties but in the face 
of greater difficulties in 
France and Germany, they 
do not seem so negative. 
• Fear of economic crisis 
• Idea of permanent resident 
suffrage at all levels 
(national and municipal) 
regardless of naturalization 
• Associations are there more 
for cultural reasons, not 
political reasons. 
 
Hypothesis: 
The reasons for these 
immigrant associations were 
originally for religious lack 
of acceptance in their home 
country although economic 
immigration is taking place 
recently from Romania, thus 
its roots and perspective is a 
cultural, social and religious 
one. 
The less this association, or in 
this case a federation, fights for 
political rights, the more the 
Forum is a consultative body in 
the positive sense and the more 
the focus of the association is 
on cultural issues. 
The more this association 
concentrates on social and 
cultural services, the more its 
definition is simpler—the idea 
of simply not being rejected. 
In the face of greater  
difficulties/ discriminations in 
other societies, Spain does not 
seem all that bad although 
difficulties in the future due to 
economic strain are there. 
Even if the associations are less 
political, voting is just as 
important. 
                                                 
175 Fonda, Miguel. Federación de Asociaciones de Inmigrantes Rumanos en España (FEDROM). Personal Interview. 9 July 2008. 
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Table 3.12 Asociación de Cooperación Bolivia-España (ACOBE)176
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 2004: Mixed association 
of Bolivians and 
Spaniards came about in 
the Amnesty process 
• legal/documentation 
• psychological help 
• social workers 
• Belongs to Forums on all 
levels: National, Community 
and Municipal 
• Wants Immigration issue to be 
treated properly 
• Immigrant “voices” are heard 
• Thinks the immigrant vote is 
important and that a great deal 
of Latin Americans that 
received documentation 
during the Amnesty Bill of 
2005 are now applying for it. 
 
• Getting to know one 
another 
• Getting past the fear of 
something different 
 
• Most societies are 
perceived as similar: in 
Spain it is the same for 
everyone as it depends on 
who you get at the 
“ventanilla” and whether or 
not you carry with you the 
proper documentation. 
• The infrastructure is what it 
is and they assume a 5-
month wait for processing 
of renovations of residency 
cards. 
• Media and political 
discourse can have a 
negative effect 
• At the same time, 
Spaniards do make friends 
with immigrants even while 
“social alarm” exists 
• Thinks in near future 
its associates will have 
the vote as they 
naturalize in greater 
numbers. 
• “Normality” within the 
Spanish society 
 
Hypothesis: 
Since this organization was 
simply and recently created 
out of legal need, then it is 
more concentrated on 
offering services, not 
culturally based. 
The more politically involved in 
the forums and the younger this 
association is, makes it believe 
itself to be a representative 
“voice”—assumption of 
representation but they do not see 
the individual vote as 
unnecessary.  It is natural. 
Simply getting to know one’s 
surroundings is a result of the 
short period this association has 
been working for simple 
documentation.  Political 
involvement, paired with recent 
creation results in a simple 
definition of integration. 
Treatment here is considered to 
be understandable since the 
association has dealt with the 
same problems since its recent 
beginnings and sees them to be 
almost normal. 
While general treatment is 
considered to be good, 
“Normalization” here is 
also the goal. 
                                                 
176 Santiestevez, Paola. Asociación de Cooperación Bolivia-España (ACOBE). Personal Interview. 11 July 2008. 
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Table 3.13 Asociación de Inmigrantes Búlgaros en España (AIBE BALSAN)177
 
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 5 years ago got together 
principally for social 
reasons 
• motivation 
• legal/documentation 
• employment 
• permanent follow-up 
• weekend school for 
children 
• dance group 
• Spanish classes 
 
• Belongs to National 
Municipal Forums 
• Opinion is seen as 
important 
• Believes want to 
individually vote is a 
natural result, and choice, 
of an immigrant being part 
of the society 
 
• Adaptation 
• Getting to know one’s 
surroundings 
• Language is an extreme 
barrier 
• Culture exchange between 
neighbors 
i.e. sharing traditional 
dishes  
 
• There are discriminations 
but the same hold for 
Spaniards (does admit that 
physically Bulgarians blend 
in with native population) 
 
• There is no word in the 
future for the word 
“immigrant” 
• They will vote if they feel it 
comes naturally to them 
since they feel part of 
society 
 
Hypothesis: 
Since this organization was 
recently created simple 
services are offered out of 
need. 
The more recent this 
association this is, sees forums 
as positive venues of opinion. 
Since political rights, although 
limited, are present in the 
individual form, integration is 
simply an exchange with a 
discussion of rights and 
responsibilities. 
Feels that treatment is based 
upon one be treated well 
themselves. Thinks those that 
discriminate are being 
discriminated themselves and 
thus finds no difference 
between treatment of native 
and of Bulgarian population. 
Here there is a limited political 
participation and therefore 
integration becomes an 
individual endeavor of getting 
to know one another-not 
fighting for political rights. 
 
 
 
                                                 
177 Doseva, Katya. Asociación de Inmigrantes Búlgaros en España (AIBE BALSAN). Personal Interview. 15 July 2008. 
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Table 3.14 Asociación de Refugiados e Inmigrantes Peruanos (ARI-PERÚ)178
 
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: Individual vs. 
Collective Association 
Property: 
• 1993 began as a cultural 
organization 
i.e. trips to museums 
• In 1994 economic 
integration turned it into a 
more legally focused 
entity: offered asylum help 
to economic immigrants 
because it was a linger 
process that allowed 
immigrants to reside in the 
country while being 
processed. 
• study the reality of 
immigration 
• accompany the law-
making process 
 
• Has been part of all 
Forums 
“nosotros no somos 
españoles y siempre 
hemos intentado 
visibilizar esa 
diferencia” 
• Consultative body 
 
• Equilibrium 
• Circular movement 
• Equality of enjoyment 
of rights and liberties 
 
• Immigrants need 
geographic mobility and 
some do not have it. 
• Immigrants have less 
money, less time for a 
social life 
• Poor immigrants are 
“tolerated” 
“…la tolerancia no es 
bueno en la perspectiva de 
la igualdad” 
• The majority of Peruvians have 
dual nationality. 
“…pero no porque no quieren ser 
peruanos…porque tienen menos 
dificultades para convivir en el 
sentido de quitarse de encima todo 
el rollo de papel…se faculta el 
ejercicio de derechos.” 
• Associations are manipulated 
politically 
• There are a lot of new ones (80% 
in a study of Peruvian associations 
they have conducted) that offer no 
activities at all 
• Federation they have tried does 
work well 
• Peruvians are integrated and 
involved in general associations 
too. 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more services offered to fill 
the void and the more political 
involvement for this 
association. 
The more politically 
involved this association 
has been for relatively 
more time, has made its 
focus a  fight more for 
demands and rights.  
Since this association has 
been around longer and is 
politically active, then 
integration is more based 
upon the idea of equality 
and rights, not cultural. 
Treatment here is based upon 
the idea of lack of equal 
opportunity in society as a 
whole, not just said instances of 
difficulties. 
Even though this is a very politically 
involved association, it still comes 
down to individual voting, dual 
nationality, involvement in other 
associations and a realization that the 
associations have their limits.  
 
                                                 
178 Sanabria, Rosario. Asociación de Refugiados e Inmigrantes Peruanos (ARI-PERÚ). Personal Interview. 17 July 2008. 
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Table 3.15 América-España Solidaridad y Cooperación (AESCO)179
 
Category: Start, Evolution and Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 20 years ago started as an 
association to help in the area 
of Columbian refugees, but 
then turned to Latin-
American economic 
integration 
• legal/ documentation 
• programs for women, 
education, employment, 
mediators between 
employees and employers, 
formation 
• work with countries of origin 
to prevent “unordered 
immigration” (Colombia, 
Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia) 
• Networks within the 
immigrant community 
• Belongs to Forums on 
all levels: National 
Community and 
Municipal 
• see it as a sphere of 
participation in a 
moment where the 
immigrant is incapable 
of having one voice 
• Is adamant that the 
association represents 
itself, not immigrants as 
a while 
 
• Cycle dependent on the 
“biology of the person” 
•  Not assimilation/no 
ghettos/no ethnic focus 
• “Normalization” 
• Bi-directional 
• Access to society 
 
• Barriers to access of 
society: employment, 
housing and education 
• History of Spain is one of 
rejecting what is different
i.e. expulsion of moors 
and jews 
“el racismo sociológico 
también está 
institucionalizado” 
 
• Thinks all 
participation is 
important: 
immigrant and 
public associations 
BUT problem is that 
such participation is 
no fomented in 
Spanish society in 
general, thus making 
such participation 
difficult 
 
Hypothesis: 
Since this organization was 
recently created simple services 
are offered out of need. 
Since this association has 
been around quite a bit and 
has been politically active, 
there is a realization of its 
lack of its representation of 
the immigrant collective. 
There are a great deal of 
political rights here: possible 
dual nationality and political 
involvement through the years 
in forums and thus the 
discourse comes down to the 
idea of “Normalization”, not 
culturally based. 
Perception of treatment here 
is based upon an overall view 
of centuries of rejection and 
not at all based upon 
nowadays reality and 
therefore a pessimistic view 
of future. 
Here there is 
participation at all levels 
and it comes down to the 
individual again having 
access to the society as a 
whole. 
 
                                                 
179 Rois, Juan Carlos. América-España Solidaridad y Cooperación (AESCO). Personal Interview. 23 July 2008. 
 
Figure 3.2: Perception of Rights vs. Antiquity Immigrant Associations 
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Figure 3.3 Perception of Equal Treatment vs. Individual or 
Associative Representation 
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Figure 3.4 Perception of Equal Treatment vs. Definition of Integration 
Rights Perception 
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Figure 3.5 Collective Forum Participation Contentment vs.  
Individual or Associative Representation 
Participation level 
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Figure 3.6 Collective Forum Participation Contentment vs. Definition of Integration 
Participation level 
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Figure 3.7 Combination of Collective Forum Participation Contentment/ 
Perception of Equal Treatment  
vs. Definition of Integration 
Participation level 
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Figure 3.8 Combination of Collective Forum Participation Contentment/ 
Perception of Equal Treatment  
vs. Individual or Associative Representation 
Participation level 
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Table 3.16 Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)180
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1991 set a up a legal 
network but started to 
seriously work the issue 
in 1996 
• legal documentation 
• 1996 focus on 
employment and 
influence of legislation 
 
• Part of the National Forum 
since its beginnings 
• good form of participation 
• holds a privileged position 
on a permanent 
commission 
“una asociación de 
inmigrantes nunca va a 
tener el peso que puede 
tener un interlocutor 
social” 
• Equality of rights and 
respect same as a national 
or EU community worker= 
“Normalization” 
• Integration n all 
associations 
• Someday they will no 
longer be immigrants 
• Union is a mirror of 
society:  If everything goes 
well—everyone has a 
job—then everything is ok 
BUT if not, the weaker 
immigrant may be blamed 
• Associations represent 
their associates 
• Equal treatment of all 
workers 
• Do not go backwards in 
regard to EU Directives 
• less rights for immigrants 
makes them more 
vulnerable which is not 
good for them or the native 
worker when the cheapest 
worker is hired. 
“a largo plazo la igualdad 
de derecho es garantía de 
paz social” 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
 
                                                 
180 Roc, Pilar. Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). Personal Interview. 3 July 2008. 
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Table 3.17 Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE)181
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Always worked with it 
within the Social 
Security Department 
 
• Received a letter from the 
Ministry saying they had to 
name a representative for 
the National Forum 
• Thinks it to be a useful 
Forum that interests them 
•  “Normalization” 
• Proper documentation is in 
their interest strictly from 
an employment point of 
view they need workers to 
hire. 
• Immigration worries 
Spaniards: think they are 
collapsing the Social 
Security system, taking 
school places therefore 
there is a necessity for 
politicians to quell the 
public alarm 
• Sees participation of 
associations as active and 
positive 
• Normalization of workers 
in general so they are 
available for contract 
Hypothesis: Very straight forward need for labor—no hypothesis, only the commentary. 
 
Table 3.18 Asociación Comisión Católica Española de Migración (ACCEM)182
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant 
and Native Population 
Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: Individual vs. 
Collective Association 
Property: 
• 1996 seriously involved 
with immigrants 
• asylum 
• legal assistance 
• psychological 
• Spanish classes 
• women in vulnerability 
• housing 
 
• Part of the Forum since 
1996 
• Consultative body to 
express opinions 
• good participation: very 
active 
• Belonging to a 
community of neighbors 
-parent associations 
-participation 
-equal rights and 
responsibilities 
• Work conditions are 
worse 
• Nationality and gender 
discrimination 
• Housing 
• Political discourse 
dangerous: public 
perceptions that re not 
necessarily true 
• Fear of Recession 
• The vote is important but not the 
only participation. 
• Associations make immigration 
visible making its work a positive 
• Immigrant associations can be 
immature and compete for public 
resources but they are helping 
their collectives. 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
                                                 
181 De Mar, Maria. Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE). Personal Interview. 3 July 2008.  
 
182 Barbero, Enrique. Asociación Comisión Católica Española de Migración (ACCEM). Personal Interview. 4 July 2008. 
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Table 3.19 Cáritas Española 183
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Started to really be 
involved in 1986/87 
• Social advice, 
psychological, legal 
network, housing and 
employment 
• Three basic ascpects 
1.get immigrants in 
touch   
with friends and family 
2.employment 
3.housing 
• Part of the Forum and 
considers it to have a 
reactive focus, not a clear 
agenda for work 
• personal option 
• long process 
• feeling of belonging 
• recognition of value of 
one’s different culture 
• Media can be negative: talk 
of an “invasion” 
• At the same time, 
Spaniards generally get 
along with immigrant 
neighbors 
• In favor of immigrant 
associations to a certain 
degree 
• Immigrants should take 
part in all kinds of 
associations but it is 
difficult when the native 
population is not active 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
                                                 
183 Gutierrez, Augustín. Cáritas Española. Personal Interview. 9 July 2008. 
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Table 3.20 Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.)184
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Became involved in 
1988, after the 
Foreigner’s Law of 1985 
• Opened CITE (Centros 
de Información para 
Trabajadores 
Extranjeros) 
• Legal/Documentation 
• Everything to do with 
employment 
“Todo la dramática 
laboral que es apropiado 
de un sindicato” 
• All nationalities 
• Interesting Participation 
• Consultative body 
• Deficit in municipal 
participation 
• Recognition of equal 
treatment 
• Rights and Responsibilities 
 
• Not equal treatment 
• Fear and discrimination 
• Different opinions but there 
is a lack of information in 
the Media 
• Associations are part of 
democracy 
• The Union cannot be 
fractioned into pieces based 
upon nationality 
• The Unions and 
Associations are not 
incompatible 
• Immigrants should become 
part of society as citizens 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
                                                 
184 Jiménez, José Antonio. Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.). Personal Interview. 9 July 2008. 
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Table 3.21 Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL) 185
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Since 1994 dealing with 
economic immigration 
• isolated issues 
• legal/ documentation 
• Spanish classes 
• Women 
• Consultative body • Outright action in social 
and political circles 
 
• Media can be negative 
i.e.-meal tickets taken by 
immigrants when in reality 
only 13% in Madrid 
• earn less money 
• cannot get housing 
 
• Participation of any kind is 
necessary: anything they 
have access to 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
Table 3.22 Comisión Española para la Ayuda al Refugiado (CEAR) 186
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1979 created between 
Religious Organizations, 
Evangelistic Church, 
Muslim Community, 
Unions (/UGT CC.OO.), 
Human Rights 
Associations, and Political 
Parties (PP/PSOE/IU) 
• Went from legal help to 
employment and 
psychological help 
• Consultative body: originally 
more active but now more 
passive 
• There’s no model in Spain yet 
• Equal rights and 
Responsibilities 
• Intercultural: social 
transformation for Spain and 
for immigrants=reciprocal 
process 
• New Concept of Citizenship: 
Nationality is more where you 
live than where you were born 
• Extreme labor exploitation 
• Housing prices can form 
ghettos 
• Irresponsible attitude on part 
of the political parties 
• Media 
 
• Immigrant participation is 
small 
• Municipal vote reciprocity: 
difficult to execute 
• Immigrants should be part of 
schools, unions, neighborhood 
associations etc. 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the more 
need for services managed by 
organizations and financed by 
the state administration. 
                                                 
185 Sanchez, Enrique,  Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL). Personal Interview. 14 July 2008. 
 
186 Jiménez, José Antonio. Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.). Personal Interview. 9 July 2008. 
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Table 3.23 Cruz Roja 187
Category: Start, Evolution and Services in Immigration Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• Started in the 1960s 
dealing with refugees 
• 1991 started dealing with 
immigrants 
• Reception 
• Family/Friend network 
• Medical check-up 
• Employment (legal 
formation or send 
undocumented 
immigrants toward other 
work) 
• language 
• legal/documentation 
• get children signed up 
for school 
• Good participation in 
Forum in general 
• Exchange of cultures and 
knowledge 
• Mutual respect: both 
natives and immigrants 
• Part of all association: 
parent, neighborhood and 
volunteers 
• Learning experience 
because both parties want 
to. 
• Spain is not a xenophobic 
country in general 
• Problems such as school 
meal tickets should solved 
by increasing resources to 
match demand in general 
• Media and politicians can 
cause harm by speaking of 
an “invasion” 
 
• Should have right to vote as 
citizens so as to participate 
as individuals 
• Personal opinion is concept 
of citizenship as a 
permanent resident  
• allows for right to vote 
 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the 
more need for services 
managed by organizations 
and financed by the state 
administration. 
 
                                                 
187 De la Rocha, Maruxa. Cruz Roja Española. Personal Interview. 21 July 2008. 
 
228 
229 
Table 3.24 Ayuntamiento de Madrid, Dirección General de Inmigración y Cooperación al Desarrollo 188
Category: Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• 1990-95 quantity of 
immigration increased but 
2000-06 constituted the 
biggest quantity 
• Social services incremented 
along with increment of 
immigrants 
• Reception and Welcome for 
vulnerable populations 
especially sub-Saharan and 
Bulgarian gypsies 
• All services are principally 
managed by the Red Cross, 
CEAR and ACCEM 
• Recent Forum has brought 
together native neighbors and 
immigrants: undocumented 
immigrants and minors and 
while recent shows great 
promise 
 
• Madrid has a very specific 
model 
• Between French and Anglo-
Saxon models: Intercultural 
• New neighbors and old 
neighbors 
• Respect of rights  
• Conservation of culture 
•  “Convivencia” coexistence 
 
• Reaction to recession a fear 
but thinks madrileños are 
welcoming in general because 
they are form other areas 
themselves 
• Slowness in renewing resident 
permits is a national level but 
says that administration needs 
time to catch up (compares it 
to a big elephant) 
• View on municipal vote is 
non-existent since it is a 
national decision 
• Naturalization is important 
• Relation neighbor to neighbor 
is important 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the more 
services offered  and managed by 
private organizations. 
 
Table 3.25 Comunidad de Madrid 189
Category: Services Political Voice Definition of Integration 
Generalized Perception of 
Treatment of Immigrant and 
Native Population Opinion 
Immigrant’s Future: 
Individual vs. Collective 
Association 
Property: 
• All services are principally 
managed by the Red Cross, 
CEAR and ACCEM 
• Financial intermediary 
between the National level and 
Municipal levels: municipal 
projects are analyzed and 
subsidies are handed out 
• Community Forum works with 
representation of the 
immigrant associative 
movement: immigrant 
associations are only one via 
of participation 
(neighborhood, parent and city 
halls) 
 
• Bi-directional: development of 
society and immigrant 
• Adaptation of basic values of 
community 
• Contribution to its progress 
• Long process 
• Citizen like any other 
• ”Normalization” 
 
• Recession is a fear. 
Discriminations could come 
about 
• Media talks of an invasion, 
criminality when prisons are 
full of natives, not immigrants 
• Participation in all spheres, not 
just immigrant associations 
• Associations have become 
politicized because of 
Foreigner’s Law 
• Associations want to speak in 
name off all immigrants but 
they are not representative 
•  “Normalization” as any 
citizen 
Hypothesis: 
The more immigration, the more 
services offered  and managed by 
private organizations. 
                                                 
188 Moreno Lopez, Gregorio.  Ayuntamiento de Madrid, Dirección General de Inmigración y Cooperación al Desarrollo. Personal Interview. 15 July 2008. 
189 Tshitshi, Kayamba. Comunidad de Madrid. Personal Interview. 16 July 2008. 
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